England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(MR JUSTICE BURTON)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2 Monday, 18th November 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE SEDLEY: Mrs Claydon appears in person on this application for permission to bring what would be a second appeal. It being a second appeal, my powers are governed by section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999, which requires either that the proposed appeal raise an important point of principle or practice or that there be some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it.
2. This case was a negligence action brought by Mrs Claydon against two firms of solicitors in relation to a tripping accident which she suffered in the street in October 1990, in circumstances which were not her fault. The solicitors originally instructed for her (the first defendants), were no longer instructed by the time that the action was struck out because they had advised Mrs Claydon to accept an offer of £2,500. Upon her refusal legal aid had been frozen. The second defendants are a firm of solicitors to whom Mrs Claydon had gone in order to replace the first firm, but who were not yet instructed since they could not be unless and until legal aid was transferred to them. In the event it never was.
3. The action against them was brought at the 11th hour of the limitation period, on the most benign reading of the facts. It was assumed by Burton J, who heard the appeal against Master Turner's strike-out order, that the action was in time. I shall make the same assumption. Nevertheless, Burton J, in a judgment given on 11th April 2002, set out with clarity why in his judgment the appeal against Master Turner's order failed. Essentially, it was that, even at the date of the hearing before him, there was no medical evidence whatever supporting Mrs Claydon's claim that she had suffered enduring back damage from the tripping accident. In other words, there was and there remains before me today, in spite of what Mrs Claydon has shown me in the medical reports, no evidence of an injury which would have justified continuing with a claim that had already been met by an offer of £2,500 and costs. That seems to me to be one complete answer to the proposed appeal.
4. A second answer lies in the fact that there appears to have been no cause of action available against either firm of solicitors, since neither of them, on the history that I have recounted, appears to have been under the obligation which Mrs Claydon claims they were under in order to found her negligence action against each of them at the material time.
5. The third reason, however, brings me back to section 55. There is no question of legal principle or practice or any point of importance involved in the appeal which Mrs Claydon wishes to bring. At most, she wishes to argue that the medical evidence, which unanimously rejects her claim of ongoing sequelae, is unacceptable. She wants more time in which to find a doctor who will support her case 12 years after the accident. I do not think that this is a realistic request.
6. Before I part with the application today, Mrs Claydon has come before me in some physical distress, it appears, asking for an adjournment. She says -- and I do not doubt it -- that she feels dizzy and unwell and that she has respiratory problems, which she hopes will be better in two weeks time if I adjourn the case. She has no medical certificate. Indeed, she tells me that she has no doctor with whom she is registered, only access to an emergency doctor who has given her anti-depressants. I am not persuaded that she will feel any better in a fortnight's time or any other period of time that I might grant. She has been able to do justice to her case today and has been able to address me, but I fear that, with the best will in the world, there are not the grounds which are necessary for a viable appeal. I refuse her permission to appeal.
Order: Application refused.