England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM BRIGHTON COUNTY COURT
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE HOLLIS)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		8th February 2008

Lady Justice Smith DBE:

1. This is an appeal, brought with the permission of the full court, against the judgment and order of HHJ Hollis, sitting at Brighton County Court on 23 May 2007. The judge dismissed the appellant's claim for damages which arose from a road traffic accident which occurred on 13 August 2004.
2. I have come to the conclusion that the appeal must be allowed and that the action must be sent back for rehearing. I understand that my Lords agree with those conclusions. Accordingly, I propose to say as little as possible about the circumstances of the accident and will say only what is necessary in order to explain why the appeal must be allowed.
3. The accident took place at crossroads controlled by traffic lights. One could say quite a lot about the layout, the road conditions and so on, but none of that is important. One needs only to imagine a junction at which two roads cross each other at right angles. The traffic lights were working normally.
4. The claimant, now the appellant, was riding his motorcycle towards the junction, intending to cross directly over it. The defendant's fire engine was approaching the junction, coming from the appellant's left and intending to drive straight across. The sightlines were such that the two drivers could not see each other approaching the junction. The collision took place in the middle of the junction. Both drivers must have entered the junction and, as a matter of common sense, it appears that the accident could not have happened unless one or both drivers had gone through a red light.
5. The appellant's case was that the traffic lights were green in his favour as he approached and he went straight on. He said his speed was within the 30 mile an hour limit. The judge seems to have accepted that. The appellant accepted in oral evidence that the traffic light might have turned to amber as he went over the line. As he was in the junction, he saw the fire engine coming from his left. He tried to brake but there was a collision.
6. The respondent's evidence, given by the driver of the fire engine and colleagues travelling with him, was that the fire engine approached the lights slowly, as they were on red against it. The driver paused, but then the lights turned to red/amber and he set off slowly. The light had turned to green as he entered the junction. Suddenly he saw the appellant's motorcycle travelling quickly from his right. He stopped but there was a collision.
7. There was agreed evidence about the sequence by which the traffic lights operated. Nine seconds would elapse between the lights ceasing to be green for the appellant and showing green for the fire engine. Those nine seconds were made up as follows. From the appellant's position, the light would change from green to amber for three seconds, then to red; then all four lights would be on red for four seconds. Then the appellant's light would remain on red, but the fire engine's light would turn to red/amber for two seconds before changing to green. Thus these lights had a substantial safety margin built in, as I understand that most traffic lights do. The period of four seconds, with all lights on red, should give plenty of time for any vehicle which has entered the junction at the last moment to clear the junction before the traffic begins to enter the junction from the roads at right angles.
8. The judge's first finding of fact was to accept the evidence of the driver of the fire engine. Thus, he accepted that the fire engine did not enter the junction until its light was green. The corollary of that finding -- and this is agreed between the parties and expressly accepted by Mr Davis today on behalf of the respondent -- was that the appellant must not only have driven through a red light, but the light must have been red against him throughout his approach to the traffic lights. The light must have been showing red against him for, at the very least, five seconds and before that it must have been showing amber for three seconds. In fact, Mr Davis accepted that, taking into account the time for the fire engine to reach the collision point travelling slowly, the red light must have been at red against Mr Carr (the appellant) for considerably more than six seconds.
9. However, the judge did not say that the appellant had gone through a light that had been on red for a substantial period of time. He said the appellant went though just as his light was turning red. His actual words, taken from paragraph 10 of the judgement were:

"He was some distance from the lights when they had turned to amber, and they were only on amber for three seconds… he decided to accelerate through the changing lights, which turned to red by the time he passed, rather than come to a halt."

10. The corollary of the judge's finding -- that the lights had (just) turned to red as the appellant went through them -- was that the lights for the fire engine must have been still on red, because all lights were on red for four seconds. But that was not what the judge had found.
11. It appears that the judge was unwilling to grapple with the implications of the sequencing of the traffic lights. In paragraph 9 of the judgment he said this:

"I do not consider that a close analysis of the traffic light sequence and likely speeds and times involved, which requires considerable precision in the evidence of distances, times, speeds and positions, a precision which I do not have, entirely helpful. I may have been better helped if I had had a measured plan which showed with accuracy the positions of the vehicles at the relevant times."

12. In fact, the judge did have a plan; and counsel had, very helpfully, before the trial began, worked out and agreed the approximate times and distances. Nonetheless, it appears to me that either the judge did not understand the sequence and timing of the traffic lights or that he was not prepared to grapple with the implications of the timing. This is puzzling because the timing and sequence had been explained to him and he had correctly set out the evidence earlier in his judgment. But, the judge did not deal, in particular, with the implications of the safety feature of these lights which ensured that all four lights were on red for four seconds. That margin of safety meant that if the appellant did indeed cross his light just after it had gone red, he would have had plenty of time to clear the junction before the fire engine was permitted by his green light to enter the junction.
13. Mr Davis submitted that the judge must have understood the sequencing of lights. He clearly found that the fire engine had waited until his light was green. If that meant that the appellant must have driven across a light which had been red for several seconds, so be it. I cannot accept that submission. The judge made specific findings in respect of each driver. He found that the appellant went through as the light was turning red. He found that the fire engine did not cross into the junction until his light had turned green. In my judgment, those two findings are mutually inconsistent, given the agreed evidence about the sequence of the lights.
14. In my judgment the judge has failed to grapple with the implications of the sequence and timing of the lights and there is, as a consequence, a material error in his reasoning. For that reason, in my judgment, the appeal must be allowed and the case remitted for rehearing before another judge.

Lord Justice Wilson:

15. As my Lady has foreshadowed, I agree with her judgment.

Lord Justice Dyson:

16. I also agree.

Order: Appeal allowed