England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice The Strand London WC2A 2LL
		22 July 2010

Thursday 22 July 2010

LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: I shall ask Mr Justice McCombe to give the judgment of the court.

MR JUSTICE McCOMBE:

1. On 11 February 2010 in the Leeds Magistrates' Court the appellant pleaded guilty to an offence of causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving and was committed to the Crown Court for sentence. On 11 March, in the Crown Court at Leeds, he was sentenced by His Honour Judge Grant to a term of 24 weeks' imprisonment and was disqualified from driving for three years. He was also directed thereafter to take an extended driving test. He now appeals by leave of the single judge only in respect of the disqualification period and the order for a retest.
2. In view of the limited extent of the appeal it is unnecessary to recite in great detail the facts of the truly tragic events which led to the appellant's conviction for the offence. They are fully set out in the Criminal Appeal Office Summary and in the transcript of the Crown's opening in the Crown Court, both of which this court has seen.
3. In summary, the appellant was driving his heavy tipper lorry on an "A" road in the suburbs of Leeds at about 10am on 28 July 2009. Roadworks had caused the traffic to merge into one lane, and the traffic had been brought to a virtual standstill in the direction in which the appellant was travelling. The unfortunate victim was a young lady of 27 years of age, cycling in the cycle lane to the nearside of the appellant's traffic lane. She was observed by the driver of another vehicle in the same lane to pass the nearside of the appellant's lorry. As the appellant neared a left turn in the road, he decided to turn left in an attempt to avoid the slow-moving traffic. He briefly indicated his attention to turn, but by then the young lady was in a position that did not enable her to clear the lorry before the turn was executed. The result was that she and her cycle became entangled in the lorry's wheels for a number of seconds and she was dragged along the road for about thirty metres. It was accepted that the appellant had not noticed either the cyclist to his nearside or the fact that he had collided with her. He turned into the side road, which was in fact a cul-de-sac, and was there approached by a motorist who had seen the collision. This witness informed him of what had occurred. The appellant indicated that he had been unaware of a collision and drove back immediately to the scene.
4. The unfortunate young lady was taken to hospital but was pronounced dead shortly after midday that day.
5. In interview with the police the appellant repeated that he had not seen the cyclist, although he had glanced briefly in his mirror. It was accepted by the learned judge in passing sentence that the appellant had indeed not noticed the collision and had not driven away in any attempt to evade detection or anything of that sort.
6. The appellant is now 60 years old. He had no convictions of any relevance to this matter and he had a clean driving licence. The last of his convictions was over forty years ago. Throughout his working life, since leaving school at 15, he had been engaged in the truck industry and had worked for a great number of years as an HGV driver. He is married with adult children. The pre-sentence report stated that he accepted full responsibility for what had occurred and did not seek to lay any blame upon the deceased cyclist. In interview with the probation officer it was stated that he was clearly distressed and expressed genuine sorrow and sadness for the victim and her family.
7. Also before the learned judge was a victim impact statement from the deceased's mother made on behalf of herself and her husband (the deceased's father). It is a moving statement, which this court has seen. It speaks to the terrible loss that they had suffered with the loss of their only child, a young woman of great promise who was embarking on life having recently completed doctorate studies.
8. In passing sentence the judge stated that in his view the case was not one of merely momentary inattention. He considered that it fell into the intermediate category of this offence, as described in the guidelines produced by the Sentencing Guidelines Council, that is "other careless driving which did not, however, reach the description 'being not far short of dangerous driving'". He proceeded to pass the custodial sentence to which we have referred and the period of disqualification. At the conclusion of his remarks he was asked by counsel for the Crown whether he proposed to order a retest, to which he simply said "Yes".
9. On this appeal there is no argument against the sentence of imprisonment that was imposed. Indeed, the appellant has now been released from that sentence in the ordinary course under the release provisions enacted by Parliament. The only contest is as to the disqualification period and the order for a retest.
10. In brief and succinct written submissions, supported by his oral argument this morning, Mr Sugare says that the period imposed was too long in the light of the appellant's driving record and because of the inhibition on him in finding work in the only field in which he has any expertise. The written grounds refer to a "momentary lapse" in the appellant's driving -- a description which, as we have said, the learned judge rejected.
11. On conviction for this offence a twelve month disqualification period was obligatory. It is submitted that such a disqualification would have been commensurate with the seriousness of this offence in the light of the appellant's record. While reference is not made to this in the grounds of appeal or before us orally, it is also established by the cases that where an offender had no previous record of bad driving, the period of disqualification should not impede his rehabilitation after completion of a custodial sentence: see those principles as summarised in Archbold's Criminal Pleading and Practice (2010 edition) paragraph 32-182, at pages 2975-2976. It is there stated, if such needed saying, that the purpose of disqualification is to protect the public. The thrust of the submission before us is that such a lengthy disqualification is not required for that purpose.
12. Having considered those submissions, we agree. We consider that the period of disqualification was too long in the light of the sentence that had been passed by way of custody on a 60 year old man and in the light of the principles which we have summarised by reference to the text book. In our judgment this was a paradigm case for the passing of the obligatory disqualification period under the statute and no more. We do not consider in the case of a man who has an absolutely clean driving record after professional driving for a number of years that a retest is necessarily called for. Such a retest is envisaged for offenders who have a bad record -- possibly young offenders who for good public reasons are required to be certified as properly fit for the driving qualification before being allowed on the roads again. That cannot be said in the case of the appellant, even in the light of the very serious offence which was committed.
13. For all those reasons we allow the appeal.

LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK: The period of disqualification will be reduced to one of twelve months. If you needed leave to appeal against the retest order, you have it, and we will set aside the order.