England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT LIST
(MR JUSTICE BURTON)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2 Monday, 11 November 2002

Monday 11 November 2002

1. LADY JUSTICE ARDEN: This is an application for permission to appeal by Mr Damien Martins against the order of Burton J of 29 July 2002. The application made to the judge was for leave to bring judicial review proceedings in respect of the order of the Edmonton County Court made on 25 October 2001, whereby the deputy district judge dismissed the appellant's claim for damages for false imprisonment and made an award of damages on the defendant's counterclaim of £2,050.
2. Burton J pointed out that the Administrative Court could only grant leave to bring judicial review proceedings in respect of an order of the county court if there was unfairness or lack of jurisdiction. The only possible basis for granting leave in the judge's judgment was the fact that there appeared to be two orders at the conclusion of the trial before the deputy district judge. The first was an order, dated 25 October 2001 (at page 94 of the appellant's bundle) which says simply that Deputy District Judge Gordon ordered that:

"There be judgment for the defendant for £250.00 payable by the claimant within 14 days."

3. At page 96 of the bundle there is a further order which states not only that the claim was dismissed and that there was judgment for the defendant on the counterclaim for £250, but contained four further paragraphs as follows:

"3. The claimant to pay the defendant's costs, such costs to be subject to detailed assessment if not agreed.

4. There be a detailed Public Assessment of the defendant's costs.

5. The claimant do pay on account of the costs the sum of £350.00 to be paid to the court within 14 days from 25th October 2001 and the sum of £575.00 to be paid to the defendant within 14 days from 25th October 2001.

6. Leave to appeal refused."

That order is of course also dated 25 October, but in the top right there appears a further date of 21 February 2002, which is the date when the second order was actually drawn.

4. The judge adjourned the hearing of the application for leave to bring judicial review proceedings and at the adjourned hearing, which was heard on 29 July 2002, there was before the judge a bundle of letters comprising a letter dated 23 July 2002 from the respondent's solicitors, Hickman and Rose, and in addition a letter dated 25 July 2002 from the Lord Chancellor's Department to the court. It appears in brief that the order as originally drawn was not in accordance with the district judge's own notes, or indeed with the respondent's solicitor's notes, and it had been corrected under the slip rule at the instance of the respondent's solicitors.
5. Having perused those letters the judge held that there was no ground for concluding that the process in the county court was unfair, because the appellant could still apply in the county court for a rehearing of the application whereby the order was amended since it had been made without notice to him. Accordingly, the judge dismissed the application for permission to bring judicial review proceedings.
6. That is the order which Mr Martins has appealed to this court. His appellant's notice contains grounds of appeal and arguments in support of an appeal, and he has today helpfully given me an additional skeleton argument which I have read. I can summarise the matters this way. Mr Martins submits that the Administrative Court should have set aside the order of Deputy District Judge Gordon and entered judgment for him, the appellant, for a number of reasons, in particular because the county court had shown bias against Mr Martin, for instance first, it has not allowed him to cross-examine the respondents; second, the county court had given no reasons; third, the respondent had defaulted in complying with the court's rules for acknowledging service and filing a defence; fifth, the court had issued the second order of 21 February 2002 to which I have already referred. Mr Martins accuses the respondents of conspiracy to produce a false order. He does not recollect the order being made in the terms which it was made in February 2002.
7. Mr Martins has also at one point in his papers accused the Administrative Court of bias, but I should say there is absolutely no evidence of that whatsoever and Mr Martins has not pursued that aspect of the matter before me this morning.
8. Mr Martins further complains of orders in the High Court made in 2000 at interlocutory stages of his action. However it is far too late to raise those matters now in this court.
9. The only jurisdiction, in my judgment, which it was open to the Administrative Court to exercise was a very limited jurisdiction if indeed there was jurisdiction at all. It is a matter which has not yet been considered by the court. In the normal way if a litigant is unsuccessful, as Mr Martins was before Deputy District Judge Gordon, he has a right of appeal to the next tier, or in some circumstances directly to this court. However, that is not the course which Mr Martins has taken; although it appears to me, having heard Mr Martins this morning, that his real grievance was that the court did not allow him to conduct the case fully and that the district judge accordingly reached the wrong conclusion. All those matters could have been raised on an appeal: the question of bias, failure to give reasons, the relevance of the defendant's default and so on.
10. The Administrative Court, however, only had very limited jurisdiction. The judge followed the decision in The Queen on the Application of Kevin Mahon v Taunton County Court, in which Hooper J concluded that on the authorities it was clear that the Administrative Court had power by way of judicial review to quash the order of the county court judge if made without jurisdiction, or perhaps if the claimant did not receive a fair hearing. Those are very limited grounds. There is no suggestion that the district judge did not have jurisdiction. The only question is the potential alternative considered by Hooper J whether the claimant received a fair hearing. I will assume for a moment that that is a matter in which the Administrative Court can interfere, though, as I have explained, it seems to me that in many respects that is also a matter that can be raised by way of an appeal.
11. In this case, however, the unfairness (if any) was limited to the issuing of the second order. Was that unfair? The judge concluded that as that had been done under the slip rule without notice to Mr Martins it was open to him to ask the county court to review that matter. There therefore could not be any basis for the Administrative Court interfering. Likewise, there could be no claim for conspiracy on the part of the respondents to alter the order because it is a matter where Mr Martins had the possibility of going back to the court and asking the court to hear his submissions. I should point out the judge did not think that he had a good prospect of success because of the coincidence between the judge's notes and those of the respondent solicitors.
12. Accordingly, in my judgment, the judge reached the right conclusion and there is no prospect of success on appeal and I must therefore refuse permission to appeal.
13. I appreciate that Mr Martins has had a very frustrating experience in the course of this litigation. He would, in my judgment, have had a right to appeal from the district judge and it may have been a right of appeal direct to this court. But much time has now passed and the question of whether that right would still be open to him is also very much in doubt on account of the delay; but he must consider that position for himself.
(Application refused; no order for costs)