ON APPEAL FROM THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
TAX AND CHANCERY CHAMBER
JUDGE TIMOTHY HERRINGTON & MARK WHITE (MEMBER)
[2016] UKUT 302 (TCC)
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD JUSTICE MOYLAN
and
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD JUSTICE NEWEY
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THE FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY |
Appellant |
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- and - |
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JULIEN GROUT |
Respondent |
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Mr Richard Lissack QC, Mr Farhaz Khan & Mr Simon Paul (instructed by Signature Litigation LLP) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 16th January 2018
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Crown Copyright ©
See Order at bottom of this judgment.
Lord Justice Longmore:
Introduction
"If any of the reasons contained in a warning notice to which this section applies relates to a matter which (a) identifies a person ("the third party") other than the person to whom the notice is given, and (b) in the opinion of the regulator giving notice, is prejudicial to the third party, a copy of the notice must be given to the third party."
Sub-section 393(4) makes identical provision for a decision notice. The purpose of this procedure is to enable a person so identified and so prejudiced to make representations to the FCA or, as the case may be, the Upper Tribunal before a final decision is made.
"(i) the employment of a high risk trading strategy;
(ii) a failure to properly vet and manage that trading strategy;
(iii) a failure properly to respond to information which should have alerted the Bank to the risk which was present in the SCP;
(iv) a failure properly to value the Bank's positions within the SCP;
(v) mismarking of the SCP; and
(vi) a failure to be open and co-operative with the Authority about the extent of the losses generated by the SCP as well as other serious and significant issues regarding the risk situation in the SCP."
"such as would reasonably lead persons acquainted with the claimant/third party, or who operate in his area of the financial services industry, and therefore would have the requisite specialist knowledge of the relevant circumstances, to believe that he is a person prejudicially affected by matters stated in the reasons contained in the notice."
Applying that test, this court held (see [2015] EWCA Civ 490; [2016] 2 All ER 265) that the Notice identified a person other than the Bank and that Mr Macris was a person so identified by the phrase CIO London Management. The court therefore upheld a decision of the Upper Tribunal to that effect.
The submissions
i) the decision of the Upper Tribunal, based as it is on the erroneous decision of this court in Macris, cannot stand; and
ii) on the facts as found by the Upper Tribunal, it is clear that Mr Grout was not "identified" for the purposes of section 393(1) and that this court should so declare.
i) a decision whether the Notice used a person's name or a synonym and in the case of a synonym whether the Notice referred to one person only; and
ii) a decision, if a synonym was used, whether information in the Notice itself or publicly available elsewhere identified that particular person.
i) the phrase "traders on the SCP" or "the traders on the SCP" was a synonym for or, at least, included Mr Grout, since it was a collective term which must include individuals;
ii) in any event any isolated reference in the Notice to the activities of a particular trader sufficed, with publicly available information, to identify Mr Grout;
iii) references in the Notice to the mental states of the traders inevitably referred to individual SCP traders which, with the publicly available information, identified Mr Grout; and
iv) any other interpretation would infringe Mr Grout's rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights since a person's reputation was part of his private life.
The ratio of the Macris case
"In my opinion, a person is identified in a notice under section 393 if he is identified by name or by a synonym for him, such as his office or job title. In the case of a synonym, it must be apparent from the notice itself that it could apply to only one person and that person must be identifiable from information which is either in the notice or publicly available elsewhere. However, resort to information publicly available elsewhere is permissible only where it enables one to interpret (as opposed to supplementing) the language of the notice. Thus a reference to the "chief executive" of the X Company may be elucidated by discovering from the company's website who that is. And a reference to "CIO London Management" would be a relevant synonym if it could be shown to refer to one person and that person so described was identifiable from publicly available information. What is not permissible is to resort to additional facts about the person so described so that if those facts and the notice are placed side by side it becomes apparent that they refer to the same person."
" in order for the section to apply to an individual, either he must be named in the notice, or the description in the notice must be equivalent to naming him. On this basis, a reference to the Chairman of the Board of a United Kingdom-registered company would "identif[y]" the individual concerned, as it would be easy for anyone to find out his name. (And, depending on the facts, the same might be the case with a reference to the Chairman of the Board of a foreign-registered company). It is true that even that form of identification would require the reader to have some outside knowledge, but as a matter of ordinary language, I would accept that an individual is "identified" in a document if (i) his position or office is mentioned, (ii) he is the sole holder of that position or office, and (iii) reference by members of the public to freely and publicly available sources of information would easily reveal the name of that individual by reference to his position or office."
He added in the next paragraph that, "in order to satisfy the test, any research or investigation should be straightforward and simple any investigation process should not require any detective work; and so jigsaw identification would not do".
The terms of the Notice
"2.8 From 2007, at the direction of SCP management, the traders on the SCP's approach to marking the SCP's positions was such that they provided an estimate of what they, the traders, thought the position was worth, rather than necessarily picking the mid of what the market thought the position were worth. In February and March 2012 as the SCP began to lose substantial amounts of money, traders on the SCP began to mark their positions in a noticeably favourable manner. At the direction of SCP management, they priced the positions at the most beneficial end of the bid-ask spread. This had the effect of making the SCP appear more profitable and enabled the traders to conceal the scale of the losses arising in the SCP from CIO Senior Management.
2.9 The IG9 10 year index was the biggest contributor to the profit and loss in the SCP. As February 2012 month-end approached, traders on the SCP, with the knowledge of SCP management, engaged in substantial trading in that index, in particular on 29th February. One of the purposes of part of this trading was to "limit the damage" to the SCP. This could have been achieved if the market price of the index moved closer to the SCP's mark.
2.10 By March 2012, it was clear to the traders on the SCP that the adverse market moves were continuing against the SCP's positions. In order to conceal this from CIO Senior Management, traders on the SCP continued to mark aggressively. By mid-March, they had gone further and, at the direction of SCP management, deliberately mismarked the SCP in order to conceal what one trader believed to be genuine losses. On 16th March 2012, the traders calculated that the losses appeared to be understated by almost $500 million, based on their estimation of market mid-prices. Nonetheless on that day the portfolio only showed a loss of $4 million in its internal reporting to CIO Senior Management.
5.4 In breach of principle 2 the Firm has not conducted its business with due skill, care and diligence by virtue of
(c) The Firm failed to price certain positions in the SCP accurately and failed to prevent or detect mismarking in a timely manner (in the first quarter of 2012) (see paragraphs 4.55 to 4.70 and 4.78 to 4.98) as a result of:
(i) the subversion of the valuation control process in February 2012 by the traders on the SCP;
(ii) the traders on the SCP and SCP management concealing losses; and
(iii) a flawed valuation process (see paragraphs 4.78 to 4.98 and principle 3 below).
Conclusion
5.12 The failings set out above are particularly serious because they demonstrate shortcomings from the SCP traders through to Firm Senior Management. Further, there were multiple issues and breaches, including flaws in the CIO VCG process that pre-existed the problems in the first quarter of 2012."
"4.59 SCP management directed traders on the SCP to mark their positions such that they did not necessarily pick the mid of what the market thought the positions were worth (which was described by SCP management as "pressing F9 like a monkey") but instead provided an estimate of what they, the traders, thought the positions were worth.
4.60 In February 2012, the aggregate difference between mid-market prices and the SCP's marks began to increase significantly. Traders on the SCP began to mark their positions more aggressively (moving away from the mid towards the more favourable end of the bid-ask spread). CIO VCG recognised the differences but did not notice this as a trend and therefore did not challenge the traders effectively.
4.61 Traders on the SCP provided additional broker runs to CIO VCG which persuaded CIO VCG to reduce the difference between the SCP's marks and CIO VCG's own independent marks from at least $31 million to $11 million on 1st March 2012. The traders considered they were producing "better" broker quotes for CIO VCG to "justify" the marks. Although traders on the SCP saw CIO VCG as a control function, one trader considered that accepting CIO VCG process was not "the way things worked at CIO". The CIO VCG process was flawed and in addition was easily subverted at February 2012 month-end.
4.62 In March 2012, as the losses on the SCP mounted, SCP management gave a further direction as to how the SCP should be marked, telling traders on the SCP to ignore the losses arising on the portfolio through the underperformance of the trading strategy and only record those which could be explained by a particular Market event. In essence, this amounted to an instruction to mismark the portfolio in order to conceal mark to market losses from CIO Senior Management.
4.63 Between 12th and 19th March 2012, traders on the SCP kept a spreadsheet recording the difference between the estimated mid-market prices and the marks that had been applied to the SCP, broken down into certain positions. One of the purposes of this spreadsheet was to inform SCP management of the size of the difference. On 12th March 2012, this spreadsheet showed that the difference amounted to $203 million. By 16th March 2012, the difference had risen to $498 million, and one trader had formed the view that this amount was now an actual loss that should be reported. Nonetheless the profit and loss estimate produced by traders on the SCP that day showed a loss of only $4 million.
4.64 On 20th March 2012, the difference between the mid-market prices and the marks being applied to the SCP was so large, that the bid-ask spreads began to give traders on the SCP a "headache". In order to keep within the bid-ask spread, the traders on the SCP showed a loss of $40 million. Had the full difference been reported on 20th March 2012, according to the spreadsheet maintained by the traders on the SCP, the year to date loss for the SCP would have been of $500 million.
4.65 On the last trading day of March 2012, traders on the SCP were aware that, as usual, the marks they ascribed to the SCP that day would be reviewed by CIO VCG. Given the increased scrutiny over the SCP following CIO Senior Management's instruction to stop trading, the profit or loss figure for the day was also of particular interest to CIO Senior Management. SCP management instructed one of the traders to remain in the office, after the close of the London markets, in order to review the prices in the New York market in the hope of getting "any better numbers". The marks to be applied were the subject of repeated discussions involving SCP management, who requested that the loss shown on the SCP should be as low as possible. The losses reported to CIO Senior Management at March 2012 month-end were £138 million for the day and $583 million for the year. This did not however include the hundreds of millions of dollars of losses concealed from CIO Senior Management by traders on the SCP at the instruction of SCP management."
Conclusion
Lord Justice Moylan:
Lord Justice Newey:
ORDER ____________________________________________
UPON HEARING Leading Counsel for the Appellant and the Respondent
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
Dated this 31st January 2018