COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION
London, WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE JUDGE
LORD JUSTICE CARNWATH
| CARL GOUGH AND GARY SMITH||Appellants|
|- and -|
|THE CHIEF CONSTABLE OF DERBYSHIRE||Respondent|
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited, 190 Fleet Street
London EC4A 2AG
Tel No: 020 7421 4040, Fax No: 020 7831 8838
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
Mr Philip Havers, QC, and S Davenport (instructed by Weightmans for the Respondent)
Mr David Pannick QC and Mark Hoskins (instructed by The Treasury Solicitor for the Secretary of State)
AS APPROVED BY THE COURT
Crown Copyright ©
Lord Phillips MR :
This is the judgment of the Court.
“It has become common for groups of males to associate themselves with Football Clubs as a vehicle for them to become involved in violence and disorder. This has developed to the stage where this has become extremely organised. These groups will often make use of mobile phones and the internet to arrange fights with other like-minded individuals. These fights often involve the use of weapons, e.g., knives, bottles, and CS gas. They usually occur away from football grounds at railway stations or in or around city centre public houses.”
“Disorderliness has been associated with football since the end of the nineteenth century when it became a mass spectator sport. However, it only became recognised as a major social problem in the 1960s when domestic football grounds regularly provided a venue for fights and other kinds of disorder involving many hundreds of young males. Since 1977, attention has also focussed on the behaviour of English football fans when overseas. There has been a catalogue of incidents involving English supporters, including serious outbursts of violence and disorder in Luxembourg (1977), Turin (1980), Basle (1981), Oslo (1981), Paris (1984), West Germany (1988), Italy (1990), Sweden (1992), Amsterdam (1993), Rotterdam (1993), Dublin (1995), Rome (1997), Marseilles (1998), Glasgow (1999), Copenhagen (2000), Brussels (2000) and Charleroi (2000). These incidents have mainly taken place in connection with matches played by the English national team. However, serious problems have also arisen in relation to matches play by English club sides, eg. The UEFA Cup Final in Copenhagen in 2000 between Arsenal and Galatasaray. In most cases, the disorder has occurred in streets and bars rather than in the grounds and often during the period leading up to match day. Each incident has brought shame on our national reputation and also resulted in very many arrests and expulsions of English supporters by host nations. Acts of disorder by English supporters receive wide media coverage both in the UK and abroad.”
“No exclusion order may be made unless the court is satisfied that making such an order in relation to the accused would help to prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with prescribed football matches.”
“It shall be the duty of the court to make a …football banning order in relation to the accused if it is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that making the order would help to prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with prescribed [designated] football matches.”
“if the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order would help to prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with any regulated football matches.”
An appeal lies to the Crown Court against the imposition of a banning order.
“Notices are sent to all subjects prior to the control period for an England international match played overseas and, where appropriate, prior to the control period for an international club match involving the club that the subject supports. Each club match is looked at individually with a risk assessment made at that particular time. The risk of disorder at some club matches abroad is considered minimal and no reporting requirements are imposed. Exceptionally, where intelligence is received that attaches a greater degree of risk to a particular match, notices may be sent to subjects who do not have an allegiance to that club.”
“There is currently a group of males that can number between 40 and 60 for high profile games who come under the banner of the media term ‘football hooligans’. The policing term for these people is ‘football prominents’. In the Derby group they are males from 18 to 40. The group is commonly referred to by the public and themselves as the DLF (Derby Lunatic Fringe).”
“29/4/00. Tottenham v Derby, Gough attended London on this day on a rogue coach with 40 other Derby prominents. This coach was stopped and searched and was found to contain DLF calling cards, drugs and tickets for the game, all had been secreted on the coach. The group were allowed by police to walk into central London where they later became involved in slight disorder with West Brom prominents.”
“17/6/00. England v Germany Euro 2000 Championships. Smith was seen in the square in Charleroi after the disorder had occurred corralled by the Belgian riot police with around 15 other Derby prominents and 1,500 other England supporters.”
Judge Aujla’s decision
“The other condition is section 14B(4): whether or not I am satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order would help to prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with any regulated football matches.
I read this section to mean that I have to have reasonable grounds. I only have to have reasonable grounds to believe and, given the nature of the antecedents of all 11 and the matters that I have referred to earlier, I have no choice but to make banning orders on the basis that there are reasonable grounds to believe that they would help to prevent violence or disorder in the future.”
The appellants’ contentions
1. The Member States shall, acting as provided in this Directive, abolish restrictions on the movement and residence of:
(a) nationals of a Member State who are established or who wish to establish themselves in another Member State in order to pursue activities as self-employed persons, or who wish to provide services in that State;
(b) nationals of Member States wishing to go to another Member State as recipients of services;
1. Member States shall grant the persons referred to in Article 1 the right to leave their territory. Such right shall be exercised simply on production of a valid identity card or passport. Members of the family shall enjoy the same right as the national on whom they are dependent.
2. Member States shall, acting in accordance with their laws, issue to their nationals, or renew, an identity card or passport, which shall state in particular the holder’s nationality.
3. The passport must be valid at least for all Member States and for countries through which the holder must pass when travelling between Member States. Where a passport is the only document on which the holder may lawfully leave the country, its period of validity shall be not less than five years.
4. Member States may not demand from the persons referred to in Article 1 any exit visa or any equivalent requirement.”
i) The 1973 Directive has direct effect in English law;
ii) To the extent that the primary legislation in play in this case is incompatible with the 1973 Directive, it is thereby rendered void and this Court can and should so declare;
iii) By way of elaboration on the previous point, incompatibility with Community law cannot be amended by severance, with the consequence that if section 14B is incompatible with the 1973 Directive, it must be struck down in its entirety.
“(1) Banning orders necessarily involve derogations from the rights conferred on individuals by Article 2 of Directive 73/148/EEC. Such derogations are rendered unlawful by Article 8 of the Directive unless they can be justified on public policy grounds. Directive 73/148 has not been implemented in this respect into English law. Articles 2 and 8 are therefore directly enforceable in the English courts and as against UK public bodies. Thus, independently of the proper interpretation of the 1989 Act, banning orders are unlawful unless the derogations from the rights conferred on the Appellants by the Directive, imposed by the banning orders made in this case, can be justified on public grounds. The applications made by the Chief Constable and the judgments both of District Judge Aujla and of the Divisional Court are vitiated by failure to consider this issue. Further, there was manifestly no evidence on the basis of which orders could lawfully have been made if that issue had been considered.
(2) The UK legislative regime introduced in 2000 is contrary to Community law and therefore inapplicable insofar as it imposes mandatory restrictions on free movement within the Community on the basis of criteria that are not provided for or permitted by binding Community legislation.
(3) It is contrary to the Community law principle of proportionality to prevent an individual made subject to a banning order on the basis of the criteria laid down in section 14B(4) of the 1989 Act from travelling anywhere within the European Community, in order to reduce the risk of trouble at a football match or tournament taking place outside the United Kingdom, particularly where that match or tournament is not to take place within the European Community.
(4) As a matter of fundamental rights protected by Community law, the procedures for the imposition of banning orders under section 14B(4) are unfair, in contravention of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights:
(a) The standard of proof under section 14B(4)(b) is so low that a fair hearing is precluded.
(b) A notice of application for banning orders pursuant to section 14B(2) is a ‘criminal charge’ within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Convention but the procedural guarantees provided for in Article 6(3) are not provided for in the legislation or in practice.
Given the broad criteria for the making of such orders and their disproportionate geographical scope, they are also unjustified infringements of Article 8 of the Convention.”
“Member States shall not derogate from the provisions of this Directive save on grounds of public policy, public security or public health.”
Is there a public policy exception to Article 2 of the 1973 Directive?
i) Article 8 of the 1973 Directive is prohibitive, not permissive. It does not confer a public policy exception to the requirements of Article 2 but simply recognises the possibility that one may exist. One must look elsewhere to see the extent to which any public policy exception exists.
ii) The 1973 Directive states that it is directed to ‘the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the Community for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment and the provision of services’. As such, the Directive is aimed at the implementation of Chapters 2 and 3 of the EC Treaty. Chapter 3 deals with services and, in that chapter, Article 49 provides:
“Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Community shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of member states who are established in a state of the Community other than that of the person for whom the services are intended.”
iii) Article 55 provides that Article 49 is subject to Article 46. This Article is in Chapter 2, which deals with establishment. It provides:
“1. The provisions of this Chapter and measures taken in pursuance thereof shall not prejudice the applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action providing for special treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security or public health.”
iv) The forerunner of the 1973 Directive was Council Directive 64/220/EEC. That Directive had an Article 8 in identical terms to that in the 1973 Directive. One of the recitals to the Directive provided, however, that ‘co-ordination of measures justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health’ would be dealt with in a separate Directive.
v) The separate Directive is 64/221/EEC (‘the 1964 Directive’). That Directive includes a recital in the following terms:
1. The provisions of this Directive shall apply to any national of a member state who resides in or travels to another member state of the Community, either in order to pursue an activity as an employed or self-employed person, or as a recipient of services…
1. This Directive relates to all measures concerning entry into their territory, issue or renewal of residence permits, or expulsion from their territory, taken by member states on grounds of public policy, public security or public health…
1. Measures taken on grounds of public policy or public security shall be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned.
2. Previous criminal convictions shall not in themselves constitute grounds for the taking of such measures…”
vi) The last recital to the 1973 Directive refers expressly to the 1964 Directive.
vii) Thus, all the provisions dealing with restrictions on movement on grounds of public policy refer to restrictions affecting foreign nationals. Nowhere is there any provision which recognises that it is, or could be, lawful for a Member State to impose restrictions on movement on its own nationals on grounds of public policy. In the absence of such a provision, no derogation on grounds of public policy could be imposed in respect of the freedom granted to citizens of the United Kingdom to travel to another Member State under the 1973 Directive.
“Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any Member State.
Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 48, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is effected, subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital.”
“As long as freedom to provide services has not been abolished, each Member State shall apply such restrictions without distinction on grounds of nationality or residence to all persons providing services within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 49.”
“With regard to restrictions on the freedom to provide services imposed by the Member State of destination, the case-law of the Court draws a distinction between restrictions which are discriminatory and those which are non-discriminatory.
Restrictions which are discriminatory are compatible with the Treaty only if they fall within the scope of an express derogation, such as that contained in Article 56. Restrictions which are non-discriminatory may be compatible with the Treaty even if they do not benefit from an express derogation.”
“Countries which have the legal possibility to prevent risk fans from travelling abroad should take all the necessary measures to achieve this objective effectively and should inform the organising country accordingly. Each country should take all possible measures to prevent its own citizens from participating in and/or organising public order disturbances in another country.”
It would be, to say the least, surprising if the Council were urging measures which were outlawed by Community law.
Public policy and proportionality
The ban on leaving the country
“Although the protection of consumers in the other Member States is not, as such, a matter for the Netherlands authorities, the nature and extent of that protection does none the less have a direct effect on the good reputation of Netherlands financial services.
Maintaining the good reputation of the national financial sector may therefore constitute an imperative reason of public interest capable of justifying restrictions on the freedom to provide financial services.”
(i) Other Member States have requested this country to help in preventing our football hooligans from creating disorder at matches in their countries. This country should, as a matter of international comity do its best to comply with such requests.
(ii) Hooliganism by English and Welsh supporters abroad tarnishes the reputation of this country.
(iii) Such hooliganism can lead to the banning of English and Welsh clubs from international competitions. Such a ban will have serious financial implications for the clubs that are banned and for businesses associated with professional football, quite apart from depriving law abiding football supporters of legitimate pleasure.
The test of proportionality
“whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.”
“1. Measures taken on grounds of public policy or of public security shall be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned.
2. Previous criminal convictions shall not in themselves constitute grounds for the taking of such measures.”
(i) They must have been imposed after giving individual consideration to each appellant;
(ii) They cannot have been based simply upon the criminal record of each appellant;
(iii) They must be rationally connected to the objective of preventing English football hooliganism abroad;
(iv) They must be no more than was necessary to achieve that objective.
The significance of a criminal record
i) Anyone who is subject to a banning order who would have wished to go to a prescribed match abroad is likely to be prohibited from doing so. The ground on which he will be prevented will be that, on the basis of individual consideration of his circumstances, he has been identified by the Magistrates Court as a person likely to become involved in violence or disorder if permitted to go to prescribed football matches. The ban on going to the match abroad will be based on individual consideration of the person subject to the ban.
ii) Anyone who is subject to a banning order who wishes to go abroad during the period of a prescribed overseas match for a purpose other than going to, or near, the match will receive individual consideration.
iii) During the period of a prescribed overseas match, there will be a significant cohort of individuals who would not have wished to go to the match and who do not wish to go abroad for any other reason. They will be subject to the restrictions involving reporting and passport surrender. They will be subject to these restrictions on the basis that they are necessary to ensure that they do not go to the overseas game should they wish to do so. Once again the restrictions will be based on the individual consideration by the Magistrates Court which led to the conclusion that each individual was a person likely to get involved in violence or disorder should he go to or near a prescribed match.
Rationality and the scope of the restrictions
“The State was entitled to conclude that very firm measures were justified to confront the various sickening ills of football violence. The principle and the requirement which must be respected and followed have clearly been so: the progressive nature of the succeeding measures from 1986 onwards, and the safeguards clearly established in the 1989 Act, demonstrate as much. In short the terms of section 14B(4)(b) are amply justified in light of Council Direction 64/221/EEC, the Criminal proceedings against Calfa (Case C-348/96)  ECR I-11 jurisprudence and the general law relating to proportionality.”
The standard of proof required for making a banning order
Article 6 of the Convention
Were the orders justified on the facts?
Order: Appeal Dismissed. Order as per counsel’s Minute of Order.
Leave to appeal to the House of Lords refused.
The starting-point is to be found in Part IV of the Public Order Act 1986. This was the first measure taken by the legislature specifically to address the evils of hooliganism at football matches. S.30(1) empowered a court “by or before which a person is convicted of an offence to which s.31 applies” to make an “exclusion order”, that is an order “prohibiting him from entering any premises for the purpose of attending any prescribed football match there”. The meaning of “prescribed football match” did not include any matches played abroad. S.30(2) provided:
“No exclusion order may be made unless the court is satisfied that making such an order in relation to the accused would help to prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with prescribed football matches.”
S.31 applied to any offence which fulfilled one or more of three conditions set out in s.31(2) - (4). The first was that the offence was committed within a defined period of time starting not long before and ending not long after the match, and while the accused was at or entering or leaving the football ground concerned. The second was (essentially) that the offence involved violence or the threat of violence on the way to or from the match. The third was that the offence was one committed in breach of other statutory measures designed to control the consumption of alcohol on the way to or from football matches. S.32(2) provided that the duration of an exclusion order should be not less than three months. S.33(1) enabled a person in relation to whom an exclusion order had been made to apply to the court to terminate it.
Next in time comes the Football Spectators Act 1989, as originally enacted. S.14(1) provided in part:
“This Part of this Act applies in relation to football matches in any country outside England and Wales which are designated football matches...”
Here, then, is the first statutory measure to regulate attendance at matches abroad; and this Act, in its original form, dealt only with matches played abroad. S.14(4) defined a “restriction order” as “an order of a court under s.15 or 22 below requiring the person to whom the order applies to report to a police station on the occasion of designated football matches”. S.15 provided in part:
“(1) A court by or before which a person is convicted of a relevant offence... may make a restriction order in relation to him.
(2) No restriction order may be made unless the court is satisfied that making such an order in relation to the accused would help to prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with designated football matches.” - [effectively the same language as that of s.30(2) of the Act of 1986]
(3) A restriction order may only be made – (a) in addition to a sentence imposed in respect of the offence of which the accused is (or was) convicted; or (b) in addition to a probation order.”
“... the period for which a restriction order has effect in relation to a person convicted of a relevant offence is – (a) in a case where he was sentenced in respect of that offence to a period of imprisonment taking immediate effect, five years, and (b) in any other case, two years, beginning with the date of the making of the order.”
A failure without reasonable excuse to comply with the duty to report to a police station imposed by a restriction order is made a summary criminal offence: s.16(4) and (5). S.17 allows a person “in relation to whom a restriction order has had effect for at least one year” to apply to the court to terminate it. “Relevant offence” is defined in great detail in Schedule 1, it covers a whole series of statutory offences involving violence or the threat of violence, or drunkenness at, near, or on the way to or from a designated football match. S.22 made provision for offences under the law of countries outside England and Wales to be treated as if they were Schedule 1 offences.
Here, then, were two statutory regimes, respectively constituted by the Acts of 1986 and 1989, made by Parliament to respond to what was plainly an increasing barbarism. The later Act recognised the particular evil of violence and drunkenness by British fans abroad.
The Football (Offences and Disorder) Act 1999 amended both the Act of 1986 and the Act of 1989. The Act of 1986 was amended by ss.6 - 8. A “domestic football banning order” was substituted for an exclusion order. A new s.30(2) was enacted as follows:
“Subject to subsection (4), it shall be the duty of the court to make a domestic football banning order in relation to the accused if it is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that making the order would help to prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with prescribed football matches.”
S.30(4) as substituted provided:
“A domestic football banning order may only be made - (a) in addition to a sentence imposed in respect of the offence of which the accused is (or was) convicted; or (b) in addition to an order discharging him absolutely or conditionally.”
S.32(2) as substituted by s.8(1), provided that the duration of a domestic football banning order should be not less than one year and not more than three years.
The Act of 1989 was amended so that the following substitute provisions were made in s.15 by s.1 of the 1999 Act:
“(1) Subject to subsection (3) below – (a) court by or before which a person is convicted of a relevant offence, or (b) [the Crown Court where the person has been committed there], shall have the power to make an international football banning order in relation to him.
(2) Subject to subsection (3) below, it shall be the duty of the court to make an international football banning order in relation to the accused if it is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that making the order would help to prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with designated football matches.” [effectively the same language as is used in the new s.30(2) of the Act of 1986]
The new s.15(3) replicates precisely the new s.30(4) of the Act of 1986.
Turning to the 1989 Act as amended by the Football (Disorder) Act 2000), it will be clearest to set out the relevant provisions in full, though there is some replication of what has gone before.
The relevant provisions in the body of the statute are:
“14(2) ‘Regulated football match’ means an association football match (whether in England and Wales or elsewhere) which is a prescribed match or a match of a prescribed description.
(3) ‘External tournament’ means a football competition which includes regulated football matches outside England and Wales.
(4) ‘Banning order’ means an order made by the court under this Part which – (a) in relation to regulated football matches in England and Wales, prohibits the person who is subject to the order from entering any premises for the purpose of attending such matches, and (b) in relation to regulated football matches outside England and Wales, requires that person to report at a police station in accordance with this Part.
(5) ‘Control period’, in relation to a regulated football match outside England and Wales, means the period - (a) beginning five days before the day of the match, and (b) ending when the match is finished or cancelled.
(6) ‘Control period’, in relation to an external tournament, means any period described in an order made by the Secretary of State – (a) beginning five days before the day of the first football match outside England and Wales which is included in the tournament, and (b) ending when the last football match outside England and Wales which is included in the tournament is finished or cancelled, but, for the purposes of paragraph (a), any football match included in the qualifying or pre-qualifying stages of the tournament is to be left out of account....
(8) ‘Relevant offence’ means an offence to which Schedule 1 to this Act applies.
14A(1) This section applies where a person (the "offender") is convicted of a relevant offence.
(2) If the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order would help to prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with any regulated football matches, it must make such an order in respect of the offender.
(3) If the court is not so satisfied, it must in open court state that fact and give its reasons.
(4) A banning order may only be made under this section - (a) in addition to a sentence imposed in respect of the relevant offence, or (b) in addition to an order discharging him conditionally....
(6) In this section, ‘the court’ in relation to an offender means - (a) the court by or before which he is convicted of the relevant offence, or (b) if he is committed to the Crown Court to be dealt with for that offence, the Crown Court.
14B(1) An application for a banning order in respect of any person may be made by the chief officer of police for the area in which the person resides or appears to reside, if it appears to the officer that the condition in subsection (2) below is met.
(2) That condition is that the respondent has at any time caused or contributed to any violence or disorder in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.(3) The application is to be made by complaint to a magistrates' court.(4) If - (a) it is proved on the application that the condition in subsection (2) above is met, and (b) the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order would help to prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with any regulated football matches, the court must make a banning order in respect of the respondent.
14C(1) In this Part, ‘violence’ means violence against persons or property and includes threatening violence and doing anything which endangers the life of any person.
(2) In this Part, ‘disorder’ includes – (a) stirring up hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to colour, race, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins, or against an individual as a member of such a group, (b) using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour or disorderly behaviour, (c) displaying any writing or other thing which is threatening, abusive or insulting.
(3) In this Part, ‘violence’ and ‘disorder’ are not limited to violence or disorder in connection with football.
(4) The magistrates' court may take into account the following matters (among others), so far as they consider it appropriate to do so, in determining whether to make an order under section 14B above - (a) any decision of a court or tribunal outside the United Kingdom, (b) deportation or exclusion from a country outside the United Kingdom, (c) removal or exclusion from premises used for playing football matches, whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, (d) conduct recorded on video or by any other means.
(5) In determining whether to make such an order- (a) the magistrates' court may not take into account anything done by the respondent before the beginning of the period of ten years ending with the application under section 14B(1) above, except circumstances ancillary to a conviction.…
14D(1) An appeal lies to the Crown Court against the making by a magistrates' court of a banning order under section 14B above…
14E(1) On making a banning order, a court must in ordinary language explain its effect to the person subject to the order.
(2) A banning order must require the person subject to the order to report initially at a police station in England and Wales specified in the order within the period of five days beginning with the day on which the order is made.(3) A banning order must, unless it appears to the court that there are exceptional circumstances, impose a requirement as to the surrender in accordance with this Part, in connection with regulated football matches outside the United Kingdom, of the passport of the person subject to the order.(4) If it appears to the court that there are such circumstances, it must in open court state what they are….
14F(1) Subject to the following provisions of this Part, a banning order has effect for a period beginning with the day on which the order is made.
(2) The period must not be longer than the maximum or shorter than the minimum.
(3) Where the order is made under section 14A above in addition to a sentence of imprisonment taking immediate effect, the maximum is ten years and the minimum is six years; and in this subsection ‘imprisonment’ includes any form of detention.
(4) In any other case where the order is made under section 14A above, the maximum is five years and the minimum is three years.(5) Where the order is made under section 14B above, the maximum is three years and the minimum is two years.
14G(1) A banning order may, if the court making the order thinks fit, impose additional requirements on the person subject to the order in relation to any regulated football matches.
(2) The court by which a banning order was made may, on an application made by - (a) the person subject to the order, or (b) the person who applied for the order or who was the prosecutor in relation to the order, vary the order so as to impose, replace or omit any such requirements....
14H(1) If a banning order has had effect for at least two-thirds of the period determined under section 14F above, the person subject to the order may apply to the court by which it was made to terminate it.(2) On the application, the court may by order terminate the banning order as from a specified date or refuse the application.
(3) In exercising its powers under subsection (2) above, the court must have regard to the person's character, his conduct since the banning order was made, the nature of the offence or conduct which led to it and any other circumstances which appear to it to be relevant.
(4) Where an application under subsection (1) above in respect of a banning order is refused, no further application in respect of the order may be made within the period of six months beginning with the day of the refusal....
14J(1) A person subject to a banning order who fails to comply with - (a) any requirement imposed by the order, or (b) any requirement imposed under section 19(2B) or (2C) below, is guilty of an offence....
19(1) The enforcing authority [‘enforcing authority’ means a police organisation prescribed by the Secretary of State: s.22A(1)] and the officer responsible for the police station at which he reports initially shall have the following functions as respects any person subject to a banning order.
(2) On a person reporting initially at the police station, the officer responsible for the station may make such requirements of that person as are determined by the enforcing authority to be necessary or expedient for giving effect to the banning order, so far as relating to regulated football matches outside England and Wales.
PRIVATE(2A) If, in connection with any regulated football match outside England and Wales, the enforcing authority is of the opinion that requiring any person subject to a banning order to report is necessary or expedient in order to reduce the likelihood of violence or disorder at or in connection with the match, the authority must give him a notice in writing under subsection (2B) below.(2B) The notice must require that person - (a) to report at a police station specified in the notice at the time, or between the times, specified in the notice, (b) if the match is outside the United Kingdom and the order imposes a requirement as to the surrender by him of his passport, to surrender his passport at a police station specified in the notice at the time, or between the times, specified in the notice, and may require him to comply with any additional requirements of the order in the manner specified in the notice.(2C) In the case of any regulated football match, the enforcing authority may by notice in writing require any person subject to a banning order to comply with any additional requirements of the order in the manner specified in the notice.(2D) The enforcing authority may establish criteria for determining whether any requirement under subsection (2B) or (2C) above ought to be imposed on any person or any class of person.
(2E) A notice under this section - (a) may not require the person subject to the order to report except in the control period in relation to a regulated football match outside England and Wales or an external tournament, (b) may not require him to surrender his passport except in the control period in relation to a regulated football match outside the United Kingdom or an external tournament which includes such matches....
(6) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with any requirement imposed on him under subsection (2) above shall be guilty of an offence....
20(1) A person who is subject to a banning order may - (a) as respects a particular regulated football match, or (b) as respects regulated football matches played during a period, apply to the authority empowered to grant exemptions under this section... to be exempt from the requirements imposed by or under this Part, or any of them as respects that match or matches played during that period....
(4) The enforcing authority shall exempt the applicant from the requirements imposed by or under this Part, or any of them, as respects any match or matches to which the application relates if he shows to the authority’s satisfaction – (a) that there are special circumstances which justify his being so exempted; and (b) that, because of those circumstances, he would not attend the match or matches if he were so exempted....
(7) A person who is aggrieved by the refusal of the exempting authority to grant him an exemption under subsection (4) above may... appeal to a magistrates’ court...
21(1) The Secretary of State may issue to the enforcing authority such guidance as he considers appropriate for the purposes of their functions under sections 19 and 20 above....
(3) The Secretary of State may make regulations regulating the giving by the enforcing authority to persons subject to banning orders of notices under section 19 above... and it shall be the duty of the enforcing authority to comply with the regulations.
21A(1) This section and section 21B below apply during any control period in relation to a regulated football match outside England and Wales or an external tournament if a constable in uniform - (a) has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the condition in section 14B(2) above is met in the case of a person present before him, and (b) has reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order in his case would help to prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with any regulated football matches.
(2) The constable may detain the person in his custody (whether there or elsewhere) until he has decided whether or not to issue a notice under section 21B below, and shall give the person his reasons for detaining him in writing.
21B(1) A constable in uniform may exercise the power in subsection (2) below if authorised to do so by an officer of at least the rank of inspector.(2) The constable may give the person a notice in writing requiring him - (a) to appear before a magistrates' court at a time, or between the times, specified in the notice, (b) not to leave England and Wales before that time (or the later of those times), and (c) if the control period relates to a regulated football match outside the United Kingdom or to an external tournament which includes such matches, to surrender his passport to the constable, and stating the grounds referred to in section 21A(1) above....
(4) For the purposes of section 14B above, the notice is to be treated as an application for a banning order made by complaint by the constable to the court in question and subsection (1) of that section is to have effect as if the references to the chief officer of police for the area in which the person resides or appears to reside were references to that constable.
21C(1) The powers conferred by sections 21A and 21B above may only be exercised in relation to a person who is a British citizen.(2) A person who fails to comply with a notice given to him under section 21B above is guilty of an offence...
21D(1) Where a person to whom a notice has been given under section 21B above appears before a magistrates' court and the court refuses the application for a banning order in respect of him, it may order compensation to be paid to him out of central funds if it is satisfied - (a) that the notice should not have been given, (b) that he has suffered loss as a result of the giving of the notice, and (c) that, having regard to all the circumstances, it is appropriate to order the payment of compensation in respect of that loss.
(2) An appeal lies to the Crown Court against any refusal by a magistrates' court to order the payment of compensation under subsection (1) above.(3) The compensation to be paid by order of the magistrates' court under subsection (1) above or by order of the Crown Court on an appeal under subsection (2) above shall not exceed Ł5,000 (but no appeal may be made under subsection (2) in respect of the amount of compensation awarded)….
Schedule 1 (“relevant offences”) lists a large number of statutory offences. They replicate and update the list contained in Schedule 1 to the Act of 1989 in its original form.