England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2A 2LL
		21 September 2010

1. LORD JUSTICE LEVESON: On 12 February 2010, in the Crown Court at Southwark, following a trial lasting some six weeks before HHJ Loraine-Smith, Mark Bohannan ("the offender") was convicted of conspiracy to commit misconduct in public office. On 12 March 2010, he was sentenced to a term of three years' imprisonment. Her Majesty's Attorney General now seeks to refer the sentence to this court as unduly lenient pursuant to the provisions of section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. We grant leave.
2. In short, the offender, who is now 47 years of age, was a serving police officer in the Metropolitan Police Service Territorial Support Group with the rank of Constable and the role of Field Intelligence Officer.
3. In his capacity as a police officer he received and had access to intelligence, the details of ongoing police operations and the personal details of private citizens. In particular, he had access to confidential and sensitive material held upon computer systems available to police officers for use in the course of their duties. Syed Imtiaz Ahmed ("Ahmed") was the principal of a drug dealing organisation responsible for the sale of cocaine, ecstasy and cannabis. The organisation had been operating in South London from at least 2001. Ahmed supplied cocaine to Denise Bohannan, the wife of the offender. Denise Bohannan was a long-term user of cocaine.
4. From 2002 the offender provided assistance to Ahmed in respect of his drug-dealing activities. He regularly supplied both sensitive and confidential information held by the police in respect of intelligence, police operations and the confidential details of private citizens in whom Ahmed and his associates had an interest. The information was usually provided via Denise Bohannan to Ahmed, from whom she received cocaine without payment. The information allowed the extensive and highly lucrative drug dealing of Ahmed to flourish and go unchecked and unpunished for a period of five to six years. In particular, and of special significance, the information included tipping off Ahmed in respect of an impending search at an address occupied by a dealer employed by him and the identification of areas in the locality in which police operations were in existence. The information provided was in order that such areas could be avoided by Ahmed and his associates, thereby reducing the risk of detection.
5. The facility provided by the offender also enabled Ahmed and his associates to gain access to intelligence and information held by police in respect of suspected criminal activity. By this facility Ahmed and his associates could gage whether their own criminal activity was at risk of detection or compromise. In addition, the material disclosed concerned the personal details of individuals in respect of whom Ahmed or his associates wished to locate for their own purposes, or because they were concerned about their identity as a possible informants or stooges.
6. In addition to the supply of cocaine to Denise Bohannan, on one occasion Ahmed made a cash payment to the offender in the sum of approximately £200 in return for services. He also left occasional sums of money on the kitchen table. In all between August 2002 and 2007 some 471 checks were carried out by the offender on behalf of Ahmed and his associates.
7. We add some further details at this stage. Prior to the commencement of the trial the offender offered to plead guilty and did plead guilty to a lesser alternative allegation of misconduct in public office on the basis that he had not conspired with Ahmed, but only acted at the behest of his wife. That plea was not accepted and the lengthy trial ensued. At the same trial the offender's wife was similarly convicted of conspiracy to commit misconduct in public office and she was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment.
8. Having entered into an agreement under section 73 of the Serious and Organised Crime Police Act 2004, Ahmed had previously pleaded guilty to conspiracy to supply drugs of Class A and Class C, and conspiracy to commit misconduct in public office. He gave evidence in the trial that followed in accordance with that agreement, and was sentenced to four years' imprisonment for the drugs conspiracies and two years' imprisonment concurrent for conspiracy to commit misconduct in public office, that is to say, his involvement in the conspiracy with the offender to obtain confidential and sensitive details from the offender in breach of his public duty.
9. The factual basis of the convictions are outlined in the reference in detail, although Mr Bromley-Martin QC for the offender contends that they put the Crown's case at its highest and do not necessarily reflect the findings of fact of the learned judge. We have examined his criticisms with care and recognise that a number of the facts upon which Mr Wright QC for the Attorney General relies are implicit rather than explicit within the judge's sentencing remarks, with perhaps one or two exceptions which we have modified accordingly. It is sufficient to say that we do not consider that, within the reference that we have seen, Mr Wright has unfairly characterised the factual basis upon which the offender fell to be sentenced. Having said that, it is necessary to set out these facts in some detail.
10. As we have recounted, the offender was a police officer undertaking the role of Field Intelligence Officer for Team 4 of the Territorial Support Group 4 based at Catford Police Station. Denise, his wife, had been a user of cocaine since the 1990s and Ahmed supplied her with drugs. Denise Bohannan's daughter (the stepdaughter of the offender) was in a relationship with a man named Richmond, who himself was connected to Ahmed and similarly engaged in the drugs trade. Since at least 2002 Ahmed had been heavily engaged in the supply of Class A and C controlled drugs. He employed runners and street dealers to supply drugs to users. It was an extensive network and highly lucrative. He obtained his drugs through an organised criminal gang.
11. Richmond was engaged by Ahmed as a dealer. On occasions runners or recipients of drugs would fail to account for monies received in respect of the sale of drugs, or run up a debt. Ahmed used the facility provided by the offender, whether through his wife or otherwise, to trace defaulters via confidential information held on police computer in respect of themselves, members of their family or associates. Such information was given without any regard for the potential consequences to those whose details were provided in this way.
12. In addition, the offender provided information to Ahmed and for onward transmission to his drug suppliers in respect of intelligence held upon them and others, and in order to protect them from detection. Examples of this conduct include the interrogation of computer indices in order to enquire whether a particular individual was or was not the target of a police operation, and whether individuals may on arrest or as informants have provided any information that could lead to the disruption or detection of the drug dealing business of Ahmed and his associates or suppliers. Ahmed visited the home address of the offender on occasions when information was supplied to him, either by the offender or his wife.
13. A number of specific instances of the offender's conduct that reflect the range of his activity ought to be provided. Thus in August 2002 John Payne was a user of drugs supplied by Ahmed. Payne was in debt to Ahmed. The offender provided Ahmed with details held on the police national computer in respect of Payne in order that Ahmed could find him and enforce the debt.
14. After they arrested the offender a police issue kitbag seized from Catford Traffic Garage contained a document that was a printout of the Police National Computer record of Payne, together with personal details and addresses. The document bore the fingerprints of the offender, Denise Boltzmann and Ahmed. In the same period the offender interrogated police computers in order to obtain further details in respect of the Payne and his whereabouts, including the home of Payne's mother. As a consequence Ahmed caused a visit to be made to her address in the search as to the whereabouts of Payne.
15. Secondly, also in August 2002 the offender searched police computers on behalf of Ahmed in respect of Tony Famurewa and Levi Wales, associates of Ahmed who had been stopped by the police in the vicinity of Ahmed's home address. The purpose of the search was to establish what, if any, information was known by the police concerning Famurewa and Wales and the drug dealing activities of Ahmed.
16. A third example occurred in 2003. Dawn Dodd was employed on a temporary basis at an estate agency owned and run by Ahmed. The offender was tasked with interrogating police national computers in respect of her identity. Ahmed was concerned that she could be an undercover police officer. The interrogation of police records and personal details also included addresses of members of Dodd's family.
17. Donald Stainer was an associate of Ahmed and involved in drug dealing with Philip Filugelli, the supplier of Ahmed and a senior member of an organised criminal gang. At the behest of Filugelli, Ahmed caused checks to be made upon Stainer, including intelligence and any information as to his potential status. Intelligence reports were viewed and Stainer's address provided.
18. In July 2004 Joseph Poole, who was also an associate of Ahmed, was the subject of a search by the offender in respect of any intelligence. That search was made when Ahmed requested checks to be done on behalf of his friend.
19. Anthony Bury was also a drugs associate of Ahmed and engaged in Ahmed's estate agency business. In the spring of 2004 the two men had undertaken a business trip to Spain during which Ahmed had lost a briefcase. Ahmed was suspicious of Berry. Moreover, Berry claimed to have lost a considerable amount of drugs for which Filugelli held Ahmed responsible. Berry claimed that these had been taken from him by force, although Ahmed doubted his explanation. Berry disappeared and Ahmed and his associates wished to find him. The offender provided details to Ahmed in respect of Berry. They included the address of Berry's mother, sister and former girlfriend, Jade Ost. In addition to the details provided in respect of Berry, his relatives and girlfriend, the offender also provided details of five known associates of Berry.
20. In fact, although it is not suggested that there is any link to the offender's misconduct in August of that year, Ost was at home when two men burst in wearing hoods or balaclavas and carrying a firearm. Berry was present at the flat and left via a window with the men in pursuit, since which date Ost has not seen Berry. Suffice to say, although this attack was not linked to the offender it is a good illustration of the type of activity likely to result when drugs suppliers fall out.
21. In mid-July 2004 a stop check was made on one of Ahmed's "runners" called Andrew Crutchley. In the weeks that followed the offender conducted criminal intelligence searches on Crutchley on behalf of Ahmed. On 12 November 2004, Crutchley was arrested, together with others, whilst in a vehicle and in possession of cocaine. Within minutes of the stop the offender called one of the officers responsible for the arrest in order to make inquires of him. Later Ahmed and the offender were in telephone contact. The concern of Ahmed was in respect of any possible compromise of his drug dealing business. A subsequent search of Crutchley's home by police officers may well have been compromised as a consequence of the fact of the arrest being reported to Ahmed.
22. In June 2005 Stephen Moore and George Marquiss were arrested in possession of three kilograms of cocaine and 15,000 ecstasy tablets. Six days later the offender performed a series of intelligence searches in respect of these events and any link with Filugelli or Ahmed. Of particular interest was an individual called Scott Linegar, with whom Filugelli had had a dispute. It was suspected that Linegar was an informant. The searches performed by the offender on 29 June 2005 included the details of Linegar and another, Richard Copstick.
23. Three days later the offender searched all reports put on the system by the Custody Sergeant responsible for charging Moore and Marquiss in an attempt to trace back the source of the information leading to the arrest. The offender met with Ahmed in return for payment and informed Ahmed of the product of his searches, including that there was no information that Linegar was an informant.
24. In November 2005 a search warrant was executed at an address, 81A Barnehurst Road, used by a man, Lee Dixon, who was a dealer in cocaine on behalf of Ahmed. The warrant was executed by officers from the offender's unit and in which the offender was involved. Of particular gravity, in advance of the raid the offender tipped off Ahmed that the raid was about to take place. Prior to the raid taking place, therefore, Ahmed and Dixon removed a stash of Class A drugs from the premises, and, when it occurred, only a small amount of cannabis was seized.
25. In June 2006 Lance Dixon, the brother of Lee Dixon, was engaged in the sale of drugs on behalf of Filugelli and through Ahmed. In late January 2006 he disappeared from the area owing drugs and money to his suppliers. The offender interrogated police computers in an effort to trace him.
26. In February 2006 the police were involved in a chase with a vehicle linked to Richmond, the partner of the offender's stepdaughter and the drug dealing associate of Ahmed. The offender interrogated the police computer system in order to ascertain what intelligence there may be, and as to whether Richmond was at risk of detection. The inquiries were made at the behest of Ahmed.
27. In the autumn of 2006 Daniel Azzopardi, a drugs "runner" for Ahmed, was arrested in possession of approximately half a kilogram of cocaine and 4,000 ecstasy tablets. At the behest of Ahmed, the offender interrogated police computers in order to discover what, if any, information Ahmed had provided to the police whilst in custody. The searches also included the details held in respect of those arrested in company with Azzopardi.
28. In January 2007 an incident occurred involving a Range Rover that was involved in a road traffic accident in which the driver was apparently drunk and the vehicle was later reported as stolen. The Range Rover was driven by an associate of Ahmed. At the request of Ahmed police computers were interrogated in order to ascertain what details were known. The offender performed the checks requested of him.
29. In addition other requests were made of the offender to perform tasks on behalf of Ahmed arising from his business interests or personal affairs. Gary Denny was a club promoter who was in debt to Ahmed. The offender was asked to interrogate the system in order to locate Denny. Further, in June 2006 Ahmed feared he may be kidnapped. An associate of Ahmed, Nigel Dick, was the subject of a kidnapping. On the same date vehicles had attended outside the home address of Ahmed. At the request of Ahmed checks were performed upon the details of the vehicles held on the national computer.
30. A search of the offender's home, on 10 May 2007, revealed a piece of paper in his handwriting containing the entry "new drugs line for cocaine after Nigel's kidnapping", together with the registration number and the entry "Nigel works for Taz". The entries are consistent with the enquiries made on behalf of Ahmed, together with efforts made by Ahmed to change his contact details in the aftermath of the kidnapping.
31. In the period from mid January 2007 to May 2007 an audio probe was installed in Ahmed's vehicle. That probe led to the arrest of Martin Obanya on 28 March 2007. He was a long-time associate of Ahmed and was also involved in dealing in drugs. He met with Ahmed at the Holiday Inn Hotel in Bexleyheath. At the meeting Adam Cornhill, Ali Sadrettin, and John 'Lips' Andrews, who was similarly associated with Ahmed's drugs enterprise, were also present. During the meeting a search warrant was executed at Obanaya's home address. Obanya became aware of the search whilst at the Holiday Inn and told Ahmed about it. Ahmed offered to find out information about the incident. Later he was recorded on the probe explaining to Obanya that he got himself "checked out all the time". In an unrelated conversation Ahmed was heard to say to another "Don't worry... I've got a pal in the thingy. I'm gonna find out, but ... if it was anything major they would have said "Taz" yeah?" (Taz being the nickname of Ahmed). The conversation was to reassure the person, to whom he was speaking, that a recent raid upon an address of a "runner" employed by Ahmed was not a cause for concern and had arisen by reason of routine enquiry, as opposed to intelligence, that was at risk of compromising the operation. Later that day Obanya and a man named Danny Martin were arrested. After his release Obanya informed Ahmed that the police had asked him questions about Taz but that he had said nothing.
32. On 5 April 2007, the offender searched the name "Taz" on the computerised criminal intelligence system held by the police. He also printed out details held on the same system in respect of Obanya and Martin. The printouts were later found in his kitbag at Catford Garage. The research had been conducted at the request of Ahmed in order to establish whether Obanya was telling the truth that he had not implicated Ahmed.
33. This was not the first time that intelligence held on Obanya had been researched by the offender on behalf of Ahmed. On several occasions since January 2003 the offender had conducted similar searches and made handwritten notes about Obanya. When the bag at Catford Garage was searched two pages of handwritten notes in respect of Obanya were found. Within days Ahmed was overheard informing another present with him in his vehicle that his "Old Bill friend", who checked him on every week, had provided him with up-to-date information, including that he sold cocaine and cannabis to Obanya.
34. On 2 May 2007, Ahmed was recorded asking Scott Gunn, a drugs "runner" of his for the spelling of his surname so that he could "run a check". Similar research was conducted into a "runner" of Ahmed's named Ali Sadrettin. Test purchase operations were run against Sadrettin in late 2006 and in March to late 2007. Mr Bromley-Martin makes the point that these test purchase operations were in fact promulgated by the offender and were evidence of his attempts to seek to undermine Ahmed's criminal activities.
35. On 25 April 2007, Inspector Earle sent an email to officers at Bexley Police Station requesting that Sadrettin not be approached, so that the Territorial Support Group could work up a test purchase operation on him. The inspector copied the offender into the email as the senior intelligence officer within that group. A response was received from Bexley assenting to the request. The response was forwarded to the offender. A copy of the email was found in his kitbag at Catford Garage, which we apprehend is the same kitbag upon which all the other documents that had been related to the offender's improper searches on behalf of Ahmed were also found.
36. Two days later the offender went to see the relevant officer at Bexley Police Station with a view to approving its content. By this conduct Sadrettin's vulnerability to detection was capable of being managed through the offender, thereby potentially reducing the risk should he choose to inform Ahmed of his being arrested by other officers or any other operation.
37. On 9 May 2007, three of Ahmed's associates, Adam Cornhill, Scott Gunn and Cliff Hook, met in a car park in order to hand over Ahmed's drugs from Gunn to Hooke with Cornhill supervising the handover. The men were arrested in possession of 250 grams of cocaine, 80 wraps of cocaine and 250 ecstasy tablets, the drugs having a value of £15,000. On 10 May, the following day, the offender who was off work sick went to the police station and conducted checks on the police computer in respect of the arrest. He printed copy details and these documents were found on his coffee table. Ahmed had tasked the offender to search whether the arrests may have compromised him.
38. Ahmed was arrested on the evening of 10 May as he was making preparations to leave the country. The offender and his wife were arrested on the same evening.
39. In interview the offender gave a prepared statement and denied any offence. He stated that his conduct was designed to target Ahmed rather than to shield him, and also target the "runners" of Ahmed in order to seek to get his wife off the drugs supplied to her by Ahmed, or to monitor their movements with a view to them being detected. He was later interviewed on 12 July 2007.
40. After the statement had been taken from Ahmed, the offender was re-arrested and on 8 May 2008 asked about its content. He denied any corrupt relationship and stated that the receipt of £300 in cash from him was in respect of a deposit on a flat, as opposed to any criminal activity. It is significant to underline the contents of his prepared statement constituted his defence to the conspiracy, which was tried before the jury and of which he was convicted.
41. At the sentence hearing which followed this conviction, the prosecution summarised the offending in the following way:

(i) Ahmed was made aware of what information was held on him by the police;

(ii) he was able to discover what police knew about associates of his in the drugs business (eg Filugelli) - this was both a general and specific nature (eg Famurewa). In evidence Ahmed indicated that these enquiries would either be at his immediate request (eg Famurewa), or at the request of other substantial dealers who were aware that he had a police source (eg Filugelli);

(iii) Ahmed was able to make inquiries about acquaintances of his outside of his drugs business (eg the Range Rover incident).

(iv) he was able to make enquiries as to whether the police were actively searching for particular individuals, including Ahmed himself;

(v) he was told which areas that the Territorial Support Group would be concentrating upon, hence which areas to avoid;

(vi) he was told when a search warrant was to be executed for his runner's property where drugs were stored;

(vii) he was able to make enquiries as to the reasons for arrests, and whether individuals within the drugs fraternity were giving information to the police (eg arrests of Moore and Marquiss);

(viii) he was able to enquire as to whether "runners" of his who had been arrested a day after had given the police information about his activities (eg Azzopardi);

(ix) he was able to make enquiries into those he came into contact with, to ensure they were not undercover police officers, thereby infringing their privacy (eg Dodd);

(x) he was able to trace addresses of those who owed him substantial sums of money, or had drugs but had chosen to disappear, or members of their families (eg Payne and Berry). The judge expressly adopted this analysis.

42. Mr Wright QC identifies a number of aggravating features of this offender's criminality. To a certain extent they overlap, but we accept that they are worth listing individually in these terms:

(i) a gross breach of trust;

(ii) prolonged and repeated nature of the offending;

(iii) the passing of information in a corrupt relationship between a police officer and a known criminal;

(iv) offending for gain whether in the form of cash or drugs; (v) the use to which the information was put by a known criminal in the commission of crime or the avoidance of detection, a use that was knowingly facilitated by the offender;

(vi) the risk of harm to the public;

(vi) the offender knowingly risked compromising Police activities designed to combat crime;

(viii) the offender involved knowingly "tipping off" a criminal and deliberate compromise of a police operation;

(ix) the disclosure of confidential information held by the police in respect of members of the public.

43. Mr Wright accepts that mitigating the offender's criminality are the years of his exemplary service prior to entering into the relationship, which forms the basis of his indictment, or, in other words, the offender's positive good character. Secondly, Mr Wright accepts that the principal reason for the offending was the domineering influence which Denise, his wife, had over the offender and her wish to be supplied with cocaine, with which wish he complied by supplying the information as requested.
44. Mr Bromley-Martin QC criticises this list and adds that the words of Ahmed in evidence that the execution of the conspiracy was "90% her and 10% him". With respect, that misses the point: contact with Ahmed may or may not have been "90% her and 10% him", but the very essence of this offending was the offender's breach of his public duty. To that extent, the offence was "100 per cent him" for it could not have been committed had he not been prepared to abandon his duty in so cavalier and criminal a fashion.
45. Mr Bromley-Martin also asserts that there was no appreciable benefit to the offender. If by that is meant cash reward, the assertion is accurate. Providing his wife with what she required was, however, precisely the benefit that he obtained: the learned judge observed that having watched husband and wife during the trial, he had concluded that the offender did whatever he thought his wife wanted him to do whatever the reason.
46. Mr Bromley-Martin also pursues as mitigation the fact that during the conspiracy the offender, paradoxically, was also working to arrest Ahmed and his associates. He made that point before the judge during the course of argument, and the judge observed that he did not see it like that: he considered that the offender had no alternative to take the steps that he took adverse to the interests of Ahmed. As Judge Loraine-Smith put it:

"He knew the forces were going to close on Ahmed at some stage; he had to be seen to be doing something".

In that regard, he observed that the offender's reaction to arrest was an absolute denial. When passing sentence, the judge put the point in this way:

"It is suggested on your behalf that part of you wanted Ahmed to be brought to justice, and there is no doubt that some of the actions you took were very curious, but Ahmed was always there to be brought to justice, yet there you were helping him, right up to the time of his arrest."

Whether or not the offender took the occasional step adverse to Ahmed's interests does little to mitigate the gravity of his five years offending.

47. The final feature of mitigation, which Mr Bromley-Martin suggests, is the effect of a prison sentence for a former police officer. With respect, that is not mitigation of any sort. This offence can only be committed by a public servant such as a police officer. The only value of the point is the recognition that serving any custodial sentence may well bear down more on a former police officer, although the report from the prison service that we have received does not suggest any difficulty in that direction. On the contrary, it speaks of him getting on well with most of the people in the unit on which he is serving, saying that he believes that being in custody has had a positive effect upon him and changed him for the better.
48. With that lengthy analysis of the facts, we turn to the appropriate sentence. It is, of course, trite to say that misconduct in public office can be committed in remarkably varied circumstances. The gravity of the offence will equally vary enormously, save only that the guiding principle throughout the cases is that serving police officers are permitted access to police computer records which are always confidential, and may be sensitive, only for the purpose of fulfilling their responsibilities to serve the public and never for personal use. Their misuse in any way is always very serious with the result that whatever the harm in fact caused, a deterrent sentence is both appropriate and inevitable.
49. Thus in R V Kassim [2006] 1 Cr App R(S) 12, in a court presided over by Rose LJ, then Vice President of the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, it was observed:

"It seems to us that, especially nowadays, the preservation of the integrity of information regarding members of the public held on data bases like those maintained by the police is of fundamental importance to the wellbeing of society. Any abuse of that integrity by officials, including the police, is a gross breach of trust which, unless the wrongdoing is really minimal, will necessarily be met by a severe punishment, even in the face of substantial mitigation."

Those principles were adopted in Attorney General's Reference (No 1 of 2007) [2007] 2 Cr App R(S) 86 at page 544 by Lord Phillips CJ:

"The seriousness of the offence left no proper alternative to this course. Further, this is one of those offences where it is realistic to include a deterrent element in a sentence. Accessing police computer information for an improper purpose is an offence that involves deliberation. It must be quite clear to police officers that if they commit this offence they risk dire consequences."

In Attorney General's Reference (No 68 of 2009) (R v Turner) [2009] EWCA Crim 2219, Lord Judge CJ made the same point. Having cited the two previous decisions, he went on (at paragraph 30):

"We respectfully adopt that approach to the sentencing decision which we have to make in the light of the argument that this was an unduly lenient sentence. We remind sentencing judges that the principle of deterrence in this type of case is crucial."

50. An illustration of the potential breadth of this offence is evident from an analysis of some of the decisions of this court, but it is only necessary to focus on those cases which may bear some similarity to the present. Thus, in R v Keyte [1998] 2 Cr App 165, this Court upheld a sentence of two years' imprisonment imposed after a trial on a police officer, who had on 192 occasions made unauthorised entries of a police national computer in order to supply information to a private investigation agency. The sums of money obtained were "not particularly large", and there was no suggestion of police operations being either compromised or affected.
51. In R v O'Leary [2007] 2 Cr App R (S) 51, three and a half years' imprisonment was upheld following a guilty plea to six counts of misconduct consisting of passing information to a former police officer who had contacts with criminals; again, no police operations were prejudiced and the course of justice not perverted.
52. In Kassim (supra), which was cited in O'Leary, the appellant police officer had met Dr A, a diplomat employed by the Saudi Arabian embassy, through the school where both of their children had been pupils. They initially established a friendship. Later, some time in the latter part of 2000, Dr A asked the appellant to undertake some research and enquiries on his behalf so as to obtain personal information about certain private individuals, mainly of Middle Eastern origin. The appellant understood that the enquiries would be to verify charitable requests made to the Saudi Embassy. The appellant did in fact make a number of enquiries of this nature.
53. He also made other enquires on behalf of Dr A, without it being explained to him why Dr A was seeking information. This continued for about three years. In return for some of the enquiries the appellant received cash payments at the discretion of Dr A; the Crown estimated the sum involved to be in the order of £14,000. Shortly in advance of the trial, but so that witnesses could be cancelled, a plea of guilty was notified.
54. A sentence of two-and-a-half years' imprisonment with a short concurrent sentence for possession of a CS canister was considered severe but not disproportionate to the prolonged course of offending for monetary gain. It is not irrelevant that allowing for a small discount for the late plea, that sentence is the same as that imposed in this case yet the period of offending was far less, and there was no impact on police operations.
55. For an example which does involve the latter, it is appropriate to turn to R v Gellion [2006] EWCA Crim 281, [2006] 2 Cr App R (S) 69 which concerned two counts of misconduct in public office and possession of ammunition (for which a consecutive sentence was imposed and about which we need say no more). Following an armed robbery involving theft of £7,000, an intelligence officer learnt that a Fiat motor car, which was registered to a man he knew, appeared to be connected to the robbery; he further learnt that a package was being prepared with a view to possible surveillance upon this man's address. He alerted the suspect by telephone.
56. The Fiat was later found burnt out and reported as having being stolen. The officer also conducted a PNC check on the Fiat whilst logged on in his own name, but purporting to make the enquiry on behalf of another. Suspicion fell upon the officer and a sting operation resulted in his arrest. On interview, he admitted what he had done saying that he knew the suspect's wife had been ill and felt sorry for him. He said he had acted out of stupidity and an element of naivety.
57. This officer was 40, of impressive and unblemished character with a record of public service over many years and deeply remorseful. He pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity and reference was made to the impact that imprisonment would have for a former police officer. He was sentenced to four years' imprisonment (which would have been six years after trial). In dismissing the appeal, this court said:

"This sentence was undoubtedly severe, but the sentencing judge was entitled to pass a deterrent sentence to mark the applicant's betrayal of the standards to be expected of an officer entrusted, as he was in the course of his work, with vitally important information in the detection and prevention of crime. He betrayed that trust not once, but twice."

58. The present case concerns both the provision of long-term intelligence and information and, in addition, the specific provision of information which had the effect of spoiling a police operation aimed at the collection of evidence to detect the supply of Class A drugs. Further it was not once or twice there was a betrayal of trust, but hundreds and hundreds of times.
59. We pass to the case upon which Mr Bromley-Martin specifically focused, on which the learned Judge commented when passing sentence, and to which we have referred in passing above. In the Attorney General's Reference (No 68 of 2009) (R v Turner) the court was concerned with a police officer who, on a large number of occasions during the course of about 18 months, accessed records held on police computers for his own purpose. On occasions he passed the information he had obtained to friends of his who were criminals. That information related both to them and also other members of the public. Some of the details were used by others to commit fraud, although the basis of the plea, as was acknowledged by both sides, limited the criminality.
60. There were two counts: in relation to the first, the offender admitted accessing police computer systems to view police intelligence material in relation to four named persons, and providing information in relation to two of them together with a third, in respect of whom he also provided a police crime report. He checked various addresses and provided details to the same person and did so out of bravado and nosiness. Of great importance, there was no evidence that the information was used or intended to be used in furtherance of any criminal activity.
61. A second count of misconduct concerned admitted access to police computer systems to view police intelligence material in relation to three others for reasons other than policing purposes. There was no evidence of direct financial payment or indeed any benefit as a result and no police operation was compromised. In addition, there was a further count involving the provision of false personal details of the criminal contact to a bank, with a view to opening an account in a false name. That account was opened and the offender made six withdrawals in cash of £200 each. The offender having served 137 days in custody, the judge made an order of 12 months' imprisonment which he suspended, making further orders for supervision and unpaid work.
62. Lord Judge CJ summarised the case in this way:

"[T]he records were accessed repeatedly. At least some of the purpose was to pass confidential information to others, including known criminals, for their own purposes. It is true that the offender provided rather than sold the information. It is also true, and we bear it in mind, that no police operation was compromised or hindered by the offender's criminality. Nevertheless, some of the information he provided was ultimately deployed for criminal purposes, although again, fortunately, the actual damage caused by his misconduct was in relative terms minor. The offences constituted a gross breach of trust. Quite separately from these offences, the offender also committed a quite separate offence which involved a fraud on a bank. It was not a huge fraud; it was not on its own a major case. But it was an offence of deliberate dishonesty from which he made some financial benefit."

63. Lord Judge was conscious that this offender had been detained effectively for three months in difficult circumstances, and was then released so that he remained at liberty for many months before the case came to trial. Thus, if sentenced to an immediate custodial sentence he would now be serving a second sentence. Nevertheless, even taking that into account, the court concluded that a sentence of 18 months would have been appropriate. This sentence was imposed after a guilty plea, which was the subject of detailed negotiation, and the details contained in paragraph 24 of the judgment outlined those circumstances. Given that the offender had performed the unpaid work and would now be returning to custody having been at liberty, the sentence was further reduced to 12 months' imprisonment.
64. None of these decisions are, of course, binding in the sense that they drive the decision in this case. They are, however, illustrative of a number of important principles. First, punishment and deterrence are always important elements in these cases: not only must police officers be deterred from misconduct, but also the public must see that condign punishment will be visited on police officers who betray the trust reposed in them and do not live up to the high standards of the police service. Secondly, an incentive (usually money but it need not be) inevitably increases the seriousness of the offence. Third, misconduct, which encourages or permits criminals to behave in the belief that they will be kept informed of areas to avoid in connection with their criminal activities, or of those who might be informing on the police also increases its gravity. That is reflected in the observation of the learned judge who commented that Ahmed had boasted that it was "like having his own police station at the end of a phone". Fourth, any misconduct that impacts on police operations moves the offence into a different category of gravity.
65. Thus, in Keyte and in Attorney General's Reference (No 68 of 2009) two years and 18 months after an early plea respectively were appropriate for misconduct over a period which did not impact on police operations. In Kassim the sentence increased to what would have been three years after a trial where a clear financial incentive was proved, albeit again that no police operation was hampered. Taking into account misconduct which did hamper police operations, even only two instances without suggestion of reward, moved the sentence further upwards with four years being upheld after an early guilty plea in Gellion.
66. That brings us to this case which encompasses a very much longer period of time (found by the judge to be 'from mid 2002 if not earlier' until arrest in May 2007) with 471 inappropriate intelligence checks between August 2002 and May 2007. Although the judge found minimal financial reward, the benefit otherwise came in the form of extra drugs to the offender's wife.
67. In addition, quite apart from keeping Ahmed informed about the particular focus of police information and intelligence, and so allowing him to know where to avoid in his operations, there was at least one specific example of specific interference, which was the forewarning of the execution of a drugs warrant at 81A Barnehurst Road where the target was Class A drugs in quantity. That incident itself, and without anything else, justified at the very least the total term of imprisonment imposed by the learned judge.
68. We have taken into account the mitigation advanced by Mr Bromley-Martin both before the judge and reiterated before us, and we recognise not as mitigation, but as an inevitable consequence of the fact of his prior employment the potential difficulties to which the offender could be subject in custody. We have also taken into account Mr Bromley-Martin's legitimate argument that we should hesitate long before departing from the view formed by the trial judge, who had the conduct of this lengthy hearing. Having considered all these features, in our judgment this sentence was unduly lenient and significantly so.
69. Taking into account all the circumstances that now obtain, we conclude that the very least sentence which could properly have been imposed after this trial was one of six years' imprisonment. This reference, therefore, succeeds and the sentence is varied accordingly.