England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM GREAT GRIMSBY COUNTY COURT
(His Honour Judge Reddihough)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Tuesday 7th May, 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE THORPE: Mr Paul Spencer seeks permission to appeal a judgment of His Honour Judge Reddihough given in the Grimsby County Court on 20th September 2001. The judge was sitting in appeal on orders made by District Judge Robinson in the court on 13th and 14th March and 2nd May. In order to understand the history, I say only that proceedings were brought under the Family Law Act by Susan Spencer, to whom Paul Spencer had been married in 1991. There is one child of the marriage, J, who is about six and an older child from Susan Spencer's previous relationship, D, who is about 17.
2. The application before District Judge Robinson on 13th March was an application for a non-molestation injunction. There was a brief hearing on the 13th, both parties attending but only the wife represented. An order was made on that day, but there was to be a further hearing on the following day relating to contact and residence disputes. The order was amended on the following day to include D's name in the relief, apparently on the court's motion.
3. The order that was made is what might be described as the conventional non-molestation order to ensure that there is no uncontrolled friction between parties who are at war. Mr Spencer was injuncted from using or threatening violence or from intimidating, harassing or pestering. Mr Spencer says that there is an element of stigma involved in those orders, and perhaps he is right in that in the eyes of those who are not so familiar with this legal territory.
4. The judge was only dealing with the matter as a provisional determination. He ordered Mr Spencer to file his evidence in answer by 19th March and set the issue over for further consideration on 21st May. Unfortunately, in the interim breaches were alleged to have occurred on 28th and 29th March and also on 14th April. On 14th April the wife applied for committal for breach of the non-molestation orders using County Court Form N78, and that application came before the court, again District Judge Robinson, on 2nd May. The proceedings have been transcribed, and it is possible to see the whole course of the day from the transcript. The wife gave evidence and two further witnesses were called by her counsel. Then Mr Spencer gave evidence and three witnesses were called by his counsel. Then each counsel made submissions and the judge delivered his judgment. The outcome was that two of the breaches were found proved, but the District Judge noted that there had been no violence and that the allegations were not of the most serious character. Accordingly, in respect of one of the two breaches found he imposed a sentence of seven days but suspended for six months; and in respect of the other he imposed no sentence, but did extend the injunction order for 12 months from that day to expire on 2nd May 2002.
5. Mr Spencer exercised his right of appeal, which brought him before Judge Reddihough on 20th September. The wife was represented by the same counsel who had appeared for her on 2nd May, but Mr Spencer was in person. He challenged the orders of 13th and 14th March, essentially asserting that there had been no process of fair trial since he had not had representation. He had not had the opportunity of cross-examining the wife and he had not had the opportunity of putting in his case. He criticised the subsequent committal proceedings, since they were conducted by the same District Judge, who stated plainly that he knew the history and that prior knowledge inevitably resulted in prior judgment, submits Mr Spencer.
6. Judge Reddihough delivered a careful and comprehensive judgment, running to 46 paragraphs, in which he sought to explain to Mr Spencer why there was no merit in his appeal. I have considered this judgment to see if anywhere within it there is any semblance of misdirection or error. However, I can find none. This is simply not business for the Court of Appeal. There has already been an appeal in the County Court. I am not deciding today the issue as to whether section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 bites in a case such as this, where the original committal order is made by the District Judge and where there has then been an internal appeal. I have heard no argument on this difficult point and it is unnecessary to venture upon that ground in this case, since the whole structure in the court below is so manifest.
7. There are two very plain additional reasons why this court should not become involved. The first is that time for application to this court expired on 4th October 2001, but Mr Spencer's application was not filed until 29th November. It was therefore nearly eight weeks out of time.
8. The final reason why this court should not entertain these proceedings is because the orders of 2nd May 2001 are now time spent. The sentence of imprisonment was suspended for six months, and within that period there was nothing about which the least complaint against Mr Spencer could be made. As to the extension of the injunction, the period of 12 months has also expired. It inspired in fact on Thursday of last week. So these two orders are now but history. Of course Mr Spencer feels that he is the victim of injustice. He thinks that the law should be changed to ensure that others do not find themselves in the same circumstances as him. I understand him to say that there should really be public funding for respondents, not just to applications to commit but also to applications for injunctions. Well all that may be, but it is a matter for public policy to be decided by government and it is way outside the function of this court to determine issues in that field.
9. For all those reasons, there is nothing that I can do to assist Mr Spencer. It is my plain obligation to dismiss this application for permission for all the reasons which I have stated.
ORDER: Applications for permission to appeal and an extension of time refused. (Order not part of approved judgment)