England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM CHANCERY DIVISION
(MR G MOSS QC, Sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Wednesday, 17th April 2002

Wednesday, 17th April 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE CARNWATH: This is an application for permission to appeal against a decision of Mr Gabriel Moss QC, sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court, on 18th January 2002. The dispute related to a property at 16 Primrose Court, 49 Prince Albert Road, London NW8. The events date back to April 1987 when there was an agreement to buy the property, and Mr Assuity, who is the appellant before me, came into that by providing part of the purchase price. At the trial there was a considerable conflict of evidence about what precisely the agreement was, but in the event the judge took a strong view that he preferred the evidence of the claimant, Mr Hanfy, and did not accept the evidence of Mr Assuity, and he gave his reasons for that. In the event he gave judgment against Mr Assuity on all the material issues.
2. Mr Assuity seeks permission to appeal. His grounds of appeal as put before the court referred to various documents which he said had not been taken into account. The nub of his case before me relates to a statutory demand served by Mr Bebawy, who is the third defendant, and gave evidence which no doubt tied in with that of Mr Hanfy. Mr Assuity points to the last paragraph of that, the particulars of the debt where, having referred to the agreement, the following appear:

"You hold the property subject to the creditor's equitable charge, and the creditor now calls for the immediate repayment of the monies due to him under the agreement reached, which he must now consider revoked."

3. So Mr Assuity says whatever agreement there was, that had been revoked.
4. There are two problems with that as a ground of appeal. First, Mr Assuity fairly accepts that he did not make that point to the judge; second, at best, that is an indication of a unilateral statement by Mr Bebawy. Again Mr Assuity accepts that there is no indication that that was ever accepted by the other parties to the agreement so as to revoke the agreement between the parties. So on those two grounds it seems to me that by itself it does not provide a basis on which this court could possibly say that the whole matter has to go back to the judge.
5. Mr Assuity makes a number of other points. He says that in particular the judge did not call for the bank statements which would have shown further information on the matter. However, again it seems to me too late at this stage for this court to try and re-open these issues. I accept that Mr Assuity was in a difficulty, which faces many litigants in person in a trial, in trying to assemble the material he needed, and he felt that he was not able to draw the judge's attention to the points which we regard as important. But unfortunately those matters are not ones which by themselves would justify this court in intervening.
6. In those circumstances I am afraid I have no alternative but to refuse permission to appeal, which I now do.
(Application refused; no order for costs).