England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2A 2LL
		13th February 2008

1. MR JUSTICE DAVID CLARKE: On 2nd December 2005 in the Crown Court at Truro, before His Honour Judge Rucker and a jury, following a retrial, the appellant was convicted on nine counts of a ten count indictment alleging sexual offences against two boys. This was a historic sex abuse case in the sense that the complaints to the police were made some years after the commission of the alleged offences, though by no means as long as in many of the cases that have been before the courts.
2. The first three counts on the indictment related to a boy, WB, who was born in 1983. The offences were alleged to have taken place when the boy was between 9 and 11 years of age, between 1992 and 1995, ceasing at about the time he went on to senior school at 11. The first two counts were specimen counts, alleging indecent assault and indecency with a child respectively, to encompass the allegation that the appellant had touched and masturbated the boy's penis and invited the boy to do likewise to him. The third related to a specific incident during a camping trip, when the appellant allegedly masturbated himself to ejaculation in front of the boy. No report was made by the boy until, according to the evidence called by the Crown, he told a girlfriend when he was about 17 that he had been sexually abused as a child.
3. The remaining counts concerned another boy, TM, who was born in January 1984. This boy was the son of the appellant's cousin. They lived near each in a Cornish village. With the approval of his mother, TM spent a great deal of time at the appellant's place of residence, first a cottage and later a caravan where he lived on a farm. The appellant was regarded as the boy's guardian and undoubtedly did a lot for him in his adolescent years. Count 4 alleged a single incident of buggery but the evidence was somewhat tenuous; the jury acquitted the appellant on that count. The six remaining counts on which he was convicted were in two groups of three. Counts 5, 6 and 7 were specimen counts, covering the period when the boy was aged 8 to 11 years, alleging a course of conduct, including touching and masturbating the boy, requiring the boy to suck his penis and requiring him to masturbate him manually. Counts 8 and 9 related to a later period being of a similar nature during the period when the boy was 14 and 15 years of age, also being specimen counts.
4. Count 10 was a specific allegation that on New Year's Eve 1999 the boy was required to perform oral sex on the appellant "to see the New Year in". This course of conduct ceased in early 2000 but was not reported by TM until about 2003, when he was 18 or 19, revealing it first to his girlfriend. It seems that it was only at about that time that he stopped going to see the appellant at his caravan, and contact between the two of them then entirely ceased.
5. The defence was total denial. The appellant denied that any sexual impropriety ever occurred between him and either boy. He acknowledged that he was close to TM, but he denied any sexual contact. It followed that he was contending that each of his accusers was a liar and had fabricated his story.
6. The Crown relied also on evidence from three other young men, DH, NF and JM, JM being the younger brother of TM. Each of these young men, as they were when they gave evidence, spoke of a single incident of sexual impropriety towards himself on the part of the appellant, many years before. In the cases of DH and NF the allegation was that the appellant had inserted his hand beneath the boy's upper garment, stroking the skin of his stomach, then inside the waistband of his lower clothing, towards though not touching his private parts, and left his hand there for a while before withdrawing it.
7. In the case of JM, who at the age of about 15 stayed overnight on one occasion at the appellant's caravan where his elder brother, TM, spent much time, the allegation was that the appellant cuddled him, played with his penis and masturbated him to ejaculation. None of these matters were counts on the indictment, but the Crown applied to the court to admit this evidence pursuant to section 1(1)(d) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 on the footing that this evidence was relevant to an important issue in the case, namely the appellant's propensity to molest adolescent boys sexually. In relation to DH and NF, the application was made before the first trial to another judge, His Honour Judge Darlow, and was granted in a fully reasoned judgement given on 15th August 2005. In relation to JM, who had not given evidence in the first trial, application was made to the trial judge in advance of the retrial and was granted on 25th November 2005.
8. These rulings, in our judgment, which are not themselves challenged in this Court, were correct. The evidence of the witnesses was relevant to that important issue of propensity. It was rightly admitted. But it would be necessary, in directing the jury as to the relevance of this evidence, to emphasise that these were unproved allegations rather than previous convictions, which so often form the substance of bad character evidence of this general type. We shall return in due course to the relevant passage of the summing-up.
9. The judge also admitted on the application of the Crown a substantial body of other evidence to support the veracity of the five young men. This evidence was admitted over objection by the defence as hearsay evidence. It was the evidence of people to whom the five boys or young men had at different times made their complaints and given descriptions of what had taken place, some of them in considerable detail. In all there were eight such witnesses, including the mother and stepfather of the brothers TM and JM, who gave evidence of what both those boys as well as NF said to them had occurred. In the case of WB, evidence was given by his girlfriend and his mother. In the case of TM, by his girlfriend or fiancée, his mother, stepfather and a general practitioner. In the case of DH, by his mother and his father, and in the form of a statement read to the jury, of a general practitioner to whom the boy's mother had mentioned her son's complaint of sexual abuse. In the case of JM and NF, as we have indicated, by the mother and stepfather of JM.
10. Only in the case of one boy, DH, was this evidence of recent complaint, in the sense that it would qualify for admissibility as such at common law before the 2003 Act. All the other complaints were first a significant time after the alleged events, even though in some cases still a long time before the police investigation started.
11. The Crown's application to admit this evidence, apart from that relating to JM, was made before the first trial. It was based on section 120 and, so far as the written application is concerned, section 114 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The judge expressly admitted it, pursuant to section 120. What he said in his ruling was this, and no more than this:

"But so far as the hearsay is concerned, I am going to admit it on the basis that I think the prosecution have made out the case for admissibility and that I should admit it for the reasons argued for under Section 120.

However, so far as B is concerned [that being the witnesses B] some objection was taken, in effect, to the extent of the hearsay and I think since the important bit of this evidence, the true thrust of it, is to rebut recent fabrication or fabrication generally, then the mere fact that the complains were made is what is important, not the extent of the complaint or the details thereof."

12. It is to be noticed that in his ruling the judge did not specify under which part of section 120 he made his decision, though he did refer to rebutting fabrication.
13. Before the second trial a similar application was made, and granted, in relation to hearsay witnesses, to speak of what JM had said to them.
14. The first ground on which leave to appeal was granted was that this hearsay evidence ought not to have been admitted and that, having been admitted, both it and the bad character evidence itself were not properly summed-up to the jury, as a result of which the jury were misdirected into giving this evidence undue weight without the necessary safeguards. It is the summing-up point which Mr Heraghty, rightly in our view, puts at the forefront of his oral submissions and we shall come to it shortly.
15. Section 120 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 reads so far as material as follows:

"(1) This section applies where a person (the witness) is called to give evidence in criminal proceedings.

(2) If a previous statement by the witness is admitted as evidence to rebut a suggestion that his oral evidence has been fabricated, that statement is admissible as evidence of any matter stated of which oral evidence by the witness would be admissible...

(4) A previous statement by the witness is admissible as evidence of any matter stated of which oral evidence by him would be admissible, if—

(a) any of the following three conditions is satisfied, and

(b) while giving evidence the witness indicates that to the best of his belief he made the statement, and that to the best of his belief it states the truth."

We then go straight to the third of the three conditions which set out in subsection (7), as follows:

"(a) the witness claims to be a person against whom an offence has been committed,

(b) the offence is one to which the proceedings relate,

(c) the statement consists of a complaint made by the witness (whether to a person in authority or not) about conduct which would, if proved, constitute the offence or part of the offence,

(d) the complaint was made as soon as could reasonably be expected after the alleged conduct,

(e) the complaint was not made as a result of a threat or a promise, and

(f) before the statement is adduced the witness gives oral evidence in connection with its subject matter.

(8) For the purposes of subsection (7) the fact that the complaint was elicited (for example, by a leading question) is irrelevant unless a threat or a promise was involved."

16. The first submission made by Mr Heraghty in writing was that this form of evidence could only been admitted under section 120(4) and (7) in relation to the two complainants on the indictment, TM and WB, and not in relation to the other three. This, he submits, is the effect of subsection (7) (a) and (b). Mr Sellick, for the Crown, contends that the phrase "the offence is one to which the proceedings relate" is capable of including the offences alleged by the other boys, being offences committed against them and relied on by the Crown under the bad character ruling.
17. It is not necessary for us to determine this issue but we tend to the view that Mr Heraghty is right. These provisions were not intended to open the door to recent complaints by those who are not complainants on the indictment. But it seems to us in any event that evidence should not be admitted under subsections (4) and 7, without specific consideration of whether the complaint "was made as soon as reasonably be expected after the alleged conduct". This is a term which, as this Court has said in R v Ian 0 [2006] EWCA Crim 556, can be given a wide interpretation. Evidence of this general nature was given in that case. It concerned a course of conduct of sexual abuse of a young girl which had ended over 5 years before she first complained, at the age of 17, to a number of people. Some months later she told another person, her brother. The court admitted the evidence of those witnesses under subsections (4) and (7) on the basis that in the circumstances these were still complaints made as soon as reasonably could be expected. In the present case, however, there is nothing to indicate that the judge's attention was directed to this issue and he made no reference to it. Counsel for the Crown, Mr Sellick, points out that in this case the evidence was not admitted pursuant to that part of the section but was admitted under section 120(2) in order to rebut the suggestion of fabrication. It was relevant for the jury to know to whom and what terms the complainant had made their complaints.
18. In our judgment, section 120(2) is not itself a provision governing admissibility. What it says is this:

"If a previous statement by the witness is admitted as evidence to rebut a suggestion that his oral evidence has been fabricated, that statement is admissible as evidence of any matter stated of which oral evidence by the witness would be admissible."

What the subsection does is to regulate the use to which such evidence, once admitted, may be put. It is then admissible as evidence of the truth of its contents, not merely as evidence going to the issue of consistency.

19. It is to be noticed that in his ruling the judge had indicated that he was admitting this evidence for that latter purpose. It was the fact of the complaints rather than their extent or detail which was important. But this is not a direction which he ever gave to the jury in the course of his summing-up. In the light of section 120(2) such a direction would have been unduly favourable to the appellant.
20. It seems to us that the subsection says nothing about whether such evidence may or may not be admitted. Accordingly the admissibility of evidence to rebut fabrication must be considered by reference to the principles which have governed this question in the past. It may in some cases not be possible for a judge to make that decision until he has heard the evidence of the complainant and the nature of the challenge put in cross-examination. It may be that the outcome will be different in relation to different complainants.
21. We would not wish to be taken as saying that this evidence ought not to have been admitted in this trial, or that none of it should have been admitted in this trial. Some or all of it may have been properly admitted but the decision, in our judgment, calls for more thorough scrutiny than was given.
22. We turn to the primary complaint about the summing-up. We look at the summing-up to examine the way in which the judge dealt with the evidence of the five complainants, by which we mean the two named on the indictment and the three whose evidence was admitted under the bad character provisions. The learned judge said this (page 10G):

"You must consider each of these counts separately in relation to each complainant. It would perhaps be illogical to decide that [WB] was telling the truth in one respect and you could not be sure about the rest. It may be that the same comment could be made in relation to [TM]. But there may be some reason why you can say a difference and all I need to say is that you must consider each count separately.

But having said that these incidents all occurred in private and are essentially word against word, it is right to tell you that in this case that you are entitled to look at the whole picture. You are entitled to look at not only the trees, but the wood. It is open to you to consider whether the five complainants in this matter support each other. The rationale is that two or more people do not make up or mistakenly make up similar allegations against the same person, independently of each other. It is a pure matter of common sense. So it is for you to judge whether there is anything in that argument... and this is the prosecution argument,.. whether there is any strength in that argument and what that strength is.

If it is true or maybe true that there has been contact, collusion between some or all of the witnesses, then you would obviously not regard one complainant as supporting another or any of the others. If you are sure that there has been no collaboration, collusion, conspiracy, putting their heads together, even though they know each other to make up a case against the defendant, then it is open to you as a matter of law... but it is a matter of fact of the judgment of it ... open to you to say that the whole picture is much stronger than the individual witnesses. But to what extent you do that is a question of judgment of fact of the witnesses and so is a matter for you.

The prosecution argue and you may think it is a very powerful argument, that they presented a lot of evidence here. But one can see the argument and perhaps the power of it, but you may be unimpressed by it, so it is a matter for you. But they argue that all five of these young men, or boys as they were then, had a broadly similar experience at the defendant's hand in that he fiddled with them. For [WB] and [TM] it happened over a very much longer time. The other boys suffered single incidents. But although there are differences and Mr Brunton [counsel then for the defence] argues that they are significant differences, the prosecution say, no they are broadly similar and in some respects, in detail similar and it can help you in this case and you are entitled to look at the whole picture as well as each individual complainant.

Mr Brunton made a point about the fact that there are no charges in this indictment in relation to [DH], [NF] and [JM]. They could have done, I do not know why they did not do it, it may well be that because what happened to [WB] and [TM] went on much longer, they did it that way. The evidence of [DH], [NF] and [JM] was relevant, that is why you heard it. Relevant for the reasons that I am talking about. And the prosecution argue that it shows the defendant has this propensity; fiddling with boys is what he does. That is the relevance of it, that is why you heard it. It is for you to judge it and make up your minds what strengths, if any, you think it has."

23. It can be seen from this passage that the judge did start by giving the appropriate direction as to considering each count and each complainant separately. That related to the counts on the indictment and the two boys named upon it. He did not do so in relation to each of the three additional boys. On the contrary, in the passage just cited, he referred to their evidence compendiously in the sentence "that is the relevance of it", "it" being the evidence of all three young men.
24. The passage is criticised by reference to the decision of this Court in R v Lowe [2007] EWCA Crim 3047. The submission is that these were unproved allegations, quite different from previous conviction bad character evidence. The jury should have been directed in clear terms that they should consider the case of each of the complainants separately and it should have received a similar direction in respect of each of these three additional young men. In the case of each of them they should have been directed that only if they were sure of the reliability and accuracy of the evidence of that particular witness, could they take it into account as evidence supporting the Crown's case because it showed the relevant propensity.
25. In Lowe, where a somewhat similar situation arose, Sir Christopher Holland, giving the judgment of the Court said this at paragraph 21:

"For our part we are satisfied that the Judge was in error and that there should have been a bad character direction, encompassing the following elements:

(a) Identification of the incidents evidence of which had been adduced pursuant to his bad character ruling;

(b) A direction that, with respect to each incident, the jury should decide whether the facts as alleged by the Crown had been proved so that they were sure of them, that is to the criminal standard of proof;

(c) A direction that, with respect to any incident not so proved, the evidence should be put aside and accorded no significance;

(d) A direction as to the potential significance of any incident that had been proved – in this case that the incidents may throw light on the relationship between Complainant and Defendant and thus bear upon the potential for consent on her part to his sexual advances; and

(e) finally, a warning against necessarily according the incidents any significance if an alternative construction serves to cast doubt upon the construction contended for by the Crown and also against attaching too much weight to this evidence."

26. In our judgment, this is not a rigid formula to be applied and should not be read as such. But there is in the present case nevertheless substantial force in the criticism of the summing-up in this respect. When the absence of, in particular, the separate consideration warning is added to the substantial weight of evidence of earlier complaints of these boys, some of which, arguably, should not have been before the jury, in our judgment, the resulting convictions cannot be said to be safe.
27. In the circumstances, we deal more shortly with the remaining grounds of appeal. Within ground 1 there was the further complaint that the jury were not directed as to the risk of innocent contamination, even though they were directed as to the risk of collusion and putting their heads together. Reliance is placed on the specimen direction in the Judicial Studies Board's compilation at page 20.3, the need for the jury to consider whether the complainants may have been consciously or unconsciously influenced through hearing of complaints made by others. In the case of R v Alan V [2003] EWCA Crim 3641, in which the conviction was quashed, following the absence of such a direction, this was clearly a necessary direction. But we do not consider that it is shown to have been required in this case.
28. So far as can be seen from the summing-up the issue was not raised specifically in cross-examination. These witnesses were cross-examined on the basis they were lying, not on the basis they might have innocently embellished or exaggerated their stories because of hearing rumours in the neighbourhood.
29. The second ground is an attack on the judge's direction as to the burden and standard of proof. There is no criticism of the primary direction given at page 4B - D in the summing-up. But the submission is this was substantially watered down by a later passage in which the judge discussed with the jury the frailty of human memory; the relevance or, as he was impliedly suggesting, possibly lack of real relevance of discrepancies between various parts of the evidence; and in which he particularly exhorted the jury not to take a shortcut of deciding too quickly that in the case of one person's word against another they could not be sure, acquitting without detailed consideration. In the circumstances we will not lengthen this judgment by reading that passage. But, at the end of it, the judge, as counsel recognised, reverted squarely to repeating the burden and standard of proof in undiluted form. We do not think there is any substance in that complaint.
30. The final ground needs a little more consideration. Although we might not have been persuaded to intervene on this ground alone, it concerns the direction in relation to the relevance of the appellant's good character. Quite apart from the fact that the appellant had no previous convictions, he called a substantial number of witnesses to testify as to his good character, people who trusted him totally, never had reason to doubt his integrity and honesty. The witnesses included some young men of a similar age to the complainants, who spent some time with the appellant, with no hint of any conduct of this sort towards them. The direction given by the judge, reading from page 14D-G was as follows:

"The last matter of law before turning to the evidence is in this particular case of the most central importance to the defendant, because he says I have no previous convictions, I have never been cautioned and I have called a raft of evidence to support my good character. If you are sure that he is guilty because of the prosecution evidence, that cannot save him. But it is highly relevant for two reasons. Firstly, he can say, I am a decent respectable man, no previous convictions or caution, people speak very well of me, very highly of me. When I go into the witness box and take the oath you can believe what I say; I am a truthful man. In other words, it enhances his credibility as a witness. Mr Brunton argues that it does to an extreme degree in this case in the light of the evidence that has been called. But for the very same reasons the defendant can say, I am not the sort of person to do this. I may have a penchant for company of young adolescent boys but not molest them and nothing in my past shows that. There is nothing in my past that shows a propensity to this. Over to you, ladies and gentlemen, what do you think about all this?"

31. As to the judge's remark about the appellant's penchant for the company of adolescent boys, Mr Sellick says this was a judge's paraphrase of the appellant's own evidence that he preferred the company of young people, although we note t hat in the summing-up, at page 33, what the appellant appears to have said is that he preferred the company of people in their twenties and thirties. There was of course, however, significant evidence in the trial of the appellant being often in company with teenagers, particularly in his work as a driving instructor.
32. However the criticism of the direction is that it failed to give the appellant the benefit and full weight of the second limb of the standard good character direction. The jury were not told they should give weight to the appellant's good character. On the contrary the judge left it to the jury to form their own view as to the significance, if any, of the evidence in that regard.
33. Attention is drawn by counsel to the case of R v Chapman [2006] EWCA Crim 1656, a decision of this Court on 16th June 2006, in which this Court quashed convictions following a trial before the same trial judge. In that case the judge gave a direction on good character, which was held to have been defective. Some parts of the ruling are similar: the credibility limb of the direction given was in terms very similar to the present case. The judge in that case then went on:

"And, secondly, he can say, obviously, 'I am a decent respectable family man, I would not do what I am being accused of and there is nothing in my life before that suggests that I would.' But it begs the essential question of where the truth lies, and that is for you to discover."

This Court held that the direction was inadequate. The final sentence of the paragraph undermined what had gone before. The Court went on to say in paragraph of 13:

"On the essential question of where the truth lies, since it begged no such question at all, the judge failed to direct the jury that this evidence of good character was, as many decisions of this court teach, of evidential significance. The essential importance of good character evidence is that the jury should not reach a concluded view as to the truthfulness of a complainant's evidence without taking into account the two important features of the good character of the defendant, both of which are relevant to the assessment of the truthfulness of the complainant's account. In other words, the process by which the jury reached a conclusion as to the truth of the allegations requires, in accordance with proper directions from a judge, the jury to take into account the good character of the defendant. The vice in the directions given by this judge was that it sought to separate those two issues."

34. In our judgment, the direction in the present case is open to a similar criticism, although we should add in fairness to the judge that the summing-up in the present case preceded the judgment of this Court in Chapman. In this case, the Crown had adduced a substantial body of evidence in seeking to establish a propensity to offend. It seems to us that it was necessary, in those circumstances, not in any way to dilute the propensity element of the direction on the appellant's good character. However, at the conclusion of the summing-up the learned judge gave a detailed reminder of all the good character evidence and specifically described it as "powerful". We doubt whether, had this criticism stood alone, we would have been led to regard the conviction as unsafe on that account. We believe we would not. We note that in the case of Chapman this was by no means the only ground upon which the conviction was quashed.
35. Having said all that, for the reasons which we have given earlier in this judgment, the appeal against conviction is allowed and the convictions quashed.
36. MR SELLICK: I have asked the officer in the case last week to make enquiries of the principal two young men, WB and TM, of their views were the Court to come to the decision it has. I can tell the Court that both very firmly said they wished there to be a jury retrial. I put that before the Court.
37. SIR IGOR JUDGE: Is there any other basis on which you are seeking a retrial, bearing in mind the defendant was arrested in January 2005, presumably was on bail, stood trial in October 2005, and then stood trial again, because the first jury could not agree and was it December 2005?
38. MR SELLICK: It concluded 1st or 2nd December.
39. SIR IGOR JUDGE: So far as the custodial term of 4 years' imprisonment which he has now served.
40. MR SELLICK: Nearly, no, under the old rules.
41. SIR IGOR JUDGE: Really. All right, thank you very much.
42. MR SELLICK: He has to serve two-thirds under the old regime. I appreciate all that because I thought it only right to make enquiry and inform the Court.
43. SIR IGOR JUDGE: Mr Sellick, I am not criticising you, merely reflecting on some of the other features of the case.
44. MR HERAGHTY: The Court has the point.
(The Bench Conferred)
45. SIR IGOR JUDGE: We have reflected carefully on the overall interests of justice as they strike us in this case. Following a trial in which a jury was unable to agree and the trial in which the jury convicted the appellant of serious offences and a conviction or convictions which are now quashed, for the reasons given by my Lord in the judgment of the Court. In our judgment, the interests of justice require us to order there should be a further trial and that is the order we shall make. We shall give some further directions consequent on that in a moment. We shall allow the appeal, quash the conviction on all the counts in the indictment of which the appellant was convicted. He will be retried on all those offences. A fresh indictment will be preferred. The appellant should be re-arraigned on that fresh indictment. At the moment we are inclined to say within one month. Is there any reason why not? Within one month. We shall ask the presiding judge of the Western circuit if he would kindly make arrangements for this trial to take place as rapidly as the other business of the court may allow.
46. Two questions arise: custody or bail and representation orders for the retrial.
47. MR HERAGHTY: My client was on bail throughout the earlier proceedings with the condition of residence.
48. SIR IGOR JUDGE: Where can he go now?
49. MR HERAGHTY: His mother is in court, he can go to her address, which I invite the Court as an additional address as soon as he has given notice to the tenants there. I can give those addresses to the Court now or later on if necessary. His mother's address, GF. I suspect it might be appropriate for him to apply to vary bail in front of the Crown Court when the time comes.
50. SIR IGOR JUDGE: Any other conditions?
51. MR HERAGHTY: As far as I am aware, no.
52. MR SELLICK: Non-contact.
53. MR HERAGHTY: There will be no objection to that.
54. SIR IGOR JUDGE: If we order that your client should go to live at No 1 Glebe Terrace and he wishes to move or make new arrangements, or because it becomes difficult for his mother, then an application will have to be made to the Crown Court to vary the conditions. We are making that order. We would be making that order on the basis that is the obvious place for him to go to for the time being.
55. MR HERAGHTY: He would not be able to comply with that condition until some time tomorrow, because of travel arrangements. I understand the family are staying in Bournemouth and then going directly to Cornwall, so if my Lords say it starts not today but tomorrow.
56. SIR IGOR JUDGE: Can arrangements not be made for him to leave custody and go to Bournemouth with his family?
57. MR HERAGHTY: The idea.
58. SIR IGOR JUDGE: We misunderstand.
59. MR HERAGHTY: He is going to leave custody today, travel with his family I think by car, by train to Bournemouth, have somewhere to stay, so that is why I say the condition can start tomorrow at the address that I have given.
(The Bench Conferred)
60. SIR IGOR JUDGE: The order that we shall make that the appellant will be released on bail, subject to these conditions: first, that today he should go and stay wherever it is in Bournemouth that his mother is staying--
61. MR HERAGHTY: I made a mistake, Eastbourne is what I should have said--
62. SIR IGOR JUDGE: -- very well, wherever in Eastbourne his mother is staying tonight. That is a condition, and he remain in her company at all realistic times of the day for the rest of the day and again tomorrow. Thereafter he reside with her at GF. That address being the address where he should stay immediately. We are not laying that down as a firm and final condition. If it turns out a more convenient address can be found, then provided an application is made to the Crown Court and the judge so agrees, that address can be varied. There will be a quite separate and permanent condition that he is not to contact directly or indirectly any of those who have given evidence in the Crown Court against him for the Crown. Thank you for your assistance. Your client is going to want a representation order for counsel and solicitors in the next trial.