ON APPEAL FROM CHANCERY DIVISION
MR G BOMPAS Q.C.
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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Louise Brittain (the Trustee of the Property of the Bankrupt) |
Respondents |
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(1) Hamid Dehdashti Haghighat (2) Nasrin Dehdashti Haghighat |
Appellants |
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Miss Raquel Agnello QC (instructed by Beachcroft LLP) appeared on behalf of the Respondent.
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Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Lloyd:
"82. After careful consideration of the matters set out in this Judgment, my clear conclusion is that I should make an order for possession of the Property to be given to the Trustee; but, nevertheless, the order for possession should be deferred for a substantial period or until, if sooner, three months after Mani has ceased permanently to reside at the Property. That substantial period, which I think should be three years, I have decided on with a view to allowing (a) the local authority to make provision for Mrs Haghighat and Mani to be rehoused (together, if appropriate but not necessarily, with Mr Haghighat and the other children) in accommodation which will be suitable to their needs, and (b) an orderly change to be effected (so far as change is made necessary by the move to new accommodation) in the care arrangements for Mani. As to this I did not understand Mr Eyres' evidence to be that the Council neither could nor would ever offer suitable alternative accommodation; rather, it was that in the absence of an order for possession an offer of suitable alternative accommodation could be expected within six to eight years. While recognising that the Council may have difficulty in accelerating any offer in the short term, I cannot think it unrealistic to expect the Council to make a suitable offer within three years in the face of an order for possession within that time.
83. The order I have decided on is a compromise between the two other possible alternatives. It is far from ideal; but in the circumstances I consider that it is the best possible balance between the competing interests of those concerned in the present case, and that it is just and reasonable having regard to the matters which IA 336(4) and 337(5) direct to be taken into account."
He made that order under which the property is to be sold and possession given within three years, or earlier if Mani [the eldest child] ceases to reside permanently at the property, whichever of those dates is the sooner.
"6. On the question of permission to appeal, I am going to allow that application. Although the order which I have decided upon ultimately is a matter of discretion, I can well see that this is the sort of case in which a different court might consider that there is some point of principle which ought properly to have been taken into account but which has not been.
7. The application for permission to appeal, as I mentioned, was made by the Trustee in Bankruptcy, but it seems to me that the respondents should have the same privilege. However, so far as concerns the respondents, the permission which I am granting does not apply to the first judgment which I made. That is to say, I am not giving permission to appeal on the question of claim to ownership of the property."
Lord Justice Rix:
Order: Appeals dismissed