CRIMINAL DIVISION
Strand London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
MR JUSTICE KEITH
MR JUSTICE LEWIS
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R E G I N A | ||
v | ||
WARREN LAING | ||
DAMIAN LOUGHMAN |
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Mr D Thomas appeared on behalf of Loughman
Miss S Whitehouse appeared on behalf of the Crown
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Crown Copyright ©
i. "DC Tyrer (OIC) informs Garfield Johnson that Warren Laing (Bob) was responsible for the assault on him. 'It was clear that Johnson was in complete shock when told it was Bob. Johnson stated that he had known Bob for a long time, he also stated that he knew Bob's father who is also a music promoter named 'Chips' Johnson. Stated he had no beef with Bob and he couldn't believe this. He said that he had seen Bob on Saturday night outside the local Premier store.'"
i. "3.12 Whenever:
ii. ...
iii. (ii) there is a witness available, who expresses an ability to identify the suspect, or where there is a reasonable chance of the witness being able to do so, and they have not been given an opportunity to identify the suspect in any of the procedures set out in paragraphs 3.5 to 3.10 and the suspect disputes being the person the witness claims to have seen, an identification procedure shall be held unless it is not practicable or it would serve no
iv. Useful purpose in proving or disproving whether the suspect was involved in committing the offence..."
i. "8. The evidence of DC Tyrer was not wholly clear about when he had first learned of Johnson's inability to make an identification; he testified that it was on 6th January but the statement he took from Johnson on 13th March suggested an earlier date. What is clear to me is that by 6th January he was aware that (for whatever reason) Johnson would be unable to make any identification. DC Tyrer explained that once it had been resolved with DS Cowan that Johnson would not do a VIPER, he used the conversation on 6th January to flush out any possible motive; he was interested in Johnson's reaction but nothing surfaced apart from surprise."
i. "Q. Did you at any stage see that man's face?
B. No, sir ... "
i. "Q. So was it Warren Laing who punched you?
A. No, sir.
ii. Q. Are you sure it wasn't him?
A. No, sir, no.
iii. Q. You are not sure it's not him?
A. It's not Warren Laing punch me.
iv. Q. Right and how can you say that if you did not see his face?
A. Because what happen I know Warren Laing good, so if I see Warren Laing face I would know exactly as he punch me.
v. Q. Yes, but this man who punched you, did you see his face?
A. No, sir, that's what I'm said, no.
vi. Q. Right, so I am asking you, can you say it wasn't Warren Laing?
A. It wasn't Warren Laing.
vii. Q. Right, and how can you say that if you didn't see his face?
A. Because I know him, so it definitely weren't him, Warren Laing know me, I know Warren Laing so if it were Warren Laing punched me, if Warren Laing walk in the shop I could say Warren Laing punched me."
i. "Q. When you say you didn't know them [ie all three men], is [it] that you didn't recognise them or you didn't see their faces?
A. I didn't know them, I didn't see their faces, and I didn't know them. If I know them I would have said I know them."
i. "If you thought that Mr Garfield Johnson was exonerating the defendant Laing and doing so honestly and reliably that would undermine Mr Carter's identification. But whether it does so or not is a matter for you because you are the judges of the facts."
i. "To summarise ... that evidence has some contradictory features and may be somewhat confusing but it is said to undermine ... the reliability of Mr Carter's identification and so you should give it full and proper consideration."
i. " ...the jury should ordinarily be told that an identification parade enables a suspect to put the reliability of an eye-witness's identification to the test, that the suspect has lost the benefit of that safeguard and that the jury should take account of that fact in its assessment of the whole case, giving it such weight as it thinks fair. In cases where there has been an identification parade with the consent of the suspect, and the eye-witness has identified the suspect, in circumstances involving no breach of the code, the trial judge will ordinarily tell the jury that they can view the identification at the parade as strengthening the prosecution case but may also wish to alert the jury to the possible risk that the eye-witness may have identified not the culprit who committed the crime but the suspect identified by the same witness on the earlier occasion."
i. "74. This in our judgment was a misdirection. It was not a question of whether it were desirable to hold a parade, rather there existed a positive obligation to hold one. Otherwise, once there was one positive identification the police could avoid the risk of another witness failing to make a positive identification, thus undermining their case. The judge's summing-up may have given the impression that the failure to hold an ID procedure was of little consequence whereas he should have given a full Forbes direction."
i. "75 ... Be that as it may, the consequential question is the effect on the safety of the conviction of the absence in the summing-up of mention of the breaches of the Code. That counsel for Gojra had addressed the jury on it is no answer - Gojra was entitled to the imprimatur of the court. The jury should have been told of the protection extended to a suspect by the statutory scheme. There should have been set out a reasoned path through the provisions so as to put in context the possible prejudice to Gojra as a consequence of the breach. The process did not need to be complex or wordy but it did need to be clear and unequivocal. Such guidance might have affected the jury's approach to its task and we are persuaded that on this Ground Gojra must succeed ..."
i. "Now if you were sure of those two things, that there was a case calling for an explanation, and secondly, that the only sensible inference is that the defendants have none, then you could take it as some evidence of guilt."