CRIMINAL DIVISION
Strand London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
MRS JUSTICE SIMLER DBE
HIS HONOUR JUDGE BEVAN QC
(Sitting as a Judge of the CACD)
REFERENCE BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL UNDER
S.36 OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1988
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ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S REFERENCE NO 28 OF 2014 |
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Mr N Edwards appeared on behalf of the Offender
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"(2) Notwithstanding its revocation by paragraph (1), the 2007 Order continues to apply, and Articles 2 to 6 of this Order do not apply, where after the coming into force of this Order a court deals with a person for—
(a) a single offence committed before 1st October 2012; or.
(b) more than one offence, at least one of which was committed before 1st October 2012."
It will be seen that the statutory instrument does not deal with the situation where an offence straddles the date of 1st October 2012. There are two counts on the indictment. Count 2 was committed on 19th October 2012 and so falls out of consideration. Count 1, conspiracy to breach immigration control, is stated to have been committed between 10th April 2007 and 19th October 2012. It appears from the judge's remarks that she was satisfied on the facts that this appellant was involved throughout the whole period of the conspiracy. Whilst one view might be to apply the approach of this court in R v Harries and others [2008] 1 Cr.App.R (S) 47 and treat the applicant as having committed the offence after 1st October 2012, because some of the conduct within the conspiracy took place after that date, it seems to us necessary in fairness to apply the approach adopted by Leveson LJ in Bailey where at paragraph 5 he said by analogy to Harries:
"... in relation to the victim surcharge, without taking undue time, the court should take a view on the evidence so that the appropriate order can be made; in the absence of a clear answer, lengthy analysis is utterly unnecessary and the issue should be resolved in the way least punitive to the offender."
It seems to us that since the overwhelming majority of the conduct in relation to count 1 took place prior to 1st October 2012 and since paragraph 7(2) of the statutory instrument has not been drafted with clarity in relation to the situation now before the court, we should follow the guidance of Bailey and deal with the matter in the way least punitive to the offender. This will also follow the approach of this court in the recent decision of Poole.