England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions

You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Eskdale, R. v [2001] EWCA Crim 1159 (8 May 2001)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2001/1159.html
Cite as: [2001] EWCA Crim 1159

[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]

		Neutral Citation Number: [2001] EWCA Crim 1159
		No: 200100700/W2PRIVATE

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

Royal Courts of Justice
The Strand
London
WC2A 2LL

Tuesday 8th May 2001

B e f o r e :

LORD JUSTICE MANTELL
MR JUSTICE PENRY-DAVEY
and
HIS HONOUR JUDGE EVANS
(Sitting as a Judge of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division)
____________________

	R E G I N A
	- v -
	Stuart Anthony ESKDALE

____________________

Computer Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited
190 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2AG
Tel No: 020 7421 4040 Fax No: 020 7831 8838
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

____________________

MR N TATLOW appeared on behalf of the Appellant
____________________

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT
____________________

8th May 2001

MR JUSTICE PENRY-DAVEY: This appellant pleaded guilty to causing a nuisance to the public by making threatening, obscene and malicious telephone calls between 13th June and 1st July 2000. On 18th January 2001 he was sentenced in the Crown Court at Stafford to nine years' imprisonment.

He appeals against sentence with the leave of the single judge.

A telephone record showed that over a period of two weeks in June 2000 the appellant made about 1,000 telephone calls. There were 15 complainants. Four were telephoned in the middle of the night, three very late in the evening and the rest very late in the morning. In some of the calls the appellant said that he had been following them or that he was outside their homes and in some instances he appeared to show that he knew the victims' names and personal details. The calls were described as threatening, obscene and malicious and were made for the appellant's sexual gratification.

By way of example he telephoned on 16th June a 28 year old married lady with a small child who was pregnant at the time and whose telephone number was ex-directory. He telephoned her in the early morning, spoke to her by name, asked if her husband was home, said that he was outside. He added, "I'm going to come inside now and fuck you. Don't put the phone down or you'll regret it". She did put the telephone down and tried to phone her husband. However she could not do so because the appellant was blocking the line. She eventually went to a neighbour who assisted her.

Three days later on 19th June another housewife and mother, this time with grown up children, was telephoned by the appellant. It was 8.30 in the evening. He said he knew her name and her husband's name. He asked her a number of questions, then threatened to stab her if she put the telephone down. It was clear that he was intent on some form of sexual conversation, but having put the phone down she went to wake her son. The appellant rang again. This time the son answered the call. He swore at him and put the phone down. The victim indicated that she felt terrified in her own home as a result. It was on that occasion possible to trace the number.

The worst case involved a young woman who lived in a flat in which her bedroom overlooked a darkened car park. At about 1 o'clock on the morning of 22nd June she was woken up by a telephone ringing next to her bed. When she answered the appellant told her that he was outside in the car park and that she had better do as he said or he would come and rape her. She became very frightened because she was alone and feared that he would carry out the threat.

He made her stand in front of a window and take her clothes off, threatening to enter the flat if she refused. He said a number of things which made it clear to her that he was in fact watching her. He told her to touch her breasts and vagina and then to put her bottom against the window and part her cheeks. He told her to stop crying otherwise he would, as he said, "I'll come and fuck you". He told her to get a banana and made her simulate sex before putting the banana in her mouth. He told her that she had been a "good girl" and told her not to tell anyone, saying, "If you tell anyone, I'll come and get you".

When the call ended the girl put an armchair against the door, collected a carving knife from the kitchen and sat in her lounge. She phoned friends and later called the police. The incident left her feeling disgusted, embarrassed, dirty and violated. In her mind she felt as though the appellant had raped her and performed acts of a sexual nature. As a result of the incident she left her flat and intended to live with her father.

The appellant was arrested on 12th July at his home in Wolverhampton. When interviewed he admitted the offence on the basis that the calls were made at random, that he had never in fact been outside any of the victims' home when he made the calls and that in fact the victims were not researched or targeted in any way. Originally he entered his plea on that basis but that was abandoned before the date fixed for a Newton hearing which did not in the event take place.

In the context of this serious offence the appellant's record is very significant. He was first convicted in 1990 of using the telephone system to send offensive matter. In the same year he was convicted of several offences of burglary and theft and of threats to kill. The burglaries consisted of him breaking into homes in order to steal underwear. In June 1990 there were further convictions for using the telecommunications system to send indecent matter for which he was fined. Then in June 1993 for indecent assault he was sentenced to five and a half years' imprisonment. Subsequently, in September 1996, for using the telecommunications system to send offensive matter and cause annoyance he was again sentenced to imprisonment.

The pre-sentence report describes a pattern of sexual offending dating back to his childhood. It includes the frequent making of obscene and threatening calls. During his sentence for indecent assault he received treatment at Grendon Underwood but months after release committed further offences and was recalled to prison. His behaviour was described as addictive in nature and highly damaging to his victims. The senior probation officer concerned formed the view that the behaviour was escalating in a dangerous way. The appellant was described as constituting a serious risk of harm to the public.

The sentencing judge also had the advantage of a psychiatric report which describes the appellant's profound problems, including sexual deviancy. The consultant psychiatrist Dr Brown describes:

"... anger, social isolation, little self-control and an abnormally high sexual drive in the appellant with the likelihood that he gains gratification by humiliating women."

Dr Brown was of the view that the appellant is a danger to women and will probably when under stress revert to his previous behaviour in the future. He also described the escalation in seriousness of the appellant's offensive behaviour towards women. He points out the fact that the appellant has received extensive treatment but has continued to offend.

On behalf of the appellant Mr Tatlow submits that whilst a substantial prison sentence was inevitable the sentence imposed was too long. He has referred us to the case of Wadland [1996] 15 Cr App R(S) 543 in which this Court upheld five years' imprisonment for threats to kill in a series of hoax telephone calls to women. Mr Tatlow points out that in that case there were a large number of telephone calls to a total of 270 women. The calls involved demands for money, demands that the women remove their clothing and mutilate themselves by pushing pins through their nipples or setting fire to their pubic hair. 12 women injured themselves in compliance with his demands. The appellant had researched his victims and knew their names and details about members of their family. This Court upheld the sentence of five years's imprisonment, expressing the view that it could not be said that the sentences were a day too long.

It is, however, to be noted that in that case the appellant was of previous good character and it was felt that his condition was amenable to psychiatric treatment. There was considerable personal mitigation also which does not appear to be the case here.

We have also been referred to the case of Onyon (1994) 15 Cr App R(S) 663 where this Court, having regard to the case of Wadland, reduced a sentence of six years to one of five years. In that case there were eight counts of threats to kill, with 14 offences taken into consideration, and a total of 22 victims. But, again, in that case there were no previous convictions and the appellant was felt to be susceptible to psychiatric treatment.

Finally we have been referred to Tucknott [2000] Crim LR at 1026 in which this Court made a number of remarks about appropriate levels of sentencing for cases of threats to kill. We do not find that case of any particular assistance with regard to this appeal.

In our judgment the judge was absolutely right in having proper regard to the need to protect the public from this appellant. He approached the question of sentence very carefully indeed, setting out the circumstances of the offences and expressing his conclusion that the ordeal to which he subjected one of the women, who was forced to undress, whilst not rape or indecent assault was akin to such offences. He pointed out that the calls to all of the women carried menace and in many cases terrible threats and disgusting and depraved suggestions. He was also fully entitled to have regard, as he did, to the appellant's antecedents which clearly disclosed the pattern of offending. He took into account the contents of the pre-sentence report, the psychiatric report and the similarities and differences from the case of Wadland, including the significant factor that the defendant in that case was not perceived to be a continuing danger to women. He also took into account the plea of guilty and the fact that the appellant had some positive qualities.

The sentencing judge in our judgment was confronted with an exceptionally difficult sentencing exercise. He approached it with great care. He took into account all the relevant features of the case, both for and against this appellant. In our judgment, his view of the seriousness of this offence was justified. This was a very severe sentence, but in our judgment it was justifiably so. It was neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.