England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2A 2LL
		Monday, 27th April 2009

1. MR JUSTICE OPENSHAW: On 1st September 2006 at the Central Criminal Court the applicant pleaded guilty to murder of his 71-year-old mother, Maria Wright. Just over 1 year later, on 7th September 2007, after a Newton hearing in which the judge determined that he had killed her for gain, to fund his cocaine habit, he was sentenced by His Honour Judge Forrester to the mandatory term of imprisonment for life. The judge specified 28 years as the minimum term to be served before he was considered for release by the Parole Board, less the 538 days which he had spent in custody on remand. His application for an extension of time of 1 year and 1 day within which to appeal against sentence was referred to the full court by the single judge.
2. The facts are as follows. The applicant lived with his mother at 28 Harmood Street in Camden. At 8.30 am on 16th March 2006 he went to Kentish Town Police Station and reported that he had killed her. Police officers went to the house. In the rear bedroom they found her body, lying dressed only in her night clothes, on the floor, in a pool of blood. Nearby they found a bloodstained knife and a hammer which plainly were the murder weapons.
3. In the living room they found the applicant's crack pipe on a table together with his mother's credit cards. There was evidence that she never willingly would have left out her credit cards because she knew from past experience that the applicant would have used them to obtain cocaine.
4. The postmortem examination showed that she had suffered a compression of her neck and many blows to the head. She had four broken ribs. There were five puncture wounds to her right side, as if she had been poked with a knife tip. There were also marks on the neck caused by the blow. She had suffered in all over 40 blows in the course of this attack. Although the applicant purported to have little or no memory of the events leading up to her death, it seems that the evening before the applicant and his mother had gone out for a meal. Relations between them seemed then to be perfectly amicable. After the meal his mother had returned home and went to bed but the applicant went to a friend's house where he smoked crack cocaine. He returned home later and smoked more crack. In the early hours of the morning it is plain that he attacked his mother with the knife, the hammer and may be also a belt. Shortly after he killed her he took one of her credit cards. At 4.30 am he withdrew £200 from a cash machine and visited a local crack dealer from whom he bought more crack. He then went back home and smoked that. At some stage he must have tidied up a little. He put the murder weapons away. As we have already said, the following morning he went to the police station to report what he had done.
5. There was a pre-sentence report in which the applicant maintained that he could not remember the actual killing but he said that he had experienced a visual and auditory hallucination on the evening of the killing. He said he heard voices as far as back as when he had been in his twenties and the voices instructed him to harm people. The applicant said he believed that his mother had dominated him and he gave the impression that he had not accepted full responsibility. He denied that he had acted as he had done in order to obtain money.
6. The applicant started using cannabis at the age of 18 and at 32 he was introduced to crack. He described his relationship with his mother as close but he said that she was a forceful character. He claimed he had had mental health problems since he was in his early twenties. He said the hallucinations became worse when he smoked crack and drug use made him aggressive.
7. There was a psychiatric report prepared by Dr Johns who was retained by the defence. He thought that the applicant presented with apparent signs of severe mental illness. He said he heard voices commanding him to harm himself and others but for various reasons the doctor did not regard the applicant as a reliable informant. Some of the elements in his medical history suggested a severe mental illness such as schizophrenia. But the doctor thought that was unlikely. He thought these symptoms were probably due to malingering. However, although the applicant himself said that his misuse of cocaine had not led to aggression, the doctor thought that it was probable that his consumption of crack could lead to a psychotic state, such as a drug induced psychosis. It was his opinion, therefore, that the attack on his mother could have resulted just from anger or range, but he thought it more probable that it was due to an acute cocaine induced psychosis.
8. The psychiatric report from Dr Chesterman, retained by the prosecution, said that the applicant had become preoccupied with obtaining crack cocaine. He claimed that he had heard voices even in childhood but the apparent psychotic symptoms which he described were not typical of genuine serious mental illness. Indeed he thought that the symptoms complained of were not genuine. He did not accept Dr Johns' conclusion that the applicant was suffering from cocaine-induced psychosis. The doctor noticed that there was evidence in the past that he had stolen from his mother in order to fund his cocaine habit. Whilst recognising that this was a matter for the court, he thought that the applicant had murdered his mother to obtain money to buy more crack cocaine.
9. Dr Johns had been asked to comment on this report, which he did by way of addendum dated 16th October 2006. He reiterated that the applicant did not show signs of severe mental illness. He had fabricated symptoms to provide a partial explanation for his actions but Dr Johns thought it improbable that he had attacked his mother to gain the money to buy cocaine. He maintained his original opinion that a cocaine induced psychosis was the most probable explanation for the killing.
10. The question therefore arose whether this was a murder for gain, with an appropriate starting point of 30 years, which was disputed by the defence. Quite rightly, the judge held a Newton hearing to determine that issue. The judge heard the psychiatric evidence. In the course of the careful judgment he reviewed all the circumstances of the case, he expressed his conclusion in these terms:

"Cocaine is the root cause here, and, under the influence of cocaine, I am sure, to the criminal standard of proof, that what happened on this night is that he wanted more cocaine. Of course, cocaine costs money, and he decided to use his mother's card for the purpose of getting money from a machine. His mother must have disapproved of that and resisted; but the defendant decided that she was not going to stand in his way, and therefore he attacked her. He used extreme violence, as can happen under the influence of intoxication or, I stress, withdrawal from this drug. He attacked her and, having killed her, used one of her cards to withdraw money from her account and purchase more cocaine for herself. In that sense, I have no doubt that this was a murder done for gain, within the meaning of paragraph 5(2)(c) of schedule 21."

11. In our judgment, there was plainly sufficient evidence to justify the judge coming to that conclusion and accordingly we reject the submission that the judge was wrong to take a starting point of 30 years. The judge then went on to decide what, if any, adjustment he should make to that starting point. Having regard to the nature and extent of the injuries inflicted by this man on his own mother, he considered this to be an horrific case. The applicant had been affected by cocaine but he said that was no excuse. Indeed it was, as he put it, an aggravating feature. The applicant may have no previous convictions but the judge said he had consistently broken the law by using Class A drugs. He had handed himself in to the police and he was given some credit for his plea of guilty but that credit was reduced because the Newton hearing had been determined against him. Accordingly, he fixed a minimum term at 28 years. It is now said that the minimum sentence imposed was manifestly excessive, particularly having regard to his early guilty plea.
12. This court has repeatedly drawn attention to the dangers of applying starting points mechanistically. Full regard must be had to the detailed circumstances of each particular case, then to make such adjustments as are necessary to achieve justice in that particular case. The relevant circumstances are these. First, this was a most brutal murder. The attack being pressed home with ruthlessness and determination. Secondly it is, in our judgment, plainly an aggravating circumstance that the victim was his own mother, since this has greatly increased the anguish of the other members of the family. It is clear from their victim personal statements that they now must bear the knowledge not only that their mother has been brutally murdered but that the deed has been done by their own brother. Thirdly, as the judge decided, this was a murder for gain. However, there are degrees of seriousness, even in murders committed for gain. We do not think that this murder, dreadful though it is, is to be equated with murders committed in the course of robbery, particularly in the course of armed robberies when the murder is by shooting, and perhaps not even with murders committed in the course of a brutal burglary.
13. Fourthly, there is the guilty plea. It is true that the applicant did not accept that this was a murder done for gain and that a Newton hearing therefore had to be held and it was decided against him. No doubt the judge was quite right to make some reduction to the credit for the guilty plea to which he was otherwise entitled. However, he did plead guilty and, of course, he did go to the police to confess his guilt, even before the investigation was underway. We think this feature was not perhaps given sufficient weight.
14. For all these reasons we think that the minimum term of 28 years was somewhat too high. Accordingly, we extend time for the appeal. We grant leave to appeal. We reduce the minimum term to 23 years less the 538 days which he has spent in custody before sentence. We are anxious that this is not misunderstood or misreported. The defendant is not sentenced to 23 years but the sentence is and remains a sentence of life imprisonment but we order that 23 years should pass before his case is considered for release by the Parole Board. Whether or not he will then be safe to be released is, of course, a matter for them.
15. MR HORNE: Your Lordships I am very grateful. May I confirm whether the order granted by Langstaff J is sufficient for today's hearing?
16. LORD JUSTICE MOSES: The position is that permission to appeal has been granted. He is here, and we have dealt with that application as the appeal.
17. Are you worried about a representation order? Now I have understood. You may have a certificate of representation for today's hearing.
18. MR HORNE: I am very grateful.