England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
CIVIL DIVISION
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT
EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL

		The Royal Courts of Justice The Strand London Friday 26 April 2002

Friday 26 April 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE PILL: This is an application for permission to appeal against a judgment of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, Lindsay J presiding, on 18 June 2001. At a preliminary hearing the Tribunal dismissed an appeal by Mr Mamnoon H Siddiki against a decision of an Employment Tribunal for London South given on 6 July 2000. The Tribunal, Professor Rideout presiding, unanimously decided that the applicant had failed to prove that he was discriminated against by the respondent, the Barfield Group, on grounds of race contrary to section 13 of the Race Relations Act 1976. The Employment Tribunal gave detailed reasons for its decision.
2. The Employment Appeal Tribunal similarly considered the submissions made to them, by Mr Siddiki in person, in some detail at the preliminary hearing. The Employment Appeal Tribunal concluded (paragraph 12):

"We have not been able to find any arguable error of law, and we have to emphasis that, in any part of the matters raised in the Notice of Appeal or in the statement in support. Nor have we found anything that can genuinely raise a claim that can be described as arguable in relation to prejudice or bias on the Tribunal's part or on the Chairman's part below. Accordingly not being able to find any such feature, we have no option but, even at this preliminary stage, to dismiss the appeal."

3. The form IT1 was presented to the Employment Tribunal on 16 February 2000. Mr Siddiki wanted to set up his own small business and was referred to the Barfield Group, an organisation which provides advice to adults who are long-term unemployed. He was interviewed by a business consultant employed by the Group in August 1999 and he said he wanted to establish a small takeaway food enterprise. There were discussions, in the course of which it became clear that a lot of planning and work would be required from Mr Siddiki. There were progress meetings but progress appeared to be slow. The Barfield Group claim that at a meeting in November 1999 it was agreed by Mr Siddiki that the long hours, lack of capital and his less than perfect health meant that the project was unlikely to succeed and the programme of proposed training between Mr Siddiki and the Group was brought to an end.
4. I say that by way of factual background. The circumstances in which the case comes to this court are, on the basis of what Mr Siddiki has told me this morning, extraordinary. He has prepared a document for the court, at page 30 of his bundle, which sets out matters which are substantially the same as he has courteously told me this morning. He says that he went to the Employment Tribunal because he had a complaint against the Barfield Group by way of breach of a commercial contract. He had never alleged that he had a contract of employment but that he had a claim against them, as one proposed businessman against a business organisation, of a breach of a commercial contract. He says that the Chairman, once he had said that, nevertheless insisted that he go on with the complaint of racial discrimination he was making.
5. It is clear that the Employment Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider the breach of commercial contract which Mr Siddiki sought to allege. He says that he had been in touch with the Citizens Advice Bureau at Balham High Street. Mr Siddiki submits that the Chairman of the Employment Tribunal should then have "closed down the hearing". Mr Siddiki says that he was required to continue and felt that he would have been in contempt of court had he not continued with the complaint to the Employment Tribunal which was not, in fact, the complaint that he sought to make.
6. It appears from the judgment of the Employment Appeal Tribunal that complaints were then pursued, not in relation to the commercial contract which is the real source of complaint, but in relation to the conduct of the Employment Tribunal on matters which the applicant says were not for them to consider at all. I refer briefly to the written document which has been submitted at page 30 of the bundle:

"... the Judge [the Employment Tribunal Chairman] insisted to start the hearing. If hearing was adjourned and later I had legal representation that would have made a different decision."

and:

"The EAT admits that the Tribunal had limited jurisdiction and only with Employment Contracts. It is arguable therefore in the light of above the Tribunal was in error to assume full jurisdiction over my case. ... the Tribunal was in error to hear my case, or I had submitted that to a county court immediately. In this way the Tribunal perverted [the course of] justice.

In view of above, I beg the [honourable] court that Appeal be allowed on the judgment of EAT."

7. When asked what he wanted this court to do, Mr Siddiki told me that he wanted a direction that the appeal be directed to the county court. This court has no jurisdiction to make any such direction, nor would it be appropriate to do so. Mr Siddiki has helpfully told me that he has spoken to someone within this building who has sought to advise him this morning. As I understand it, the advice he has received is that his complaint should be brought in the county court. He has been warned, very properly, that a limitation period applies in relation to claims in the county court.
8. I can see no basis for an appeal to this court. It is not arguable that this court is going to take any action to reverse the decision either of the Employment Appeal Tribunal or of the Employment Tribunal. It is unfortunate, on what I have been told this morning, that the applicant has pursued for so long a track which, on what he has told me, is not the proper track. I have made clear to him that I am not in a position to advise him about it and he may wish to take further advice as to whether he should bring an action in the county court. I am certainly not expressing any view -- I am not a position to do so in any event -- as to the possible merits or demerits of any such action. All I can do is to consider the application to this court in the way Mr Siddiki himself puts it.
9. There is no virtue in this court remaining seised of the matter. There is no arguable ground of appeal. For the reasons I have given this application is refused.
ORDER: Application refused