England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL
AND AN EXTENSION OF TIME

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Friday, 1st March 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE PILL: This is an application for permission to appeal against a decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal which had dismissed a decision of an Employment Tribunal. The decision of the EAT, His Honour Judge Peter Clarke presiding, was given on 6th June and sent to the parties on 7th July 2001. The appeal was against a decision of the Employment Tribunal, to which I will refer.
2. The substance of the applicant Mr Deman's claim is against the Association of University Teachers. It involves allegations of race and sex discrimination and victimisation alleged to have occurred in September 2000. The hearing was due to be in September 2000. There was a suggestion that a restriction order upon those proceedings would be made. Indeed, a stay was granted in favour of the AUT for a short period, the Employment Tribunal stating:

"I therefore order a stay of those proceedings for one month and if no application has been made under Section 33 by one month from today's date, i.e. by 3 October 2000, then it will be open to the applicant's representative to apply for the hearing of this case to be reinstated."

3. In the event any restriction was withdrawn, at least by 9th February 2001.
4. However the complaint made to the EAT was in relation to the earlier order of the Employment Tribunal that there should be a stay. It was that appeal which came before the EAT. That tribunal pointed out that, in view of the fact that any application for a stay on proceedings had now been withdrawn, the appeal against the stay granted in anticipation of the possibility that an order might be made against Mr Deman was academic. The tribunal went on to hold in judgment (pages C3 to C5 of the bundle prepared by the applicant) that the decision had been one that the EAT were entitled to make. A suggestion of bias had also been made by way of appeal to the EAT and they rejected the suggestion that there had been bias in the Employment Tribunal, stating:

" ..... we can see no evidence of bias or the appearance of bias in the decision which was reached by Mr Rabin."

5. The applicant has referred to a letter at page 143 of the bundle. That was a letter from the Commission for Racial Equality to the Regional Secretary for Tribunals. It referred to the complaint of the applicant against the AUT. It was dated 5th October 2000 and stated:

"I am instructed to request that the stay of proceedings ordered at that hearing"

that is the hearing of the Employment Tribunal

"be lifted and that these proceedings be allowed to continue."

6. Reference was also made to the Human Rights Act. The applicant has not pointed to any letter, or other way, in which the suggestion that the proceedings be allowed to continue was pursued by the CRE or anyone else. No good reason has been placed before me why that original complaint to the Employment Tribunal has not been pursued.
7. When the point was put to him, Mr Deman referred me to other correspondence he has had with officers of the tribunal service. They do not appear to me to assist at all and certainly provide no explanation as to why he has failed to pursue his original complaint against the AUT.
8. Mr Deman requested a review of the decision of the EAT. On 14th August 2001 they declined to review it. I find that a wholly understandable decision.
9. The grounds of appeal to this court are that the EAT erred in law in not ruling on his application for an adjournment, that they erred by refusing him leave to appeal without providing copies of documents to the lay members, that they erred in refusing leave to appeal without hearing the application properly, that threats were made to the applicant, that the tribunal then erred in law by refusing the request for a review and then for permission to appeal to this court and that the tribunal had shown a lack of regard for the Human Rights Act. I still fail to understand why this matter has come before this court at all. This court is now asked to give permission to appeal against an order which was of limited duration and has long since expired. In any event, I see no merit in the application. I agree with the EAT that in the circumstances and on the material before them the Employment Tribunal were entitled to make the order they did.
10. Mr Deman has addressed the court orally on this application. He has not developed the point about copies of documents; I am not surprised about that. I see no merit whatever in that point, having regard to the academic nature of the entire appeal to the EAT. I see no merit in the suggestion that the EAT did not properly deal with the matter, having considered the judgment which they gave. The Human Rights Act does not, in my judgment, assist the applicant in this respect. I see no basis upon which he can argue that he has not had the opportunity for a fair hearing. If he has not had a hearing before now in the Employment Tribunal it is because he declined to take steps to have it heard by them. I see no merit in any suggestion that he would not have a fair hearing in the Employment Tribunal. Whether after this lapse of time they would be prepared to consider the application as a matter of substance, I do not know. That is a matter for them and not one upon which this court should express a view. I see no arguable basis upon which this court could reverse the decision of the EAT.
11. Accordingly I refuse this application for permission to appeal.
Order: Application refused