England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT
OLDHAM COUNTY COURT
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE CARTER)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2 Monday, 11 November 2002

Monday 11 November 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE SCHIEMANN: Before me is an application for an extension of time within which to set down an appeal, permission for which was given in principle by Judge LJ on 8 June 2000. The appeal is from an order of His Honour Judge Carter, sitting in the Oldham County Court, which he made on 9 February 2000. That order ordered Mr Kohanzad to pay various costs to the claimant, which the judge assessed summarily at £3,000.
2. Judge LJ gave permission to appeal because he felt that the points were arguable if facts were as they were claimed to be by Mr Kohanzad, who addressed him in person. He however made the condition that the appeal could only be argued if Mr Kohanzad swore an affidavit within seven days confirming those facts. It seems that Mr Kohanzad did swear an affidavit and did send a copy of the affidavit to the defendants. The defendants are not in front of me but they have been kind enough to fax a letter to me of 8 November 2002, a copy of which I have given to Mr Kohanzad and which he has had a chance of reading. In that fax they said they were not quite sure what Mr Kohanzad was applying for now, and the last thing that they had heard of this case was on 5 November 2001 when they had telephoned the Court of Appeal and someone had, according to them, told them they thought the case was closed.
3. What undoubtedly has not been done by Mr Kohanzad is to set the case down within the seven days prescribed, which was from 8 June 2000. He claims he lodged the appeal on 7 August 2000 because there was some delay in relation to an application by him for a fee remission reason. I have some unease in this case as clearly did Judge LJ, because underlying Mr Kohanzad's appeal there may well be a genuine grouse, if I can put it that way.
4. He now, however, has faced various further hurdles. The first of these is that he has apparently been declared a vexatious litigant under section 42 of the Supreme Courts Act. He has appeared in front of me and has provided the court with a series of bundles which are, I am afraid, wholly badly prepared and extremely difficult to understand. Even the pages do not follow sequentially, but go backwards and forwards in an utterly confusing way. However, notwithstanding the fact that he was made vexatious, he obtained permission from Forbes J to bring an appeal under section 42. I have seen the judgment of Forbes J (who obviously was as puzzled about the matter as I am). What he said is this:

"If the Court of Appeal office is satisfied that Mr Kohanzad has met the condition imposed by Judge LJ ... then, subject to Mr Kohanzad satisfying any other requirements for the pursuit of that appeal, insofar as any permission is required for him to do so, I am prepared to grant permission."

5. He was obviously being very careful about this because of course he was dealing with the matter under section 42 of the Supreme Courts Act and was not purporting to exercise the jurisdiction of this court - that is what I am charged with doing.
6. The second hurdle which faced Mr Kohanzad is that he is being declared bankrupt on the petition of Mr Mazurek. That happened on 29 May 2002. The official receiver has been appointed receiver and manager. According to the facts from Mr Mazurek's solicitor the total amount is some £6,000-odd, plus the costs of the bankruptcy petition. Mr Kohanzad tells me he has not cooperated with the receiver because he says the bankruptcy order should not have been made, and I understand he wishes to challenge that.
7. I have to say that my instinct in the matter is insofar as anybody should be pursuing this appeal it is something which should only be done with the assent of the receiver. But the detail of that position I am not aware of.
8. The problem is where do we go from here? The court is bound by the Civil Procedure Rules. Those rules provide in rule 1 that the court must try and deal with cases justly, and dealing with a case justly includes saving expense, dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the amount of money involved, the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues and the financial position of each party, ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly and allotting to it an appropriate share of the court's resources.
9. One of the matters I have to consider here is whether fairness is best advanced by my granting permission to extend the time within which he lodges an appeal or refusing it. I have looked at the papers with some care. As I say, they are in a complete shambles after some years, and although I have some sympathy for Mr Kohanzad I do not regard it as appropriate that for the sum which is at stake in this case it is suitable that the resources of the Court of Appeal be employed. It is impossible with the material in front of me today to be satisfied that this appeal has a real prospect of success and there is no reason to suppose that he will ever improve on that position.
10. The position of Mr Kohanzad is an unfortunate one, but it is one that he has got himself into by not having an appropriate way of presenting his case and by letting time pass. The judgment now under appeal is more than two years old and I do not regard it as appropriate to extend the time. This application for permission is refused.
(Application refused; no order for costs).