COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HON MR JUSTICE MACKAY
SITTING IN THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION (MANCHESTER)
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE THOMAS
and
MR JUSTICE MANN
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David Booth |
Appellant |
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- and - |
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Oldham MBC |
Respondent |
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Mr Chris Quinn and Mr Simon Forshaw (instructed by The Director of Legal Services, Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 12 May 2009
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Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Thomas :
Employment by the council
"27(1) Where a member leaves a local government employment by reason of being permanently incapable of discharging efficiently the duties of that employment because of ill-health or infirmity of mind or body, he is entitled to an ill-health pension and grant.
31(1) If a member leaves a local government employment … before he is entitled to the immediate payment of retirement benefits …, once he is aged 50 or more he may elect to receive payment of them immediately.
31(2) An election made by a member aged less than 60 is ineffective without the consent of his employing authority or former employing authority (but see paragraph (6)).
31(4) If the sum-
(a) of the member's age in whole years on the date his local government employment ends or the date he elects, if later,
(b) of his total membership in whole years, and
(c) in a case where he elects after his local government employment ends, of the period beginning with the end of that employment and ending with the date he elects,
is less than 85 years, his retirement pension and grant must be reduced by the amounts shown as appropriate in guidance issued by the Government Actuary (but see paragraphs (5) and (6) and regulation 36(5) (GMPs)).
31(6) If a member who has left a local government employment before he is entitled to the immediate payment of retirement benefits … becomes permanently incapable of discharging efficiently the duties of that employment because of ill-health or infirmity of mind or body –
(a) he may elect under paragraph (1) before attaining the age of 50; and
(b) paragraphs (2) and (4) do not apply."
97 (1) Any question concerning the rights or liabilities under the Scheme of any person other than a Scheme employer must be decided in the first instance by the person specified in this regulation."
"97(9) Before making a decision as to whether a member may be entitled under regulation 27 or under regulation 31 on the ground of ill-health, the Scheme employer must obtain a certificate from an independent registered medical practitioner as to whether in his opinion the member is permanently incapable of discharging efficiently the duties of the relevant local government employment because of ill-health or infirmity of mind or body."
"100(1) Where there is a disagreement about a matter in relation to the Scheme between a member or an alternative applicant and a Scheme employer, the member or, as the case may be, the alternative applicant ("the complainant") may-"
(a) apply directly to the appropriate appointed person to decide the disagreement, or
(b) apply to the appropriate administering authority for them to refer the disagreement to an appointed person for decision.
……
101(1) A decision on the matters raised by an application under regulation 100 must be issued by the appropriate appointed person-
(a) to the applicant,
(b) to the Scheme employer, and
(c) if the Scheme employer is not the appropriate administering authority, to that authority,
by notice in writing before the expiry of the period of two months beginning with the date the application was received.
……..
102(1) Where an application about a disagreement has been made under regulation 100, an application may be made to the Secretary of State to reconsider the disagreement by the person who applied under regulation 100 or the Scheme employer in question.
(2) The application must set out particulars of the grounds on which it is made, including a statement that the applicant under this regulation wishes the disagreement to be reconsidered by the Secretary of State."
Claims in the Employment Tribunal and before the Pensions Referee
"if he has a physical or mental impairment which has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on his ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities."
Schedule 1 to the Act sets out provisions supplementing s.1. Paragraph 2 of the Schedule provides that the effect of impairment is long term if
"(a) it has lasted at least 12 months, (b) the period for which it lasts is likely to be at least 12 months or (c) it is likely to last for the rest of the life of the person affected""
Paragraph 4 of the Schedule makes provision in respect of normal day-to-day activities:
"4(1) An impairment is to be taken to affect the ability of the person concerned to carry out normal day-to-day activities only if it affects one of the following -
(a) mobility;
(b) manual dexterity;
(c) physical co-ordination;
(d) continence;
(e) ability to lift, carry or otherwise move everyday objects;
(f) speech, hearing or eyesight;
(g) memory or ability to concentrate, learn or understand; or
(h) perception of the risk of physical danger."
Paragraph 6 makes provision in respect of the effect of medical treatment:
"6 (1) An impairment which would be likely to have a substantial adverse effect on the ability of the person concerned to carry out normal day-to-day activities, but for the fact that measures are being taken to treat or correct it, is to be treated as having that effect."
"In relation to all the matters relied upon by the applicant in relation to mobility, speech, memory, concentration and perception of risk we have looked at these matters separately to determine if there has been a substantial adverse effect. We have also considered all of these matters together and we are not satisfied that even after taking all of these matters cumulatively they can be said to have had a substantial adverse effect on the applicant's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities."
The Tribunal also concluded that on the evidence from the doctors there had been no mental impairment which had a long-term effect on his ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. It accordingly determined that he was not a disabled person for the purposes of the DDA 1995. It referred his claim for unfair dismissal to a differently constituted Tribunal
"which relates to the capability or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do."
The claim in the High Court
i) The primary claim pleaded in paragraphs 9 to 12 was that the Council had, at the time of his dismissal in August 2001, acted in breach of contract by reason of its failure to refer Mr Booth to a medical examiner and failed to take other steps, all of which were in breach of contract.ii) The alternative claim pleaded at paragraph 13 was that the Council had acted in breach of contract in refusing to refer the appellant to a medical examination or assessment in December 2002 or December 2003 and failing to take other steps that would have lead to the payment of an immediate or enhanced pension.
Mr Booth relied upon the report of Dr J F McNamara, a Consultant Occupational Physician who had seen him in October 2006. Dr McNamara concluded that, if Mr Booth had been referred to him he would not have classed him as permanently incapable of work in July/August 2001 as he would then have been guardedly optimistic that he could have been rehabilitated back to his original post. However, since August 2001 Mr Booth had continued to suffer from anxiety and depression. If he had been referred in the autumn of 2001, Dr McNamara believed there was an 80% chance he would have satisfied the criteria for ill health retirement under Regulation 27 of the Pension Regulations and by December 2003 that chance would have been 90%.
The appeal to the Court of Appeal
i) The Pension Regulations provided that an employee, having become permanently incapable under Regulation 27(1), was entitled under Regulation 31(6), after leaving a local government employment, to make an election to receive payment of the benefits immediately. If so, he could do so without the consent of the employer under 31(2) or scaling back under 31(4). As Mr Booth was over 50 at the material time and permanently incapable, he was entitled to make this election.ii) The Council, in breach of contract, failed to allow Mr Booth to take his pension immediately; it also failed to investigate whether he was permanently incapable of performing his duties; it also failed to refer him for assessment with a medical practitioner.
iii) Dr McNamara's report showed that if he had been referred in either December 2002 or December 2003, he would have been awarded permanent ill heath retirement.
i) The Appointed Person was correct in his view that the Council should have followed Regulation 97(9) by obtaining an independent medical examination.ii) Although the Employment Tribunal had determined that Mr Booth was not under a disability within the meaning of the DDA 1995, that finding only established his medical condition as at the date of his dismissal, namely 31 August 2001.
iii) Tests for disability for the purposes of the DDA 1995 and permanent incapacity for the purposes of the Pension Regulations and for s.98 (2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 were different.
iv) The test for disability under the DDA 1995 was concerned with impairment which adversely affected an ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. The question of permanent incapability for the purposes of the Pension Regulations was linked to the efficient discharge of the duties of the relevant employment; under the Regulations the question was whether the employee was permanently incapable of discharging the duties of his employment because of ill health. Whilst it was accepted that a permanent incapacity for the purpose of the Pension Regulations would on some occasions also amount to disability under the DDA, that would not always invariably be the case.
v) The type of reason which provided a potentially fair ground for dismissal for the purpose of s.98 of the 1998 Act was one which related to the capability of performing work of the kind which the relevant employee was employed to do.
vi) The Employment Tribunal had only determined that he was not under a disability on 31 August 2001; his claim to a pension depended on his condition 15 months later in December 2002 or 27 months later in December 2003. There was no logical ground for contending that a finding he was not a disabled person on 31 August 2001 necessarily precluded a finding that he was permanently incapable of efficiently discharging the duties of the relevant employment in December 2002 or December 2003. An examination of the medical history showed that there was a change in Mr Booth's condition after August 2001, as was evident from Dr Ansari's report and the conclusions of Dr McNamara as to his diagnosed conditions.
Conclusion
i) The finding of the Employment Tribunal was that Mr Booth was not under a disability under the DDA 1995 at the date of his dismissal in August 2001. The only arguably relevant date after his dismissal for assessing whether under the Pension Regulations he was permanently incapable of discharging the duties of his employment by the Council because of ill-health or infirmity of mind or body was a date anytime between August 2001 and December 2002 when he claimed to be entitled to early payment of a pension.ii) The date cannot be a time later than that because under Regulation 36 of the Pension Regulations, the date cannot be later than the date of the election.
iii) It is not necessary to consider whether a person who is found not to be under a disability under the DDA will always fail to establish permanent incapacity under the Pension Regulations; there may possibly be circumstances as outlined by Mr Benson QC where that is not so. On the facts of this particular case and the specific matters raised by Mr Booth, the clear evidence before the Tribunal which heard the case on 6 May and 3 June 2003 plainly established on the facts that he was not permanently incapable of discharging the duties of his employment by the Council because of ill-health or infirmity of mind or body between August 2001 and December 2002. That is the inevitable conclusion based on the reports before the Tribunal, including the reports of Dr Ansari and the Tribunal's own conclusion in its decision of 25 June 2003 that "the applicant is not a disabled person". There was ample evidence on which the Tribunal could have reached that view. The nature of the disabilities relied on by Mr Booth - his lack of mobility because of his claustrophobia and fear of meeting new people, his speech, his memory and ability to concentrate and his perception for he risk of physical danger-were such that if they did not result in him being under a disability under the DDA 1995, then he was not permanently incapable of carrying out the duties of his employment.
iv) I accept that the last medical report before the Tribunal was that of Dr Ansari who, as I have set out at paragraph 9 above, saw him in September 2002, but there is nothing to suggest that his condition could have so deteriorated between then and December 2002 to make him permanently incapable by that date. There is nothing in the Report of Dr McNamara which would support such a change in his circumstances.
v) As there is no evidence to establish that he was permanently incapable at the relevant date, it is not necessary to consider whether there was a duty to refer him for an assessment, as even if there was such a duty, there cannot have been any loss.
i) Mr Booth's status as an employee of the Council gave him a right under the Pension Regulations to a pension on the terms there set. It was not necessary, in my view, for that right to be incorporated into the contract of employment. For the purposes of its strike out/ summary judgment application alone the Council conceded that the Pension Regulations were incorporated into Mr Booth's contract of employment (on the basis that this may have been a triable issue). I am far from convinced that this would have been a proper concession to have made should these proceedings have gone any further because it was not wholly clear from the contract what incorporation of the Pension regulations meant and because it would probably have been wrong in law. However, the concession does not make a difference to the view I have taken in this second ground, for his right to the pension depended solely on the Pension Regulations and could be obtained solely on the terms of the Pension Regulations.ii) It was contended that the Council should have followed the procedure under the Regulations by obtaining a report under Regulation 97(9) and then by awarding him a pension under Regulation 27 without any deduction as provided for in Regulation 31.
iii) The Regulations had their specific form of dispute resolution procedure. Mr Booth followed that procedure in initially taking the dispute to the Appointed Referee, but he failed thereafter to pursue that claim under the statutory machinery under the Regulations which governed the matter about which he complained and his right to the pension. In my view that was the remedy he should have pursued and not the action which he brought many years later in the High Court. Parliament specifically provided machinery through the Regulations for the resolution of disputes. It is not possible for a person who has those remedies to attempt to bring an action in the High Court when he has failed to utilise the statutory machinery under the Regulations which create and embody the rights which he seeks to enforce. That dispute resolution machinery gave him an opportunity to challenge the refusal of the council to have a medical assessment and to early payment of an enhanced pension and he had no right to bring those proceedings in the High Court.
Mr Justice Mann
Lord Justice Laws