ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CHANCERY DIVISION
BIRMINGHAM DISTRICT REGISTRY
HIS HONOUR JUDGE COOKE
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE LLOYD
and
LORD JUSTICE GROSS
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(1) BOLSOVER DISTRICT COUNCIL (2) MANSFIELD DISTRICT COUNCIL |
Claimants Respondents |
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- and - |
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(1) ASHFIELD NOMINEES LTD (2) DENNIS RYE LTD (3) EAST MIDLANDS DEVELOPMENTS LTD (4) HARDWICK NOMINEES LTD |
Defendants Appellants |
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James Morgan (instructed by Summers Nigh Law LLP) for the Respondents
Hearing date: 7 October 2010
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Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Lloyd:
Introduction
The legislation relating to council tax
Comparison with other statutory regimes
The Limitation Act 1980
"An action to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued."
"An action shall not be brought upon any judgment after the expiration of six years from the date on which the judgment became enforceable."
"This Act shall not apply to any action … for which a period of limitation is prescribed by or under any other enactment (whether passed before or after the passing of this Act) …"
Discussion
"If one asks, 'By virtue of what is the sum of £1.25m recoverable?', the answer would surely be: 'By virtue of section 214'."
"Mr. Squibb's main argument was that the limitation imposed by the section runs from the date of the accrual of the cause of action, and he contended that as no action lies for rates there could be no cause of action. But if the word "action" is to embrace proceedings which are not actions in the true sense it seems to me that for "cause of action" must be read "cause of proceeding," and the cause of the proceeding in this case is the failure to pay on demand. I would accordingly hold that time runs from the demand."
"… liability orders are orders of the court like ordinary civil judgments."
"It is not at all illogical that time limits should apply differently where the creditor already has a judgment. In such a case it is unnecessary to protect the defendant from stale claims on the basis that it may be difficult for him to collect together the relevant evidence. The parties' rights have been established by court proceedings, and it is only then a question of enforcement."
Lord Justice Gross
Lord Justice Laws