ON APPEAL FROM THE IMMIGRATION APPEALS TRIBUNAL
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
PTA192008/PTA322008
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
(Vice President, Court of Appeal, Civil Division)
LORD JUSTICE CARNWATH
and
LORD JUSTICE LLOYD
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AT |
Appellant |
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- and - |
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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPT |
Respondent |
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Robin Tam QC & Tim Eicke QC (instructed by Treasury Solicitors) for the Respondent
Judith Farbey QC & Shaheen Rahman (instructed by Special Advocates Support Office) as Special Advocates
Hearing date : Monday 5th December, 2011
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LORD JUSTICE CARNWATH:
i) AT is a Libyan national who arrived in the UK in July 2002 and claimed asylum, which was granted on appeal on 23rd September 2003. He has a wife and three children.ii) He was at that time a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group ("LIFG"), an organisation involved in armed opposition to the Ghaddaffi regime.
iii) On 8th January 2004 he was arrested on counterfeiting and forgery charges to which he pleaded guilty. On 12th May 2004, he was sentenced to 3½ years imprisonment. On 1st July 2005 he was released on licence to his family's home in Birmingham.
iv) On 3rd October 2005 he was detained under immigration powers pending deportation to Libya on the ground that his presence in the UK was not conducive to the public good for reasons of national security.
v) The LIFG was proscribed under the Terrorism Act on 14th October 2005.
vi) In December 2005 AT was re-arrested and charged with conspiring to provide money and other property for the purposes of terrorism. The charges related to events before his arrest in January 2004. On 11th June 2007 AT pleaded guilty to an offence contrary to section 117 of the Terrorism Act 2000. He was sentenced to 22 months imprisonment, but was released immediately (having already served his sentence on remand).
vii) He was re-detained under immigration powers. In August 2007 he was released on SIAC bail. On 3rd April 2008 a non-derogating control order was served on him with the permission of Collins J. It was upheld by Mitting J on 20th March 2009.
Legislative framework
"(a) has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism related activity; and
(b) considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, to make a control order imposing obligations on that individual."
"… involvement in terrorism related activity is any one or more of the following:-
(a) the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism;
(b) conduct which facilitates the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so;
(c) conduct which gives encouragement to the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so;
(d) conduct which gives support or assistance to individuals who are known or believed by the individual concerned to be involved in conduct falling within paragraphs (a) to (c);
and for the purposes of this subsection it is immaterial whether the acts of terrorism in question are specific acts of terrorism or acts of terrorism generally."
"(10) … the function of the court is to determine whether any of the following decisions of the Secretary of State was flawed –
(a) his decision that the requirements of section 2(1)(a) and (b) were satisfied for the making of the order; and
(b) his decisions on the imposition of each of the obligations imposed by the order.
(11) In determining –
(a) ...
(b) the matters mentioned in subsection (10),
the court must apply to principles applicable on an application for judicial review."
The hearing before the High Court
"6. At the start of open closing submissions and at my invitation, Mr Tam QC encapsulated the Secretary of State's case against AT and AW in three propositions:
i) within and associated with the LIFG are people who may wish to continue the armed struggle or jihad in Libya and elsewhere;
ii) as their activities in and before January 2004 demonstrate, AT and AW have the skills, knowledge and contacts which, if put at the service of such people, would be of assistance to them;
iii) neither AT nor AW have demonstrated that they are not willing to do so.…
AT
7. The Secretary of State relies on five open grounds:
i) AT was and is a significant and influential member of the LIFG;
ii) AT has supported terrorist networks by providing a variety of false documentation including passports and identity documents;
iii) AT has supported LIFG activities by the transfer of funds;
iv) AT espouses violent Islamist views, as is demonstrated by the material seized at his home in October 2005;
v) the three propositions summarised above.
AW
8. The Secretary of State relies on four open grounds:
i) AW was and is a prominent member of the LIFG;
ii) AW was and is a facilitator for the LIFG, specializing in the production and provision of false documents to overseas LIFG members;
iii) AW was and is a facilitator for the LIFG specializing in the provision of funds to overseas LIFG members;
iv) the three propositions summarised above."
"The error went to a factor of critical importance in the decision… When, as here, that person has been successfully prosecuted – as it happens twice – one of the factors which the Secretary of State will always wish to take into account when making her decision is whether or not he has been deterred. For the Security Service submission to give the impression that, not only has he not been deterred, but he has re-engaged in identified terrorism-related activity, misleads as to a critical factor in her decision. On any view, the error is sufficiently important to lead to the conclusion, which I reach, that the decision was flawed." (para 18)
He did not find the same error in the case of AT. In his view, there was nothing in the statements to convey the false impression that AT had resumed the supply of false documentation after January 2004.
"28. I set out my conclusions on the grounds relied on by the Secretary of State by reference to the numbered sub-paragraphs of paragraph 7 above.
i) I remain of the opinion that the LIFG remains in being, although its cohesion and effectiveness have been much reduced, for the reasons set out in the open and closed generic judgments. I am satisfied, on balance of probabilities, that AT was and remains a significant member of the LIFG, with the potential to exercise influence over its members and associates if not subject to obligations imposed by a control order. I reject his claim to have had nothing to do with the organisation since 8th January 2004.
ii) I am satisfied on balance of probabilities that AT's admitted participation in the provision of false documentation was for a terrorism-related purpose: the support of the activities of the LIFG in the United Kingdom and overseas.
iii) I am satisfied on balance of probabilities that AT has supported LIFG activities by the transfer of funds. I reject as untrue his claim that he was only the book-keeper – a claim which is inconsistent with the mitigation advanced on his behalf in the first criminal proceedings.
iv) I am satisfied to the criminal standard that AT has lied to me about the footage of atrocities seized at his house. Some, at least, of the footage was not in existence at the time when he says it was left with him. Some of it depicts the murder of the hostage Paul Johnson. His beheaded corpse was found near Riyadh on, or shortly before, 18th June 2004, following the release of a video showing him alive on or shortly before 16th June 2004. The police searched AT's home (at different addresses) on only two occasions: 8th January 2004 and 3rd October 2005. This footage must have been seized on the latter date. I am also satisfied, to the criminal standard, that the individual named by AT did not leave the footage with him. That individual had long since ceased to belong to the LIFG and, as published interviews with him since have made clear, did not espouse pan-Islamist views or barbarous conduct of the kind depicted in the footage. I do not claim to know why AT lied about these issues; but the lies are deeply troubling and are capable of supporting the cautious conclusion of the Security Service expressed in paragraph 7 of the third open statement that (AT) does not necessarily object to the global Islamist agenda espoused by AQ and the wider Islamist extremist community. The finding of the material and the lies told about it go a long way to supporting the third of the propositions advanced by Mr Tam, summarised in paragraph 6 above.
v) I am satisfied that Mr Tam's three propositions are factually sound.
I have reached these conclusions on both the open and closed material. In relation to some of the issues, my conclusions are more fully set out the closed judgment."
"… When dealing as they are in the case of AT, with a significant and influential member of the LIFG whose activities in the past have furthered its ends, who has the capacity to re-engage and whose views are suspect and clouded by lies told by him, the Security Service and so the Secretary of State are entitled to be cautious....
… The management of the risk posed by AT is a delicate and difficult task. The imposition of a control order was and remains a necessary and proportionate response to that risk, because it diminishes the risk that AT will re-engage in the affairs of the LIFG in a way which would assist those who wish to continue the armed struggle. That is a sufficient justification of the making and continuance of the order." (para 29)
The issues
i) (a) In determining whether or not to make and/or uphold a control order what is the relevance, if any, that the controlee has been prosecuted and sentenced for the same activities which form the basis of the control order? Does there need to be evidence that a controlee has re-engaged in terrorist activity following conviction to justify a Control Order?(b) Are the principles espoused in Lord Alton and Others as to whether an organisation "is concerned in terrorism" relevant to the question as to whether an individual poses a risk of terrorism to the public?ii) Are the errors identified in AW's control order (which led to its quashing) present in AT's control order?
iii) Was sufficient disclosure given to satisfy the requirement of fairness?
iv) Did the judge make material errors of fact?
Discussion of the Issues
(i) New evidence following conviction
"5. ….the House of Lords [in E] neither considered, nor expressed any opinion about the situation which has arisen in this case: the imposition of a Control Order after a successful prosecution.
6. I accept, as does Mr O'Connor (in practice, if not in principle) that where the only information known about an individual is a set of facts which justifies, and results in, a successful prosecution for a terrorism-related offence and there is no reason to believe that the individual has undertaken any other terrorism related activity or will do so after he has served the sentence imposed for the crime, it would not thereafter be necessary to impose a Control Order upon him. In such circumstances, Baroness Hale's 'best' option would have succeeded: there would be no need for the 'second best'. The two would truly be alternatives…." (emphasis added)
"It is submitted that positive evidence must be advanced since the prosecution which would establish a firmness of intent sufficient to satisfy the test of necessity under the PTA 2005. There was no such evidence advanced in the instant appeal by the Secretary of State." (his emphasis)
"On the basis of the first sentence of paragraph 6 of my Judgment in AU [2009] EWHC 49 (Admin) Mr Owen submits that it must be proved that AT has a present intention to re-engage or, at least, that there is reasonable ground to suspect that he intends to do so; and that such an intention can only be inferred from post-release acts. Otherwise, he asks rhetorically: how can AT ever establish that he does not pose a risk to the public? His submission mis-states what I accepted in AU which was: where the only information known about an individual is a set of facts which justifies, and results in, a successful prosecution for a terrorism-related offence and there is no reason to believe that the individual has undertaken any other terrorism-related activity or will do so after he has served the sentenced imposed for the crime, it would not thereafter be necessary to impose a control order upon him. The second circumstance does obtain here: for the reasons explained, there was and is, currently, reason to believe that AT will undertake terrorism-related activity unless inhibited by a control order. It is pointless now, to speculate on when and by what means AT may demonstrate that he will not do so. If, as he contends, he has the settled intention not to re-engage, there will come a time when he can safely be taken at his word. That time has not yet arrived..." (para 29)
"The public is far better protected, even while criminal proceedings are pending, let alone if they result in a conviction. From the point of view of the controlled person, serious restrictions are imposed upon his freedom of action on the basis of mere suspicion rather than actual guilt. From both points of view, prosecution should be the preferred course. That is why section 8 was inserted in the 2005 Act." (para 26)
"I do not accept the validity of the analogy. There is a significant difference between making a decision about the future risk posed by an individual who has been involved in terrorism-related activity and about an organisation which 'is' concerned in terrorism. The former concerns future risk and the latter the assessment of a current state of affairs…" (para 29)
I agree. Here too, Mr Owen makes assertions about the correct inferences from the evidence in this case, but they are points of fact not law, and again his view is inevitably partial, without access to the closed material.
(ii) Comparison with AW's case
"The summary of the national security case, in paragraph 10 is in the past tense:
'(AT) has provided support to terrorist networks overseas. His activities on behalf of these groups have involved the provision of false documentation. It is assessed that (AT) continues to pose a risk to national security.'
The detailed case refers only to past events and does not assert that it provides evidence that AT 'is' a manufacturer and supplier of false documentation. The language of the assessment in paragraph 18 is accurate: '(AT) is a member of the LIFG, who has been involved in the provision of forged passports and false passports…', as is that of paragraph 24 justifying the curfew and related obligations, 'he has created and supplied false documents'. Nothing in the first open statement could lead the reader to conclude that AT had resumed the supply of false documentation or funds with AU or otherwise after 8th January 2004. The information provided about AT's activities in the submission to the Secretary of State was accurate and, for the reasons explained, not misleading. I am satisfied that the Secretary of State's decision to make the order in the terms which she did was not, in the case of AT and for that reason, flawed." (para 22)
(iv) Errors of fact
i) AT's role with LIFG The judge contrasted AT's statement in evidence, that he was only a book-keeper and did not transfer funds, with the statement on his behalf at the criminal proceedings that he had been "particularly concerned with raising funds". Mr Owen submits that the judge misinterpreted AT's evidence on this point, which was not inconsistent with him having transferred money.ii) The jihadist films Mr Owen submits that the judge misinterpreted, or read too much into, AT's comments on the violent jihadist footage found in his possession. He had not, as the judge thought, distanced himself from it, but had accepted that he shared "mutual ownership" of it; it was wrong to conclude that he had lied about it.
Inadequate disclosure
"This establishes that the controlee must be given sufficient information about the allegations against him to enable him to give effective instructions in relation to those allegations. Provided that this requirement is satisfied there can be a fair trial notwithstanding that the controlee is not provided with the detail or the sources of the evidence forming the basis of the allegations. Where, however, the case against the controlee is based solely or to a decisive degree on closed materials the requirements of a fair trial will not be satisfied, however cogent the case based on the closed materials would be."
i) 3rd April 2008 - control order made. On 4th April 2008 the First Open NSS was served on AT. It referred to the activities which led to the conviction, but gave no details of any subsequent activity, stating simply:"(AT) has been involved in terrorism-related activity. The Security Service assesses that (AT) will continue to involve himself in terrorism-related activity in the future." (para 26)ii) On 9th October 2008 AT's first witness statement denied any continuing interest in the LIFG, asserting that since its proscription he had "totally relinquished any relationship I previously had with the LIFG…" and that it had effectively ceased to exist (para 11)
iii) On 14th November 2008, Mitting J gave a generic judgment relating to Libyan control orders ([2008] EWHC 2789), in which he concluded that the organisation continued to pose a risk to national security.
iv) On 21st November 2008, a second open NSS responded to AT's statement. It relied on Mitting J's generic judgment, as indicating, contrary to AT's assertion, that the LIFG remained a risk to national security (para 9). It asserted that AT "remains a significant and influential member" (para 13), but without further details, and concluded:
"In the light of the above, the Security Service assesses that, given the opportunity, (AT) will attempt to involve himself in terrorism related activity in the future, utilising and/or influencing the LIFG associates in the UK and overseas to help progress the pan-Islamist agenda of the LIFG…" (para 14)v) On 13th January 2009, in a second witness statement, AT repeated that he was no longer a member of the LIFG, adding he was not and had never been "a significant and influential member with the organisation" (para 16).
vi) On 30th January the Secretary of State served amended first and second open statements, repeating the earlier allegation, again without further details, and a third open statement, which concluded:
"Despite the current decline in cohesion and effectiveness with the LIFG, the Security Service assesses that (AT) may seek to engage in terrorism related activity should he remain at liberty in the UK." (para 9)vii) The substantive hearing opened on 10th February. AT gave oral evidence on the following day, and was subject to cross-examination. He asserted that he had had nothing to do with the LIFG since his arrest in January 2004, apart from personal friendships, and that it had ceased to exist in March 2004. No specific material was put to him in cross-examination to contradict this statement.
viii) On 20th February (following the ECHR decision in A v UK) the Special Advocates made further submissions on disclosure (a redacted version was shown to the court in the open hearing). They submitted that the description of AT as "a significant and influential member of the LIFG" was a purely general assertion, and lacked the particularity required by the ECHR judgment.
"When the House of Lords considers the appeal against that judgment later this month, it will have to take account of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in A v The United Kingdom 3455/05, given on 19th February 2009 and, in particular, its observations on the requirements of procedural fairness contained in Article 5(4)…
I have, therefore, considered the issue of procedural fairness not only on the basis laid down by the Court of Appeal but also having regard to the principle identified by the Strasbourg Court. The Court acknowledged that the Special Advocate procedure provided two important safeguards for (in that case) the appellants: questioning the need for secrecy and testing the evidence and putting forward arguments on behalf of the detainee during the closed hearings: paras. 219 and 220.
However the special advocate could not perform this function in any useful way unless the detainee was provided with sufficient information about the allegations against him to enable him to give effective instructions to the special advocate.
This question must be decided on a case by case basis, but the Court gave helpful observations about categories of case in which the requirements of procedural fairness were likely to be satisfied, or not. The former included cases in which the open material played the predominant role in the determination and those in which the allegations in the open material were sufficiently specific to permit instructions to be given by the appellant even though the underlying evidence remained undisclosed. The latter included cases in which the open material consisted purely of general assertions and (my emphasis) SIAC's decision to uphold the certification and maintain the detention was based solely or to a decisive degree on closed material. What is required by Article 6 in this case is the application of a minimum standard of procedural fairness to the issue of necessity." (para 24)
"The Secretary of State's open case on this issue is summarised in paragraphs 6 and 7 above. The closed material provides detail and context for those contentions and I have taken it into account in reaching the decisions set out later in this judgment; but AT has had the opportunity to challenge them and has done so. By reference to the numbered sub-paragraphs in paragraph 7 above,
i) he admits that he was a member of the LIFG, but denies that he has played any part in its activities since 8th January 2004, because, from that time onwards, he has been in detention or under constraints imposed by the home detention curfew regime, SIAC bail and this control order and because the LIFG was finished as an organisation when its top leadership (Sadeq and Mundhir) were arrested and deported to Libya in March 2004.
ii) he admits participating in the distribution of false documentation, but denies that he thereby supported terrorist networks.
iii) his case on funding is inconsistent. It was submitted on his behalf at the hearing at which he was sentenced for forgery and counterfeiting offences that he was particularly concerned with raising funds, in particular for the families of those who are imprisoned in Libya or who have died there and was sentenced on that basis by Mackay J for the terrorism-related offence on 11th June 2007. In evidence, he said that he was only the book-keeper and had never transferred anything, even after AU's arrest on 21st November 2002.
iv) he denies that he has ever held or espoused violent Islamist views. He said in evidence that the footage of the killing of Russian soldiers and of hostages seized at his house was not his and asserts that they were left there by a named person (whose identity is stated in the closed judgment) in November or December 2003.
v) for reasons which are apparent from his case on the specific issues referred to above, he refutes the three propositions upon which the Secretary of State's case is based.
I am satisfied that AT has had the opportunity to permit him to give effective instructions to the special advocate about his case on these issues. I am also satisfied that what appears in the closed material is not determinative of the issue of necessity. The determinative issue is whether or not the propositions set out in paragraph 6 above are made out and justify the making and continuance of the order. Even if the requirements of Article 5(4) identified by the Strasbourg Court in A apply to this hearing, I am satisfied that they have been fulfilled. It necessarily follows that I am satisfied that the less stringent requirements laid down by the Court of Appeal have also been fulfilled." (para 25-27)
Discussion
"I am satisfied, on balance of probabilities, that AT was and remains a significant member of the LIFG, with the potential to exercise influence over its members and associates if not subject to obligations imposed by a control order. I reject his claim to have had nothing to do with the organisation since 8th January 2004."
"cases in which 'the open material consisted purely of general assertions and (my emphasis) SIAC's decision to uphold the certification and maintain the detention was based solely or to a decisive degree on closed material.'"
"The determinative issue is whether or not the propositions set out in paragraph 6 above are made out and justify the making and continuance of the order."
"The open allegations in respect of the third and fifth applicants were of a general nature, principally that they were members of named extremist Islamist groups linked to al'Qaeda. SIAC observed in its judgments dismissing each of these applicants' appeals that the open evidence was insubstantial and that the evidence on which it relied against them was largely to be found in the closed material. Again, the Court does not consider that these applicants were in a position effectively to challenge the allegations against them. There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 4 in respect of the third and fifth applicants." (para 224)
Conclusion
LORD JUSTICE LLOYD :
LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY :