England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
(LORD JUSTICE RIX)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2
		14th July 2006

1. LORD JUSTICE WALLER: Mr Perotti is making an application for permission to appeal an order made by Rix LJ and Tugendhat J in the Administrative Court on 6 April 2006 imposing a civil proceedings order upon him under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act. That court refused permission to appeal. The details of Mr Perotti's litigious activity are accurately summarised in the judgment of the Administrative Court. The judgment also sets out the relevant principles to be applied on an application for a section 42 order by the Attorney General. It would not be right to take up time repeating what is fully set out in the judgment. A brief summary of the background to this application will suffice.
2. Mr Perotti's uncle, Lorenzo Perotti, died in 1984 leaving a will under which Mr Perotti was one of the beneficiaries. In 1992 Mr Perotti commenced proceedings alleging mismanagement of the estate and seeking the removal of Mr Kenneth Watson, the administrator. In 1997 Rimer J gave judgment on the claim. His findings were mostly against Mr Perotti, though he made some findings against Mr Watson, and Mr Perotti was ordered to pay three-quarters of Mr Watson's costs. Those costs then were estimated at some £240,000. He appealed against that judgment but that appeal was unsuccessful.
3. In the following years Mr Perotti attempted to re-litigate many of the issues determined in the first action. The proceeds of the uncle's estate and Mr Perotti's own finances have been exhausted by that litigation, and he has felt entitled to try everything he could to rectify and remedy the situation. He has sued Mr Watson no fewer that four times, and in total there have been some ten actions by Mr Perotti in connection with his uncle's estate and the disputes over it. On many occasions he has brought actions against solicitors and counsel who would have at some point acted in the proceedings, not only his own but also those instructed by other parties. Mr Perotti has been subject to two what are called Grepe v Loam orders made against him in 1997 and 1999 in respect of the proceedings brought by him. On 10 September 1999 Laddie J sentenced Mr Perotti to three months' imprisonment for contempt of court for breach of freezing orders made against his property in pursuit of the costs of his first action.
4. On 10 April 2003, as a result of the multiplicity of actions against Mr Watson, Neuberger J, as he then was, made what is called an extended civil restraint order restraining him from bringing any action against Mr Watson or his firm in the High Court or in the county court without applying to himself or Rimer J for permission on paper. Following many repeated and unmeritorious claims against various solicitors and counsel who had been involved in the various proceedings, on 21 July 2004 Evans-Lombe J made a general civil restraint order restraining him for two years from issuing proceedings or making any application in the High Court or any county court against any persons concerning any matter without first obtaining permission from him on paper. On 26 February 2004 Chadwick LJ, dismissing 11 unmeritorious applications to the Court of Appeal, directed the Civil Appeals Office to accept no further notices of appeal from Mr Perotti until after the hearing of an application restraining his litigious activities in this court. On 21 May 2004 this court dismissed 14 applications by Mr Perotti and by an order dated 27 July 2004 directed:

"(1) that Neuberger J's ECRO should be amended (a) so as to require any application for permission to appeal to the court of appeal not to be made without notice in writing to Evans-Lombe J (or another nominated High Court judge), and not to be subject to any appeal unless the judge himself gave permission to appeal, and (b) so as to extend to 21 May 2006 … that order.

(2) that any other application to the court of appeal by Mr Perotti 'in any matter not embraced' by that amended ECRO should, for the next two years, be considered only by a judge of the court of appeal on paper without reconsideration at any hearing, unless such judge considered an oral hearing would be appropriate; and

(3) that the Civil Appeals Office should send all relevant papers to the Attorney General so that he might consider whether it would be appropriate to seek an order against Mr Perotti under section 42 of the 1981 Act..."

5. The Solicitor General authorised the making of an application under section 42 of the Act on 27 June 2005. The claim was issued on behalf of the Attorney General on 21 November 2005 and, as I have indicated, that claim came before Rix LJ and Tugendhat J, who made an order at the close of the hearing on 6 April 2006. In a detailed judgment, the court rejected Mr Perotti's submission that he had been tricked into starting his litigation with Mr Watson or that he had been ensnared into it by his own ignorance of the law. It noted that Mr Perotti had been legally represented in the initial stages of the litigation, and noted also that if Mr Perotti had accepted the judgment of Rimer J and of the Court of Appeal on appeal he would not be in the situation he now finds himself in. The court held that Mr Perotti had subjected defendants to harassment and expense out of all proportion to any gain likely to accrue to him, and they held there was no doubt that the litigation had acquired the hallmark of being habitual and persistent with the required degree of repetition. The court did not accept Mr Perotti's submissions that the previous civil restraint orders were effective and that the section 42 order was therefore unnecessary. The court held that the previous orders, which were soon to expire, had not been wholly effective and it had no doubt that Mr Perotti would redouble his efforts if he was allowed to do so. The court also rejected Mr Perotti's submission that a section 42 order was unnecessary at this stage, as it could be sought and obtained in the event of any future vexatious proceedings. The court noted Mr Perotti's assurances to Rimer J which were not honoured, his conviction for contempt of court, and the series of increasingly restrictive orders which his behaviour had obliged the courts to make against him.
6. Of particular relevance, the court noted that in the present claim Mr Perotti had responded to the witness statement submitted on behalf of the Attorney General with 14 applications to commence criminal proceedings; and the court opined that they appeared, on any view, to lack any reasonable ground. The court was therefore satisfied that Mr Perotti had habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground both instituted vexatious civil proceedings, and made vexatious applications in civil proceedings. They were of the view that it was necessary to make a civil proceedings order against him. The court held that a section 42 civil proceedings order was needed to replace the two civil restraint orders that were shortly to expire, and would prevent the uncertainty that had arisen about the scope of the existing civil restraint orders.
7. Mr Perotti's grounds of appeal are set out in his application. He suggests that he should be entitled to argue before the Court of Appeal that such an order is unnecessary; unfair; unnecessarily punitive, especially the penal notices; unwarranted; contradictory; plainly wrong in the circumstances, especially in the light of his offer to the court described at paragraph 4.1 of his grounds. Those grounds are expanded on in ground 3, which relies on the existence of the GCRO against him due to expire in July 2006 and relies on Mr Perotti stating that he could think of no further actions he would be taking. It is expanded on in ground 3.1, which states he has shown himself respectful of previous restraining orders, and ground 4 where he suggests it was unfair to describe his submissions as requesting a last chance. He says that his submission was that "the proof of the pudding is in the eating". He submits there are no actions outstanding and he says there are no new actions contemplated, and he says that shows that a section 42 order is unnecessary. In ground 4.1 he offered to have imposed on him a rigid condition requiring him to serve with proceedings a notice enabling defendants to consider applying for a ruling that the proceedings were vexatious. Clearly whatever he is seeking, however one describes it, it is a last chance. This was dealt with by a divisional court in their judgment where they said at paragraph 63:

"Of greater relevance are his submissions that the civil restraint orders, and in particular those of July 2004, are working and that a new section 42 order is unnecessary; and that, in any event, he should be given a last chance. However, we are unable to accept those submissions. The orders have not stopped him from attempting to pursue unreasonable appeals: they have merely stopped him from reduplicating his attempts to do so. They have not stopped him from multiplying unnecessary and unreasonable litigation in circumstances where he is the defendant, as the most recent scheduled cases illustrate. And they have not stopped him from turning his obsession towards the sanctions of the criminal law, as his letters to the Commissioners demonstrate. These events show that, if he had the opportunity, he would reduplicate his efforts once he was allowed to do so. As for his last chance submission, we note the reassurances he offered Rimer J in the first action, but which he was unable to carry into action, and we also note his contempt of court, and the growing need to restrain him by the various orders which have been made against him over the years".

That paragraph, if I may say so, makes compelling reading, and in my judgment there is simply no prospect of the Court of Appeal taking a different view.

8. Ground 1.7 suggests that the court misdirected itself by failing to accept that any court of whatever level is not bound by any judgment of whatever level. I for my part could find no place in which it could be said that the divisional court misdirected itself. If ground 5 of Mr Perotti's grounds of appeal is suggested as support for the misdirection, the challenge Mr Perotti threw out to the court simply demonstrates his obsession and the need for a section 42 order.
9. So far as ground 6 is concerned he suggests it unfair to put a penal notice on the order that was made by the divisional court. In my view there was every reason to impose a penal notice in the light of the history, and it would be most unusual not to have done so.
10. Ground 1.8 suggests the court unfairly refused to deal with the applications sought in his two witness statements. That appears to be a reference to the applications made for an order that the Attorney General should be required to prosecute certain persons. The divisional court dealt with that application in this way at paragraph 64:

"Of particular relevance, we note that in the present application itself, Mr Perotti has responded in his witness statements dated 30 January and 3 April 2006 by making no less than 14 numbered applications, some of them with several sub-paragraphs, e.g. for an order that the Attorney General do prosecute or cause the CPS to prosecute the 'named criminals listed in my two letters to the Commissioners of Police'. We told Mr Perotti that we were not prepared to entertain such applications, which in any event appeared to lack any reasonable ground".

In my view the divisional court was absolutely right not to entertain such applications on an application under section 42, and there is no prospect of persuading the Court of Appeal to take a different view.

11. He then suggests that the judgment was unfair and/or unbalanced, and amongst other things the court had unfairly failed to provide him with legal representation and/or to assist him in matters of law. He supports that by grounds 7 and 8 of his grounds of appeal. I can detect no basis for saying that the judgment was unbalanced and unfair. It seems to me in its terms to be scrupulously balanced and fair. So far as ground 1.10 is concerned, the court was under no obligation to provide legal assistance. Indeed, Mr Perotti has a deal of experience in arguing points before the court and he had plenty of time to prepare himself for the application.
12. In my view the divisional court's judgment, and its decision to impose a section 42 order, is unassailable. There is no prospect of a Court of Appeal taking a different view and I would dismiss this application for permission to appeal.
13. LORD JUSTICE JACOB: I agree and have nothing to add.

Order: Application refused.