England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM CENTRAL LONDON COUNTY COURT
(HHJ MAY QC)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2A 2LL
		3 March 2016

1. SIR STEPHEN RICHARDS: This is a renewed application for permission to appeal against an order of Her Honour Judge May QC, sitting in the County Court at Central London, by which she dismissed an appeal against a review decision under the homelessness provisions of the Housing Act 1996.
2. The relevant issue before the judge was whether the review officer for the local housing authority, the London Borough of Waltham Forest, had erred in finding that the applicant did not have a local connection with the district. By section 199(1) of the 1996 Act:

i. "A person has a local connection with the district of a local housing authority if he has a connection with it—

(b) because he is, or in the past was, normally resident there, and that residence is or was of his own choice ... or

(c) because of special circumstances."

3. In guidance issued by the Local Government Association it is suggested so far as relevant that a working definition of "normal residence" should be residence for at least 6 months in the area during the previous 12 months and that this should include any periods living in temporary accommodation secured by the authority under section 188, that is the interim duty pending inquiries.
4. The applicant in this case had had an actual residence in Waltham Forest for approximately 5 months before moving to temporary accommodation that was located in a neighbouring borough, Newham, but was secured and paid for by Waltham Forest. He had lived in that temporary accommodation for some 2 1/2 months. The review officer held that that period did not count as residence in Waltham Forest and that, whilst the guidance must not be applied rigidly, the applicant did not have a local connection with Waltham Forest.
5. There was in fact an established local connection with Newport where the applicant had been housed as an asylum seeker in circumstances that established a local connection by virtue of section 199(6), which I need not quote, and Newport had accepted that it had a housing duty towards the applicant. The applicant's seeking to establish a local connection with Waltham Forest is explained by his wish to live and work in London rather than in Newport.
6. The judge upheld the review officer's decision, holding that a person is resident where they are actually resident and that the review officer's conclusion that the applicant did not have a local connection with Waltham Forest was not unreasonable given that the applicant had been actually resident in Waltham Forest for 5 months and in Newham for 2 1/2 months. She said that the fact that Waltham Forest had arranged and paid for the temporary accommodation in Newham could not add anything when a local connection (that is actual association with an area) was the point to be decided. The ground of appeal is simply that the judge was wrong so to hold.
7. Vos LJ, in refusing permission on the papers, said that the appeal did not meet the second appeal criteria and that the judge correctly identified the tests and applied them properly. The original decision that the applicant had no local connection with Waltham Forest was correct; there was no reason why the fact that Waltham Forest paid for 2 1/2 months of accommodation in Newham should count as residence in Waltham Forest.
8. Mr Hodgson submits in his renewal statement that securing interim accommodation in another borough should either count in assessing local connection or is at least a relevant consideration which may so count. As to the former way of putting the case, he submits that the accommodation is closely tied to the authority and that the guidance can be read as stating that a period in temporary accommodation counts towards establishing a local connection with the borough providing the accommodation. As to the latter way of putting the case, he submits that as the guidance is not rigid there is no obvious reason why the period should not be a relevant consideration, especially as the applicant was placed in a neighbouring borough only a mile and a half away. He submits that the point raised is one of public importance because it affects every local authority and there is an obvious ambiguity in the Local Government Association's guidance. He has developed those submissions briefly before me today.
9. I have considered the way the case is put, but in agreement with Vos LJ I take the view that the judge below was right to find no error of law in the review officer's decision and I do not accept that an appeal to this court would have a real prospect of success. The way the case was advanced in representations to the review officer was that the period in Newham counted towards normal residence in Waltham Forest. I am satisfied that that argument was correctly rejected. It was held in Mohamed v London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham [2001] UKHL 57 that "normal residence" means the place where the person in fact resides, and it was in that context that the further point was made that residence in interim accommodation can be taken into account. That is plainly in context residence in interim accommodation in the district with which a local connection is claimed. I think it plain that the period in Newham did not count in this case towards establishing normal residence in Waltham Forest and that the review officer and the judge were correct to proceed on that basis. It is also plain that the review officer did not treat the guidance as imposing a straitjacket on decision making.
10. In so far as Mr Hodgson argues that temporary accommodation in Newham may count towards establishing a local connection in Waltham Forest otherwise than by virtue of counting towards normal residence in Waltham Forest, it seems to me (and I think that he was inclined to concede) that the argument slips away from section 199(1)(a) into (d), that is to say special circumstances. But that is not how the case was advanced before the review officer and I do not think that the officer could be said to have erred in failing to consider it. In any event, in so far as one is looking at the point, it is very much a case-specific issue, and on this point at least I agree with Vos LJ that the second appeal criteria are not met. There is no important point of principle and no other compelling reason why an appeal should be heard.
11. For all those reasons, I am not persuaded that a case for permission to appeal has been made out, and the renewed application must be refused.