CRIMINAL DIVISION
Strand London, WC2 Friday, 12 November 2004 |
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B e f o r e :
MR JUSTICE DOUGLAS BROWN
MR JUSTICE GIBBS
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R E G I N A | ||
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LESLIE JOHN GILL |
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(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
MR T MOORES appeared on behalf of the CROWN
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Crown Copyright ©
"You have heard evidence that shortly after this alleged incident X made a complaint to Y. This is not evidence as to what actually happened between X and the defendant. Y was not present, and did not see what happened between them.
It is evidence which you are entitled to consider, because it may help you to decide whether or not X has told you the truth. [The prosecution say that her complaint is consistent with her account, and therefore she is more likely to be truthful. On the other hand the defence say...] It is for you to decide whether the evidence of this complaint helps you to reach a decision, but it is important that you should understand that the complaint is not independent evidence of what happened between X and the defendant, and it therefore cannot of itself prove that the complaint is true."
No such direction was given by the judge in this case.
"29. If the evidence is admissible (as it was in this case), then it is for the jury, properly directed, to consider the whole of the circumstances relating to the contemporaneous complaint in determining whether the evidence of the complaint, on their view of the witness giving that evidence, supports the complainant's evidence and what weight they consider should be attached to it in their assessment of the credit of the complainant."
And then in paragraph 34, the court said:
"34. It is, as we have observed in paragraph 32, important for the judge to direct the jury fully on the use the jury may make of the complaint; R v Islam [1999] 1 Cr. App. R. 22. The Judicial Studies Board have provided a specimen direction. In cases where there is an obvious inconsistency, it will be very important for the judge to make clear to the jury the extent and significance of the inconsistency, as the trial judge did in Braye-Jones. He should also draw to the jury's attention any reason given for the inconsistency and tell them that it is for them to take all these matters into account in deciding whether the complainant was telling the truth."
"It is a matter of law, not of judgment or discretion, that complaint evidence has only the limited effect set out above. In those circumstances it is in our view essential that the jury should be told by the judge of the very limited effect that they are permitted to give to it. Without such a direction, there is every danger of the jury thinking, as on one view might be a commonsense reaction, that such evidence is indeed further evidence of the truth of the complaints, rather than being of, limited, assistance in assessing the veracity of the complainer. Certainly, there is no reason at all to think that the jury, without direction on the point, will realise for themselves that evidence that they have heard, no differently from other evidence, has this odd and difficult status. Particularly in a case such as the present, which turned and word against word, it is difficult to feel confident in the safety of a conviction when the true legal status of part of the evidence has not been made clear to the jury." ]