England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice The Strand London WC2
		Monday 24th June 2002

Monday 24th June 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE KEENE: On 6th March 2001 at Sheffield Crown Court before His Honour Judge Goldsack QC this appellant, Peter Noble, was convicted of six offences of causing death by dangerous driving. He had previously pleaded guilty to one offence of driving while disqualified. He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment on each of the first three counts to run concurrently and to ten years' imprisonment on the remaining counts of causing death by dangerous driving, to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the terms of five years. For driving while disqualified, he received a sentence of five months' imprisonment to run concurrently. He thus received a total of fifteen years' imprisonment. He was also disqualified from driving for life. He now appeals against sentence by leave of the single judge.
2. The offences arose out of events on the A57 trunk road east of Sheffield on Sunday 2nd July 2000. In brief, at about 8.15 pm on that day the appellant, as a result of his dangerous driving, caused a collision between his vehicle, a Toyota Land Cruiser, and a Daewoo Lanos motorcar. The appellant lost control of the vehicle which he was driving. It veered across the road into a stone wall and then rebounded into the path of the Daewoo car. As a result of that collision six people, three from each vehicle, were killed. Those who died were as follows: in the Toyota three of the passengers were killed: Dennis Royston, who was aged 36; David Wood, aged 35, and John Hayward, whose car it was, aged 42. In the Daewoo, which had been coming from the opposite direction and which had at all times been on its correct side of the road, the driver, Roy Holmes, aged 79, was killed, as was his wife Audrey, aged 69, and their daughter-in-law, Diane Holmes, aged 47. Others were injured as a result of the accident. The appellant was fortunate in receiving relatively minor injuries.
3. The evidence in the case revealed a quite shocking course of conduct. The appellant and some friends had begun drinking at about 1.30 pm that day. In the course of the afternoon and early evening, they went on what the trial judge accurately called a 'motorised pub crawl'. In all, the appellant admitted to having drunk twelve pints of lager, one pint of mixed lager and cider, and two Bacardi Breezers by the time of the collision.
4. By the latter part of the afternoon there were nine of them in this group and certainly from about 4 pm onwards the appellant did the driving. Eventually they were all in the Toyota shortly after 8 pm being driven by the appellant eastwards along the busy A57 trunk road which crosses the M1 motorway at a grade separated interchange just east of Sheffield. There was evidence that the appellant drove at an excessive speed before reaching that interchange. Once across it, he continued to drive at a high speed, estimates varying between 60 and 80 mph, even though the road surface was wet. The road narrowed to a single carriageway, with a speed limit of 60 mph. It then had a double bend, first left and then right. Such was the speed at which the Toyota took the bend that the appellant lost control of it. It veered across the carriageway, struck the stone wall on the opposite side and then continued down on the wrong side of the road, toppling on to its side and eventually hitting the Daewoo with the Holmes family in it. They had just left a family barbecue.
5. After the collision the appellant ran off across the nearby fields and spent the night at his sister's home. He was eventually arrested the following day. On his arrest, he stated that it was Hayward who had been driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. On arrival at the police station, he provided samples of breath, which by then gave a negative reading for alcohol. On the appellant's account as to how much he had had to drink, it was estimated that at the time of the collision he would have been likely to have had approximately 150 milligrammes of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood in his system.
6. At a first interview, he accepted that he had been drinking all afternoon on that Sunday and that he would have been drunk, but he still insisted that Hayward had been the driver. However, on 5th July, whilst still in custody, he broke down in his cell and admitted that he had been driving. In the interview which then followed, he stated that he had not driven dangerously and he believed that his vehicle had aquaplaned due to surface water on the road.
7. The appellant is now aged 41. One of the aggravating features of the case is his record of previous driving offences. In 1990, he was fined for failing to provide a specimen of breath; in 1991, he was convicted of driving with excess alcohol and was disqualified from driving for three years; in March 1997, he was again convicted of driving with excess alcohol, given 100 hours of community service and disqualified again from driving, this time for four years. He was in consequence driving whilst disqualified at the time of the present offences.
8. On his behalf, Mr Smith QC criticises the total sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment as being wrong in principle because, it is said, consecutive sentences were not appropriate where all the offences arose out of the one incident. In addition, it is submitted that the total term here was clearly excessive. It is said that the maximum sentence of ten years was in any event adequate in this case, although it is accepted that the total sentence had to be towards the upper end of the range, where the maximum is, as we say, ten years.
9. Mr Smith contends that the court should be slow to impose the maximum penalty in any particular case, although he concedes that he has been unable to find a case with as many aggravating features as this one. Nonetheless, he prays in aid such mitigating circumstances as can be found here. Those are the fact that the appellant has a good work record and is a family man. There are letters before the court speaking of his remorse. It is also stressed that he did tell the police on the 4th and again on 5th July that he had been the driver and had been responsible for the deaths of six people. In all those circumstances it is submitted that a sentence of the order of eight to nine years' imprisonment would be appropriate.
10. Reliance is placed on the recent decision in the case of France [2002] EWCA Crim 1419 and on Barber [1997] 1 Cr App R (S) 65. It is also submitted that it was wrong to disqualify the appellant for life given that he is now aged 41. Mr Smith submits that the appellant must be able to pick up the pieces of his life when he is eventually released. His rehabilitation, it is said, will be impaired if he can never drive again, and the public interest does not require that.
11. So far as this Court can discover, this case involves, along with the case of France, the highest number of deaths to have arisen from a single piece of dangerous driving. It is without doubt an horrendous case, involving tragedy for many families, as well as several obvious aggravating features. Those include the fact that the appellant was about two-and-a-half times above the legal limit for alcohol in the blood, having engaged on a motorised pub crawl. In addition, he had a very bad driving record. He was driving while disqualified at the time of this accident. He ran off after the accident, without trying to help those who had been hurt in it, he then blamed someone else, and the assessment of the trial judge was that he had shown a breathtaking arrogance in the witness box, with no compassion for his victims. Furthermore, it is clear that he had been driving dangerously for a little while before the accident occurred.
12. As to the issue of remorse, the judge heard the appellant give evidence over some time and was therefore able to assess him. We are asked to accept that the appellant felt remorse after these deaths. The fact is that he contested these charges, having initially sought to cast the blame on someone else. We regard any sorrow which he in due course felt and expressed as being more indicative of self-pity because of his predicament rather than a sign of genuine sorrow for his victims.
13. Cases of causing death by dangerous driving always present a difficult problem for sentencing judges, especially where multiple deaths are concerned. This has been noted in a number of cases, including that of France, to which we have already referred, where Potter LJ, at paragraphs 26 and 27, said this:

"26. This is because in the case of a serious accident, resulting from one particular piece of bad driving, it is very often a matter of chance how many people are killed. For example, if one car is knocked off the road and/or badly damaged, it is quite fortuitous whether there is a lone driver within it or an entire family. Equally, if a person drives recklessly fast round a corner it will be a matter of chance whether an ongoing vehicle which is forced from the road and hits a wall as a result, is a motorcycle or a charabanc full of passengers on an outing. In either case, however many lives are lost, the level of dangerousness, lack of care, or recklessness of the driver will be exactly the same.

27. For these reasons, the classic guideline case of Boswell [1984] 1 WLR 1047, which examined at length the approach to sentencing in cases of causing death by dangerous driving, principally concentrated on features going to the degree and level of blameworthiness involved in the actions of the driver as dictating the proper level of sentence to be imposed, rather than the question of the number of people killed. Nonetheless, that feature was included as an element which the court must take into account."

14. We would add indeed that in Boswell the then Lord Chief Justice, Lord Lane, referred to the fact that several people had been killed as one of the various aggravating features which the Court there listed.
15. It seems to this Court that the element of chance in the number of people killed by a single piece of dangerous driving underlines the appropriateness of the general principle which applies throughout sentencing for criminal offences, namely that consecutive sentences should not normally be imposed for offences arising out of the same single incident: see the decisions in Jones (1980) 2 Cr App R (S) 152 and Skinner (1986) 8 Cr App R (S) 166. That is not an absolute principle. It may admit of exceptions in exceptional circumstances, as the trial judge in the present case rightly stated. He referred to the decision in Dillon (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 439, which was such an exception.
16. But where such exceptional cases occur, they tend to be ones where different offences are committed. It seems to this Court to be wrong in principle to impose consecutive sentences in respect of each death arising from a single piece of dangerous driving. We emphasise in saying that that it is right that the total sentence imposed in such cases should take account of the number of deaths involved. We have read the letters from relatives of several of those who died in the present case. They bring home to any reader the depth of the tragedy which has resulted from the behaviour of this appellant. At the same time, one has to recognise that no prison sentence of whatever length on the offender can make up for the anguish caused or bring back to life those who have been killed.
17. While, therefore, the total sentence should take account of the number of deaths, it cannot be determined by it, if only because of the chance nature of the number of the deaths, as we have already emphasised. The fact that multiple deaths have been caused is not of itself a reason for imposing consecutive sentences. The main focus of the sentencing judge in such cases has to be on the dangerousness of the driving, taking into account all the circumstances of that driving, including the results.
18. With that approach in mind we turn to the present case. Here, most of the aggravating features referred to in Boswell were present. We have already listed them earlier and need not do so again. There was no significant mitigation which we can discern. There was no plea of guilty here. We take account of the work record of the appellant and of his family, but we cannot see that a great deal of weight is properly to be attached to those factors.
19. The longest total sentence which we can discover in the reported cases for causing death by dangerous driving has been one of eight years' imprisonment, even in cases of multiple deaths. It is natural, perhaps inevitable, that there should be wide-spread feelings of outrage over someone driving after consuming thirteen pints plus other drinks and driving whilst disqualified and then fleeing the scene. But in our judgment these offences can properly be dealt with within the maximum sentence laid down by Parliament, which is ten years' imprisonment. This is, however, a case which comes at the very top of the range. It is difficult realistically, in our judgment, to imagine a worse case. We propose therefore to make all the sentences imposed by the trial judge concurrent ones, thereby producing a total of ten years' imprisonment. That seems to this Court to reflect the total criminality involved.
20. As for the disqualification from driving, it is right that in general very lengthy periods of disqualification should be avoided, but that is subject to the need to protect the public against someone who is a danger on the road. The appellant is someone who before these offences had already on three previous occasions either driven with excess alcohol or failed to provide a specimen of breath. He was by his own admission drunk on 2nd July 2000, but refused to recognise how that impaired his driving ability, with the result that six people lost their lives. We find that lack of recognition on his part an extremely disturbing feature of this case.
21. The judge found that this man would be a danger to other road users indefinitely; that means to all intents and purposes for the rest of his life. In those circumstances, we regard this as being one of those rare cases where there was nothing wrong with imposing a disqualification for life. We see that as being necessary to protect the public, and we propose to dismiss the appeal in that respect.
22. However, to the limited extent to which we have indicated in terms of the term of imprisonment, this appeal succeeds.
23. What is the position about the representation order in this case, Mr Smith? Does the order cover two counsel?

MR SMITH: The order covers only leading counsel at the moment. I have to say that Mr Baird has been of considerable assistance to me and has willingly attended so far.

LORD JUSTICE KEENE: We have observed that in the course of argument.

(The Bench conferred.)

LORD JUSTICE KEENE: Yes, we shall extend the representation order so that it covers two counsel. Thank you for your assistance.