England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM WILLESDEN COUNTY COURT
(His Honour Judge Copley)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Thursday, 11th April 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE THORPE: Mr. L is the applicant in person for permission to appeal an order made by His Honour Judge Copley in the Willesden County Court on 21st November 2001. His application for permission was lodged on 4th December and supported by an impressive skeleton argument in which he advanced a number of arguments, all supported by abundant reference to decided cases, largely in this court. But for one reason or another his application has taken some four months to reach an oral hearing. In the meantime, there have been very significant developments in the case which have been recorded in a letter written by counsel for the respondent, Mr. Stewart Wernham. I have been through these developments with Mr. L this afternoon. He broadly agrees the facts and adds that there has been a further direction given by the court on 28th March, which has effectively set the case down for further review on a date in June. In the light of all these developments, the application for permission is rendered entirely academic. The order of 21st November is now no more than part of the archive of the litigation.
2. What worries me is that the applicant has not had direct contact for something approaching a year now, and the order of 28th March only advances the case insofar as it provides for a one hour direction review in mid-June. The progress achieved between 21st November and a future hearing in the middle of June is disappointingly scant. It is true that by mid-June there will have been an assessment by The Coram Foundation. It is true that in the interim there will have been a completed DVIP assessment and report but in my opinion that is insufficient as the product of no less than seven months of further passage of time.
3. What is the explanation for this disappointing product? Mr. L tells me that on 12 February, when the court made an order by consent for the Coram assessment, the court erroneously referred the case to Thomas Coram direct. The result was a refusal by the Thomas Coram to accept the referral on the simple ground that it should have been the CAFCASS officer. Once that error was corrected CAFCASS itself made the referral. Thomas Coram has now accepted responsibility. But that mistake, seemingly made by the court, has undoubtedly contributed to the delay.
4. I have an anxiety that a further factor that has contributed to this history is that Mr. L has not had competent and energetic solicitors to press for expedition and priority. I make no criticism at all of the mother's solicitors, but the reality is that there is no incentive on them to move the case on. It might be said that the development of this sterile period, in which there is no contact between father and child, is to the direct advantage of the mother. So it is important that Mr. L appreciates the value of representation, at least by a specialist solicitor. There is some inequality of arms in that the mother is publicly funded, while his salary disentitles him to public funding. I have explained to him the opportunity to identify a dedicated specialist solicitor as a result of the introduction of accreditation schemes by both the Law Society and the SFLA. That is well illustrated by the writing paper of the wife's solicitors, which distinguishes the qualifications of the respective partners. Mr. L can see for himself that, amongst the six partners in the firm representing the wife, there is one who styles herself as being SFLA accredited. I assume that details as to who within the membership is accredited are readily available, either from the Law Society or from the SFLA.
5. That is all a bit of an aside which I offer out of a concern to see this case move on, but I am absolutely clear in my own mind that this application for permission would not advance that end in any way were it granted. The only result would be to expose Mr. L to the problem of presenting a hopeless appeal and the risk of having to pay the costs incurred in its disposal. For all those reasons this application is refused.
Order: Application refused.