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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Tijani v London Borough of Lewisham [2013] EWCA Civ 56 (15 January 2013)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2013/56.html
Cite as: [2013] EWCA Civ 56
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ON APPEAL FROM THE EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
[Appeal No. UKEATPA/1170/11/RN]
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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| TIJANI |
Appellant |
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- and - |
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LONDON BOROUGH OF LEWISHAM |
Respondent |
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The Respondent did not appear and was not represented.
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- This is a renewed application for permission to appeal, permission having been refused on the papers by Mummery LJ. Mrs Tijani took proceedings in the Employment Tribunal, but in a reserved judgment it decided that she had not been unfairly dismissed by the London Borough of Lewisham and that her claim for breach of contract was not well-founded. She sought to appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal. Appeals to the Employment Appeal Tribunal are governed by strict time limits. The time limit is essentially a six-week time limit. That is a generous time limit, longer than most time limits which govern appellate procedures in other jurisdictions. In the event, Mrs Tijani's appeal was not lodged in time. There was a dispute about the precise steps that had been taken by Mrs Tijani and members of her family who were assisting her. The Employment Appeal Tribunal, in the form of Judge Richardson, heard evidence about those matters. Suffice it to say that he was not impressed by that evidence. He was hearing an appeal from the Registrar's decision refusing an extension of time. The Registrar's decision is at page 2 and 3 of the bundle. Essentially, Judge Richardson reheard the application for an extension of time with the added advantage that he heard the evidence about the disputed matters relating to what had been posted, when and by whom.
- In his careful judgment he set out the well-settled principles governing applications for an extension of time in the Employment Appeal Tribunal. In paragraph 2 he referred to the well-known authorities. As I have said, the approach is a strict one, the justification for that being the generous prescribed time limit. In the event, Judge Richardson accurately set out the law, made findings on the evidence open to him which were open to him and proceeded to apply the law to the facts as he had determined them. He came to the conclusion that there was no basis for an extension of time following a scrupulous application of the law.
- I acknowledge that Mrs Tijani has a strong desire to appeal to this court. However, she can only appeal with permission, and she can only be granted permission if she has a real prospect of success or there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard. The jurisdiction of this court on appeals from the Employment Appeal Tribunal is limited to appeals on a point of law. In her documents and in her very brief oral presentation this morning Mrs Tijani has been unable to point to an error of law in the judgment of Judge Richardson which would have a real prospect of success if she were to be granted permission to appeal to this court. She has been unable to point to any other compelling reason why she should be granted permission.
- I appreciate that this is bad news for her, but the reality is that she does not have a sustainable ground of appeal against the decision refusing an extension of time. I should add that if I had granted permission and there had been appeal hearing, not only would the appeal in my judgment have been bound to fail but she would have become liable for the costs of the London Borough of Lewisham on the dismissal of such an appeal; that would have run into thousands of pounds. So in one sense, while she is no doubt disappointed by my refusal to grant her permission to appeal, I do not think she would have thanked me if that eventuality had materialised.
- This application is refused.
Lord Justice Maurice Kay:
Order: Application refused.