England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM WEST LONDON COUNTY COURT
(His Honour Judge Cowell)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Tuesday, 12th March 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE MUMMERY: This is an application for permission to appeal. The application is made on behalf of Yeomen's Row Management Limited. In the appellant's notice a request was made that a director of the company, Miss Mainwaring, be permitted to speak for the company on the hearing of the appeal. I gave permission for Miss Mainwaring, as one of the directors and shareholders of the company, to appear on the hearing of this application. In my view, it is a matter for the full court to decide whether she is permitted to appear before them on the hearing of the appeal. On that point I would indicate now that, if Miss Mainwaring wishes to have that point clarified in advance of the hearing, an application should be made to the supervising Lord Justice in relation to rights of audience at the full hearing. For today's purposes I grant permission.
2. I have heard only brief submissions from Miss Mainwaring. As I indicated at the outset, having read the papers, in particular the judgment of His Honour Judge Cowell in the West London County Court on 24th July 2001, and the judgment of Pumfrey J dismissing the appeal by the company against Judge Cowell's order on 18th December 2001, and a detailed skeleton argument dated 13th February 2002, I formed the view that this case falls within the criteria which apply in relation to second appeals to this court. Under Part 52.13.2 the Court of Appeal will not give permission (this is in relation to second appeals) unless it considers that (a) the appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice, or (b) there is some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. While expressing no views about the prospects of success on the appeal, I am satisfied that the appeal raises an important point of principle or practice in relation to provisions in tenancy agreements of the kind which is in issue here.
3. The dispute between the parties arises in respect of the property, 44 Yoemen's Row, which is owned by the company, and of which the respondent, Mrs Karen Meyrick is the successor to a statutory tenancy. The tenancy was originally a contractual tenancy granted to Mrs Meyrick by the trustees of Henry Smith Charity on 26th September 1958. The agreement contains the provision the construction of which is in dispute. The relevant provision is clause 2.20. It is a covenant by the tenant "to permit the landlords and their agent and all persons authorised by them at all reasonable times to take inventories of the fixtures in the said flat and to execute any repairs or work to the inside or outside of the said flat and also for the purpose of executing any repairs or work to or in connection with any flats above or below or adjoining the said flat to enter upon the said flat or any part thereof with or without any necessary tools or appliances." The company wishes to execute what it describes as repairs or work to the flat in accordance with a schedule and has requested permission to enter in order to do that. That has been refused. The question is whether Mrs Meyrick was entitled, on the true construction of this provision, to make that refusal. Judge Cowell and Pumfrey J thought that she was, holding that the apparent width of the words "or work" in clause 2.20 is, on its proper construction, restricted to work "akin to repair". That is the ruling on construction which the company wishes to appeal against. There are detailed arguments in the skeleton argument as to what is the proper approach to the construction of clause 2.20, in particular, the applicability of the approach to construction discussed by the House of Lords in the case of Investors Compensation Scheme Limited v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896. I say no more about the rival arguments, or about the consequences of them or about the merits of them. It is sufficient to justify granting permission that this appeal does raise a point of importance as to how such a provision should be construed, a point that goes beyond the facts of this case between these two parties, though it is obviously of importance to both of them. I grant permission to appeal.
Order: Application granted; if Miss Wainwaring wishes to speak on the company's behalf an application should be made to the supervising Lord Justice; time estimate one day; applicant granted permission to put in a supplemental skeleton argument after receiving the respondent's skeleton argument. (Order not part of the judgment of the court)