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James, R v [1997] EWCA Crim 718 (13 March 1997)
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[1997] EWCA Crim 718
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DEAN ANDREW JAMES, R v. [1997] EWCA Crim 718 (13th March, 1997)
No:
9605747 Y2
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL
DIVISION
Royal
Courts of Justice
The
Strand
London
WC2
Thursday
13th March 1997
B E F O R E :
THE
VICE PRESIDENT
(
LORD
JUSTICE ROSE
)
MR
JUSTICE OWEN
and
MR
JUSTICE MORLAND
- - - - - - - - - - - -
R E G I N A
- v -
DEAN
ANDREW JAMES
- - - - - - - - - - - -
Computer Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited
180 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2HD
Tel No: 0171 831 3183 Fax No: 0171 831 8838
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
- - - - - - - - - - - -
MR
E BALLENTYNE
appeared on behalf of the Appellant
MR
D HERBERT
appeared on behalf of the Crown
- - - - - - - - - - - -
JUDGMENT
(
As
Approved by the Court
)
- - - - - - - - - - - -
Crown
Copyright
Thursday
13th March 1997
JUDGMENT
THE
VICE PRESIDENT: Mr Justice Morland will give the judgment of the Court.
MR
JUSTICE MORLAND: The appellant appeals against his conviction for robbery at
the Derby Crown Court before his Honour Judge Appleby QC on 28th June 1996.
The appellant had been jointly charged with the robbery of a taxi driver named
Ratyal at Burton-on-Trent on 14th May 1995 with Frank Allgood, who pleaded
guilty to robbery on rearraignment.
The basic facts were not in dispute. In the early hours of 14th May 1995
Mr Ratyal was waiting in his cab at a taxi rank outside a nightclub. The
appellant, Frank Allgood and two girls got into the cab. They had had drink.
Mr Ratyal drove off in the direction of the requested destination. En route Mr
Ratyal was asked to stop because it was said one passenger was feeling sick, so
Mr Ratyal stopped the cab. All four passengers got out and started to walk
away. Mr Ratyal called after them asking for the fare. Frank Allgood and the
appellant walked back to Mr Ratyal and said, "We're not paying you so you
might as well stop fucking asking for it". Frank Allgood then punched Mr
Ratyal three or four times in the face and head. The appellant grabbed hold of
Mr Ratyal. Frank Allgood threw some more punches at Mr Ratyal, and then went
to the cab and stole £200 from a bag in the cab, some papers and a set of
keys belonging to Mr Ratyal.
The crucial questions which the jury had to determine were, firstly,
whether they were sure the appellant grabbed Mr Ratyal as part of a joint
assault with Frank Allgood, or may the appellant have grabbed Mr Ratyal in an
attempt to protect him from the assault of Frank Allgood, which was the
appellant's evidence. Second, whether they were sure that the appellant, in a
joint enterprise with Frank Allgood, assaulted Mr Ratyal with the intention of
stealing from him.
The appellant's case was that he did not assault Mr Ratyal, that he had no
intention of stealing from him, and that he was unaware that Frank Allgood had
done so.
Mr Ratyal said in evidence, and we quote from the summing-up at page 6E to
G:
"I
got out of the taxi and said, "Hey mates, you haven't paid yet". They were
about ten yards away. Then both the men walked towards me. Allgood said:
"What do you fucking want?" He was right in front of me. Then the defendant
was at the side of me. I thought they were going to attack me but before I was
clear in my mind as to what was going to happen Allgood hit me two or three
punches. I felt a bit dizzy. The defendant armlocked my throat. It stopped
me breathing. He held me in an armlock round the throat. The other man then
hit me six or seven times more.'"
The appellant said in evidence, and we quote from the summing-up at page
12B to F:
"Frank
started getting really abusive, not only to the taxi driver, but also towards
me. I did not want to argue with him and provoke him. He went over to the
taxi driver who took a couple of steps back. He punched the taxi driver to the
face and head two, three or four punches. I knew I could not get Frank away.
I tried to get the taxi driver away from Frank. I grabbed him round the
shoulder. I did not take hold of him round the neck. I intended to get him
away from Frank. I had my arms round his chest and shoulders, probably when
using force to get him away my arm slipped at some point onto his neck. It was
never intentional. Frank was trying to get more punches into the bloke.
I
was very frightened about Frank and what he was going to do to this bloke. I
could not stop him from punching him. Eventually the bloke went to the floor,
Frank ran off shouting that if the police came round don't say anything or
you'll get the same. This threat has always worried me ever since.
I
do not know what Frank was doing by the cab, he went to the passenger side for
20 or 30 seconds before he ran off."
One of the girls who had been a passenger in the cab, the appellant's
girlfriend, Angela Kempf, gave evidence on the appellant's behalf and she said,
and we quote from the summing-up at page 14A to B:
"I
saw Dean had got the taxi driver in like an armlock, arms like round his
shoulders to his neck. Frank was throwing punches from in front of the taxi
driver. Dean was pulling him and telling Frank to leave it."
When interviewed by the police the appellant denied having been in the
taxi and put forward, with Angela Kempf, a false alibi notice. Their
explanation for this was they were terrified of Frank Allgood.
It is submitted on the appellant's behalf by Mr Ballentyne that that
conviction is unsafe because the judge failed to direct the jury properly as to
the ingredients of robbery. In particular, that even if the jury disbelieved
the appellant's explanation for grabbing or holding Mr Ratyal, they could not
convict the appellant unless they were also sure that the appellant, at the
time of the assault, had the intention that a theft from Mr Ratyal should take
place.
Robbery is defined by section 8(1) of the Theft Act 1968, and the relevant
words are:
"A
person is guilty of robbery if he steals, and immediately before or at the time
of doing so, and
in
order to do so
,
[we emphasise those words] he uses force on any person....."
We have emphasised the words "in order to do so" because, theoretically,
if A assaults B and disables him without having any intention of stealing from
him, and then A opportunistically, B being disabled, steals from him, A is not
guilty of robbery but of two legally separate offences, assault and theft: see
R.
v. Margaret Harris
,
decided on 19th February 1988, and the judgment of this Court given by Leonard
J in the Court of Appeal transcript at page 7E.
Thus in this case if the appellant and Allgood jointly assaulted Mr Ratyal
without then having the intention of stealing from him and then,
opportunistically, Mr Ratyal being disabled, Allgood, or the appellant and
Allgood, stole from the cab of the taxi, the appellant would be not guilty of
robbery even if the jury disbelieved his account of the robbery. The judge did
not give the jury the statutory definition of robbery.
In
Dawson
and Jones
(1977) 64 Cr.App.R. 170, Lawton LJ said, at page 171:
".....this
Court is of the opinion that in these cases what judges should now direct their
attention to is the words of the statute. This has been said in a number of
cases since the Theft Act 1968."
Nowhwere in his summing-up did the judge direct the jury specifically that
the assault, or the use of force, must be in order to steal: see
Shendley
[1970] Crim.L.R. 49. Nor did he do so when the jury came back with a question
on the aspect of theft.
What the judge said in his summing-up was, and we quote from page 3B to G:
"What
do the prosecution say in this case? They say that he was a participant in the
robbery of Mr Ratyal, the taxi driver. There is no doubt that the taxi driver
was robbed. He was subjected to violence and he was robbed, because Allgood
has pleaded guilty to the violence and the robbery. The fact that he has
pleaded guilty to it is not evidence against this defendant. He has pleaded
guilty to the fact that he attacked this taxi driver and he robbed him."
We interpose to say that what the judge further should have said was that
Allgood's plea of guilty was not evidence that the appellant was guilty, either
of assaulting Mr Ratyal or that the robbery had in fact taken place.
To continue with the citation from the summing-up at page 3D:
"To
convict this defendant you must be satisfied so as to be sure that he was a
party to that robbery, he was a party to the violence, and he was a party to
the subsequent taking of the money.
You
may think, members of the jury, the issue really turns on whether you are
satisfied so as to be sure that he held this man in an armlock, a headlock, in
order that he could be attacked....."
We interpose there to say that he omitted to say "in order that theft
should take place". We continue quoting from the summing-up:
".....and
you are satisfied so as to be sure that he was not seeking in any way to
protect this taxi driver by pulling him away and trying to prevent Allgood from
attacking him and saying: 'Stop it'. For if you are satisfied so as to be
sure that he was part of the attack so as to render this taxi driver helpless
in the face of a torrent of blows from Allgood, then you may think the rest of
the evidence falls into place.
Well,
there it is, members of the jury. To convict him you must be satisfied so as
to be sure that he was a participant in the violence and the taking of this
taxi driver's money."
Nowhere in that passage did the judge spell out to the jury the essential
ingredient of the offence of robbery; that is that use of force has to be with
the intention of stealing. Of course, in very many cases the inference of that
intention can be readily drawn from the circumstances.
After the jury had been out for two hours they came back with this question:
"Can
we convict the defendant of robbery if the majority feel that he is guilty of
assault but are uncertain about the theft because there has been no clear
evidence?"
It is regrettable that before the judge answered that question in the
presence of the jury counsel for the Crown did not alert the judge to the
wording of section 8(1) and, in particular, the requirement that the use of
force had to be with the intention of stealing.
The answer that the judge gave to the jury's question was:
"Members
of the jury, to convict the defendant of robbery you can only convict him if
you are satisfied he was a party not only to the violence, but also to the
taking of the taxi driver's property, not just of the violence, but to the
taking of the taxi driver's property as well.
What
you are entitled to do is to ask yourselves if you are satisfied so as to be
sure he was guilty of the violence, you are entitled to ask yourselves why was
he a party to that violence, but you must be satisfied that he was a party to
the taking of the property as well as to the violence to convict him of
robbery. There we are, thank you members of the jury."
Again the judge did not refer to the requirement that the use of force had
to be with the intention of stealing.
On the directions given by the judge the jury must have been sure that the
appellant, jointly with Allgood, was a party to both the assault and the theft.
Does the judge's omission to direct the jury on the essential ingredient
of intent to steal at the time of the assault render the verdict unsafe? In
our judgment it does. We cannot come to the conclusion that if the jury had
been properly directed they could only have convicted the appellant of robbery.
However, we have the power under section 3 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968
to substitute for the conviction of robbery a conviction which, inevitably, on
the directions given to the jury, they would have returned. They must, by
their verdict, have been sure that the appellant was guilty of the assault on
Mr Ratyal and was a party to the subsequent theft from him. Therefore we
substitute a verdict of guilty of theft in substitution of the conviction for
robbery, and to that limited extent this appeal against conviction is allowed.
LORD
JUSTICE ROSE: Mr Ballentyne, there was no application for leave to appeal
against sentence.
MR
BALLENTYNE: There was not, but, my Lord, might I make that application?
LORD
JUSTICE ROSE: Yes. We shall grant the necessary extension of time, and we
shall grant you leave to appeal against sentence. What do you want to say
about it?
Sentence
appeal heard
MR
JUSTICE MORLAND: We now go on to consider the question of sentence on the
basis of the substituted conviction for theft.
We have regard to the fact that this was a theft perpetrated after an
assault had been made on the victim of the theft, thus disabling him.
On looking at the papers, and considering the summing-up, in our judgment
it is clear that Frank Allgood was the prime mover in the commission of the
offence on Mr Ratyal. It was Allgood who caused the worst part of the violence
on Mr Ratyal, and it was Allgood who actually took the money from the driver's
part of the taxi cab.
Allgood is approximately two years older than this appellant. He is a
person who had a previous conviction of great seriousness in 1989 when he was
sentenced to a total period of five years' detention for conspiracy to burgle,
aggravated burglary and robbery, with two further offences taken into
consideration.
For the offence of robbery of Mr Ratyal, Allgood was sentenced, on his
plea of guilty, to three years and six months' imprisonment.
We have had placed before us, in relation to this appellant, not only his
antecedents, but a Pre-sentence Report that was before the trial judge and a
number of references speaking well of this appellant. We are particularly
impressed by what the appellant himself has written to us, saying:
".....although
I have appealed against my conviction, I have used my time spent in prison in a
constructive way by undertaking a course in industrial cleaning, from this I
will receive a certificate to hopefully help me find work after my release."
There is support for his constructive behaviour in prison from a
memorandum before us from the Prison Service.
However, the appellant, in the past, was not averse to violence, although,
considering the sentences imposed, they were of a completely different class
and degree to the violence that was inflicted on Mr Ratyal. The appellant was
convicted in the juvenile court of assault and theft when he was given a
conditional discharge in 1991; for assaulting the police, a section 47 assault,
he was given a total of 24 hours in an Attendance Centre and fined; and in a
youth court in 1993, for breach of the Attendance Centre orders, he was ordered
to serve two months' detention in a Young Offender Institution. Apart from
that he has not been convicted of any serious offences whatever.
It is important that we emphasise the serious nature of both assaults and
thefts from taxi drivers, who are particularly vulnerable to such assaults and
such thefts from people who use their cabs when they are under the influence of
drink, as this appellant was.
In our judgment, in passing sentence on the theft, it is right for us to
take into account the background, including the finding that the jury must have
made that this appellant took part in the assault before the theft on Ratyal.
However, we do consider that the sentence passed by the learned judge for
the robbery of three years and nine months is too much for the conviction which
we have substituted of theft. The sentence that we pass for the offence of
theft is a sentence of of three years' detention in a Young Offender Institution.
He is under 21, is he not?
MR
BALLENTYNE: My Lord, yes he is.
© 1997 Crown Copyright