England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY DIVISION
(Mr Justice Lloyd)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2 Friday, 25th October 2002

Friday, 25th October 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE PETER GIBSON: Jocelyn Patrick seeks permission to appeal from the order made on 5th July 2002 by Lloyd J dismissing his appeal against the determination on 12th September 2001 by the General Commissioners for St James, Westminster of a penalty of £300 for failure to comply with a notice under section 20(1) of the Taxes Management Act 1970. As an appeal to this court would be a second appeal I can only give permission to appeal if the appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice or otherwise there is some compelling reason why the appeal should be heard (CPR 52.13). Before I consider whether that condition is satisfied I will set out briefly the background to this dispute.
2. Mr Patrick came to live in England some years ago after living overseas. The Revenue commenced an investigation into his tax affairs, as they had not received any tax returns. That investigation began in 1994. There is correspondence going back to 3rd May 1994 between the Revenue and Mr Patrick, whereby they sought information from him. By a letter dated 14th March 2001 Mr Hunt for the Revenue requested informally under section 20B(1) of the 1970 Act the information which was to be sought formally by a section 20 notice. That notice was dated 20th June 2001 and required him to deliver by 20th July 2001 the following documents or particulars:

"1) Particulars of all schools attended by your children between January 1990 and January 2001. The particulars should include the name of the child, the name of the schools, the dates of attendance at each school, the date and amount of each payment made to each school and the precise source of funds used to make each payment.

2) Particulars of the source of each deposit paid into your bank account with Messrs Coutts & Co [and three accounts are designated] over the period 1 December 1989 to 3 April 1996.

3) Particulars of the sources of all monies used to fund the development of The Old School, Thornham (such payments include £77,000 paid to the builder and £100,000 paid following a court hearing).

4) Particulars of your interest in and involvement with Thornham Holdings. Details of the beneficial owner (if you are not the beneficial owner).

5) Details of your interest in and involvement with Pro-tech Ltd.

6) Bank statements for your Standard Chartered Bank Accounts for the period 1 January 1990 to 31 December 2000."

3. Some information was provided, but the Revenue claimed none of the six points was complied with fully. Mr Patrick claimed not to have received the original section 20 notice, though he acknowledged that he did receive a letter dated 23rd July 2001 enclosing a copy of the notice.
4. Mr Hunt for the Revenue laid information before the General Commissioners at a hearing on 25th July 2001 that Mr Patrick had failed to comply with the section 20 notice. The General Commissioners summoned Mr Patrick to attend a hearing on 12th September to answer that information. Mr Patrick made a number of attempts to have the hearing adjourned, including at a hearing on 6th September, but they were unsuccessful.
5. At the hearing on 12th September Mr Patrick told the General Commissioners that he had not received the original section 20 notice, though he accepted he had received the copy in July. He told them of what he had done so far to comply with the notice. He considered that there were hundreds of items in the accounts still outstanding, and he submitted that he had done his best. The General Commissioners concluded that there had been correct service of the original section 20 notice, which had been posted to the correct address and had not been returned to the Revenue, and that a period in excess of that allowed by the section 20 notice had elapsed since the copy sent with Mr Hunt's letter of 23rd July was received, and they noted that the information had been originally requested as long ago as 14th March 2001. They found as a fact that Mr Patrick had failed to comply fully with the terms of the section 20 notice. They said that they appreciated that Mr Patrick was required by the notice to comment on a large number of matters, especially in relation to his bank deposits, but they found that some of the other information requested but not provided either should have been within his own knowledge or did not require extensive research. They therefore declared the maximum penalty.
6. On Mr Patrick's appeal to the judge, the judge noted that the appeal was on a question of law. He recited the facts and said that the only question of law which could be said to arise was whether, on the facts before the Commissioners on 12th September, it was open to them to conclude as they did. The judge dealt with a point Mr Patrick had taken that he ought to have had an adjournment from the Commissioners because he had not had time to comply with the notice. The judge pointed out that that submission proved that he had not complied with the notice. The judge said that by 12th September Mr Patrick had had the best part of six months in which to respond to the previous request of the Revenue and had still not provided what was required in full. The judge concluded that there was ample material before the Commissioners on which they could decide both that Mr Patrick had not complied and that the case was one in which it was appropriate to impose a penalty because he had failed to comply. The judge referred to the finding of fact that the original notice had been served and said that Mr Patrick did not get anywhere near saying that there was no material on which the Commissioners could come to that conclusion.
7. Mr Patrick, acting in person, has put in an Appellant's Notice in which he sets out in manuscript a number of grounds of appeal attacking the finding that the original notice was served and attacking the reasonableness of the Revenue's requirements both in quantity and as to time.
8. He has also provided me with what is called a draft skeleton running to over forty closely typed pages in which he sets out in detail excerpts from the correspondence he has had with the Revenue and elaborates on his complaints against the General Commissioners' decision.
9. Essentially Mr Patrick says that the General Commissioners' decision was perverse and that no reasonable body of General Commissioners could have reached the conclusion which they did. Perversity is a difficult matter for an appellant to establish, and I have to say that I do not think that he comes anywhere near establishing it. Mr Patrick, when asked to say what was the important point of principle or practice raised by the appeal, has told me that it is the principle of fairness. He has again stressed the limited time that was available to him to deal with the quantity of information which was sought from him by the Revenue. He has said that certain items were already in the Revenue's possession. He complains that he sought assistance from the Revenue and that, whilst they provided some documents and information, they did not meet all his requests, at any rate not until quite late. He argues that in the circumstances what was sought was totally unreasonable. He described it as being like a snow storm, he being presumably engulfed by all the snowflakes.
10. These are the types of matters which the General Commissioners, on an application to them, are accustomed to consider and, as sensible men, to arrive at a conclusion whether or not the complaint is made out. I have to say that I do not see any important point of principle raised by what is alleged on the appeal. Of course, it is important that when notices such as that which was served on Mr Patrick are sent, they must be reasonable. It is a common complaint when an information is laid that the notice asks for too much and does not give enough time. The General Commissioners did not accept these submissions, having regard to the long history of this matter, and in my judgment that was a conclusion properly open to them.
11. Mr Patrick has sought to raise again the point as to the non-receipt, as he claims, of the notice. He submits that there was no evidence to substantiate the finding that the notice was received. I do not accept that that is a point of principle or practice or, indeed, a point of law. It is a question of fact. Mr Hunt was able to say that the notice had been sent. It was sent to the correct address and, as I have noted, the notice was not returned. Accordingly, I see nothing in that point.
12. Mr Patrick also takes a point on whether the section 20 notice complied with the procedural requirements of the 1970 Act. By the provisions of that Act the procedure that is called for is this: that before a section 20 notice is given an informal request should be made of the person to whom the notice is to be directed giving that person a reasonable opportunity to provide documents or furnish particulars. If that is not complied with, then the Revenue has the ability to send a section 20 notice but cannot do so unless the consent of a General or Special Commissioner has been obtained, and that Commissioner has to be satisfied that in all the circumstances the Inspector of Taxes is justified in proceeding under this section. Mr Patrick has submitted that the General Commissioner could not have been adequately informed so as to be able to be satisfied that the Inspector was so justified. On the material before me I do not accept that submission. In my judgment it was sufficient for the Inspector, as he did, to point to the section 20B informal notice, to give evidence of a failure to comply with that notice within the specified time and, that having been established, to seek the consent of the General Commissioner which was given.
13. Mr Patrick complains that such is the volume of material that he really has not had a fair opportunity to deal with all the points. He referred in particular to the fact that matters may go back to 1984. This appears to be a reference to the enquiry that was made about Mr Patrick's interest and involvement with Pro-tech Limited, which go back at least as early as that date. For my part, I cannot see why Mr Patrick could not with ease state quite shortly what were his interest in and involvement with that particular company, albeit that his interest and involvement may have commenced a long time ago.
14. In the skeleton argument Mr Patrick has raised a number of human rights points. He has submitted in his skeleton that he did not have a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal. There is nothing in the papers before me to make good that bare assertion. The fact that Mr Patrick does not like the Tribunal's conclusion does not establish a breach of Article 6.
15. Then he said that there was a breach of his right under Article 6(3)(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence. Let me assume that in the proceedings in which the Revenue were seeking a penalty he was "charged with a criminal offence". What he is complaining about is not that he did not have time or the facilities to prepare his defence, but that he wanted an extension of time and more facilities to comply with his obligation. Article 6(3)(b) does not apply to that.
16. Mr Patrick even relies on Article 3 on the basis that he was subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, and on Article 4.2 on the basis that he was required to perform forced or compulsory labour. I can only say that it seems to me wholly fanciful to suggest that his case comes within the scope of either of those articles.
17. In the circumstances, despite the courteous submissions of Mr Patrick both in writing and orally before me this afternoon, I am afraid that I am not satisfied that any important point of principle or practice arises. Nor is there any other compelling reason why this appeal should be heard. On the contrary, it seems to me that an appeal against a £300 penalty would be wholly disproportionate and, if the appeal went ahead and failed, would result in costs vastly exceeding the amount of the penalty; and if Mr Patrick lost, he would, of course, be liable for those costs if the ordinary rule that the costs follow the event were to be applied.
18. In all the circumstances, therefore, I must refuse this application.
Order: Application dismissed.