England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT LIST
(MR JUSTICE MAURICE KAY)
(MR JUSTICE LADDIE)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2 Friday 18 October 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE PILL: These are applications for permission to appeal. Application is made to appeal the refusal of Maurice Kay J on 3 September 2001 to grant to the applicant, Mrs Christine McKay, a judicial review of a bankruptcy order which had been made against her. There is also an application for permission to appeal against a judgment of Laddie J of 2 May 2002 in which he refused permission to apply for relief made by the applicant in relation to Mr Recorder Bright and Mrs Martin in circumstances which will appear.
2. In 1994 there was a road accident in which Mrs McKay and a Mrs Martin were involved. Mrs Martin claimed damages from the applicant. On 19 May 1999 an order was made at the Leicester County Court by Mr Recorder Bright refusing an application by the applicant to adjourn the trial of the action which had arisen from the road accident. He ordered judgment against the applicant, who did not attend on that day, in the sum of £805.23 plus interest. A substantial costs order was later made against the applicant in the sum of over £13,000.
3. The applicant did not make payment. Following the service of a statutory demand, Mrs Martin presented a bankruptcy petition on 5 June 2000. Mrs McKay sought the adjournment of the hearing of the application because she brought in question the validity of the order made on 19 May 1999. On 2 August 2000, District Judge Linda Eaton made a bankruptcy order against her. Application for judicial review of that order was first made in 2000. Application for permission was refused by Hidden J on 30 March on the basis that the applicant was out of time.
4. She applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal that order. On 24 August 2000 Buxton LJ refused, stating that the application was misconceived and was out of time. He mentioned the possibility of an attempt to have the order set aside or to claim its invalidity in any enforcement action.
5. On 19 December 2000 the applicant again sought to challenge by way of judicial review the bankruptcy order. It was claimed that District Judge Eaton had no jurisdiction to hear the petition. Other complaints were made, including complaints of procedural irregularity. On 19 February 2001 Elias J refused permission to apply for judicial review on paper. The application was subsequently renewed orally. It was adjourned by Scott Baker J and was then refused by Maurice Kay J in open court. The applicant did not appear on that occasion. Maurice Kay J stated that he was not prepared to adjourn the case and that he agreed with Elias J that this order was not susceptible to judicial review. He stated that if the bankruptcy order was to be challenged at all it should be challenged by way of appeal. That remedy, too, has been pursued by the applicant.
6. Applications were made before District Judge Butler and District Judge Rogers who made orders on 17 August 2001 and 15 November 2001 respectively, the latter refusing to annul the bankruptcy order. The applicant sought permission to appeal against those orders. Such permission was refused (and it is confirmed by a document which has been supplied to me) on Monday 14 October 2000 by Hart J sitting in the Chancery Division. The applicant has told me that she proposes to seek the permission of this court to appeal against the judgment of Hart J.
7. The second proceeding arises from the applicant's claim that the hearing on 19 May 1999 which led to the bankruptcy proceedings did not occur and that no judgment was properly made on that occasion. Laddie J heard the application which was that Mr Recorder Bright, and counsel who claimed to have appeared for Mrs Martin on that day, should disclose documents. Laddie J did not give a reasoned judgment. It took the form of a dialogue between the judge and the applicant in the course of which the judge stated his position and declined any relief to her.
8. The applicant appears in person today. She has referred to the many applications which she has made to several parties: the court concerned, the recorder, counsel for Mrs Martin and solicitors, as to what happened on 19 May. She is dissatisfied with the information she has so far obtained. She comes to this court to seek permission to obtain an order that further documents be disclosed.
9. A preliminary point is taken that the transcript of the proceedings before Laddie J is incomplete. She seeks an adjournment of the application in order that a fuller record of the 2 May 2002 can be obtained. I have sought her assistance as to those respects in which it is said to be incomplete. By a letter of 8 October 2002 various alleged defects in the record are pointed out. These include a claim that a reference to her ability to give a dissertation on the pharoahs of the New Kingdom of Egypt has not been included in the transcript. There is no doubt that the applicant is an experienced archaeologist, with an academic record, who is able to give such a dissertation. It is said that when Mr Martin, who appeared at the hearing, was asked by the judge whether he was present on 19 May 1999, and replied that he was, as was Recorder Bright, it is not recorded that the applicant then said to Mr Martin, "I will get you, you bastard." A shorthand writer was not present, so the transcript has been obtained from the mechanical recording facilities.
10. I see no relevance in the absence of those matters from the transcript. It does not cast any doubt upon its reliability in respects which are material. It would not surprise me if in transcribing what was believed to be relevant and not simply an aside, the remark, in particular the second remark, was not included by the shorthand writer.
11. I am not prepared to adjourn this application. There has been an earlier adjournment of the other application. The time has come when these applications must be resolved. There is also a complaint in relation to a difference between £805 and £605 in the transcript for 2 May, but I find no basis for a suggestion that, for present purposes, the transcript which has been supplied by the official shorthand writers is deficient.
12. When the applicant began her submissions, I understood that her essential concern is the claim to set aside the bankruptcy order which she seeks to have judicially reviewed. I understood her position in writing to be that it was only if prior investigation was made into the events of 19 May 1999 that the second application should be fully considered. It was for that reason that I suggested that she address me first on the application against the decision of Laddie J. With my agreement, submissions were made generally and, in particular, on the judicial review application. It did emerge that the misgivings and complaints about what took place on 19 May were an important aspect of the applicant's case. She has addressed me on that issue as well as more generally.
13. The applicant has made many attempts, I fully accept, to obtain further information about the events of 19 May 1999. I have referred to her application, to which reference is made in both her applications today for permission to appeal, which have been submitted in writing. In application No 1116, the application in relation to Laddie J, it appears that:

"Grave concerns arise from the circumstantial evidence in the bundle before Laddie J, which points directly to the drawing of strong inferences that my allegations are substantiated and that no hearing took place on 19 May 1999 at Leicester County Court."

14. There has been considerable correspondence with that court. The applicant has also written to the Metropolitan Police Commissioner referring to her attempts to seek information from the court and from the recorder a covering note referred to his absence from the hearing before Laddie J. It also referred to his declining to answer interrogatories which had been put to him.
15. I have considered the material which has been placed before me. It has been placed before me in a number of different bundles. It is not always easy to follow, but it is clear that a substantial amount of information has been made available as to the events of 19 May.
16. The applicant draws attention to what I accept are curious features of the documentation. First, there is a difference between a sum of £605.81, which appears in the record of counsel, as to the judgment figure, and the sum of £805.23 which appears in the judgment itself. There is also one reference to the order having been drawn on 22 June 1999 and another to it having been drawn on 19 October 2000, though that latter date could well be explained because it was a date when the court was responding to an express inquiry by the applicant.
17. The applicant has been supplied with what purports to be a certified copy of the judgment of 19 May; a detailed log of the proceedings before the court on that day; letters from the solicitors concerned in which they represent that they were appearing on paper for Mrs Martin and instructed counsel to appear on that day; what appears to be an endorsement on counsel's brief that he was there and that judgment was given; what purports to be a copy of counsel's note of the judgment given by Mr Recorder Bright. A point is made in relation to that note that the date of 18 May appears on it rather than the 19th, but I am not prepared to draw any adverse inferences from that difference.
18. In her oral submissions the applicant has said that she seeks the judge's own notes for that day. She has sent requests to his chambers and has received no reply. She says she does not even know whether he exists. She says that she wants the original court list and not merely the copy which has been supplied to her, and the original court file for 19 May. She submits that the notes of judgment should be authenticated by Mr Recorder Bright. She wants an assurance from him personally that he was involved. The applicant describes this as a strange and murky business.
19. Several further points are made by reference to documents supplied to me. One is a letter signed "Jason Clark" from Riverside Midland who appear on the list for the relevant day. They say that their case began at 11.15am and ended at 11.34am on dates which conflict with the court log in relation to the present case. There is also submitted an unsigned document claimed to have been supplied by a magistrate in which it is stated that the present application, "Undoubtedly it is causing embarrassment -- the court staff are amused".
20. The applicant states that she cannot understand why she is being denied relief. She believes that her human rights are being abused; she is caught in a web. It is no pleasure to her to be involved in these proceedings, but she needs to pursue this course when the bankruptcy proceedings against her are being pursued, as was confirmed as recently as the hearing before Hart J this week.
21. The point is also made that the insurance company instructing Beachcroft Wansboroughs (Mrs Martin's solicitors) ceased to operate the relevant business on 10 May 1999 when Axa took over the relevant insurance from GRE. I am quite unable to draw any adverse inference to the credibility of Beachcroft Wansboroughs because of that take-over in the insurance business only nine days before the relevant date. I am quite unpersuaded that all the documentation that firm has provided is fraudulent in the manner alleged by the applicant.
22. I am also quite unpersuaded that the applicant is correct in her belief that Mr Recorder Bright had nothing to do with the case of Martin v McKay on 19 May. I note also that counsel for Mrs Martin did, in response to a direct question from Laddie J, say that he was present on that day. It is alleged that the judge should not have asked that leading question. It appears to me to be a direct and an appropriate question in the circumstances. The judge cannot be criticised for asking it.
23. Having regard to the material available and having considered the submissions of the applicant, I am not prepared to give permission to appeal against Laddie J. It is not arguable that, in the present circumstances, this court would make the further orders sought against Mrs Martin, Mr Recorder Bright or other officers of the court concerned.
24. I propose to deal with the second application briefly, as did Maurice Kay J when considering it in the High Court. There is no basis upon which a judicial review of the bankruptcy order can be ordered in present circumstances. The applicant has made one attempt already which was unsuccessful. She has also pursued remedies in the Chancery Division which, equally, have been unsuccessful. There is no prospect of this court, by way of judicial review in 2002, quashing the bankruptcy order which was made in 2000.
25. For the reasons I have given these applications are refused.
Order: Applications for permission refused. Transcript of judgment to be supplied at public expense.