England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT
BOW COUNTY COURT
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE RICHARDSON)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2 Monday, 7 October 2002

Monday, 7 October 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE DYSON: This is an appeal against the decision of His Honour Judge Richardson, sitting at Bow County Court on 12 July 2001, whereby he refused Mr Williams' application to set aside, alternatively to seek permission to appeal against the decision of Deputy District Judge Orr of 13 December 1999 to refuse to allow an application to extend time for serving a statutory declaration under section 6(8) of the Road Traffic Act 1991.
2. It was the case for the road traffic authority that a Notice to Owner was served on Mr Williams in respect of his car on 24 September 1998, and that that had produced no communication from Mr Williams. The charge certificate was served on 1 November 1998 and that too produced no communication from Mr Williams; accordingly, the resultant debt was registered with the Northampton County Court on 14 January 1999. On 18 January 1999 a statutory declaration form was sent to Mr Williams and that gave him 21 days in which to serve a statutory declaration: see paragraph 8 of schedule 6 to the 1991 Act.
3. Mr Williams swore a statutory declaration on 4 February but he did not serve it. Later, on 22 June 1999 he served a statutory declaration together with an application to file that declaration out of time. The reasons he gave for the delay in serving the statutory declaration were:

"The ticket attendant never came near my car at all as he was far behind when I dropped a friend at Upton Park Station. Hence he never sticked any ticket on my windscreen. Initially, I couldn't prove it, until I was in the same situation again in which I had four witnesses."

4. His case was and always has been that the Notice to Owner was never served upon him. If that was right, his case runs, then all the subsequent steps that may be taken or are required to be taken by the Act were irrelevant because the very first step in the procedure was not taken. It would seem that the judge took the view that the question whether or not the Notice to Owner was served on the owner of the vehicle was irrelevant. For my part I would seriously question the correctness of that view; and if that were the critical issue in the case I would have no hesitation in giving Mr Williams permission to appeal.
5. The matter does not, however, rest there, because the application by Mr Williams to extend the time for service of the statutory declaration came before the deputy district judge on 13 December 1999. The relevant statutory provisions are to be found in schedule 6(8)(3)and (4), which provide:

"(3) Subparagraph (4) below applies where it appears to a district judge on the application of a person upon whom a charge certificate has been served that it would be unreasonable in the circumstances of his case to insist on him serving the statutory declaration within the period of 21 days allowed for by subparagraph (1) above.

(4) Where this subparagraph applies the district judge may allow such longer period of service of the statutory declaration as he considers appropriate."

6. The issue for the district judge, therefore, was whether it was unreasonable in the circumstances of the case to insist upon his serving the statutory declaration within the 21-day period, and, coupled with that, whether he should allow such longer period for service of the statutory declaration as he considered appropriate.
7. The deputy district judge does not appear to have made any findings on that point. He appears to have simply dismissed the application on the grounds that he had no power to grant it. I am bound to say I find that puzzling. The deputy district judge does not explain why he reached that conclusion. Be that as it may, the judge did consider the question of the application of schedule 6 paragraphs (8),(3) and (4). Having set out the reasons given by Mr Williams for not filing the statutory declaration within the 21-day period, the judge reminded himself of paragraphs 8, 3 and 4 of schedule 6, and said this:

"In this case, the statutory declaration was very late indeed. It does not provide any good reason for extending time for the statutory declaration can perfectly well be completed by the Defendant without his having witnesses. After all, the only person who can actually say whether the Notice to Owner was received was him. In my judgment, the District Judge was absolutely right. There was no error of law or fact or any other kind in reaching the conclusion that it would be reasonable in the circumstances of this case to insist on the Defendant serving the statutory declaration within the period of 21 days, and in any event that the statutory declaration was far too late to be permitted or allowed."

8. As I have said, on the material before me it would seem that the deputy district judge did not apply his mind to the application of the criteria set out in schedule 6 paragraphs (8), (3) and (4). Nevertheless, it seems to me that the judge must be taken to have been of the view himself that, on a proper application of the criteria stated in those subparagraphs, Mr Williams came nowhere near satisfying the court that his was a case which justified not insisting upon adherence to the 21-day period or that it was appropriate to grant an extension of time.
9. I have considerable sympathy for Mr Williams. He plainly suffers a very considerable sense of grievance. He insists that the Notice to Owner was not served upon him and, as I see it, if he were able to establish that as a matter of fact then he would be successful. The question for this court, however, is whether there is anything wrong in law with the decision of the judge below when he concluded that this was not a case in which it was proper to extend the time for service of the statutory declaration. I can see no error in law on the part of the judge in that part of his decision. I reach this conclusion with regret, because I am left with a very strong sense that Mr Williams may well have suffered an injustice here, but it is an injustice as to procedure in respect of which I am afraid to say that this court cannot provide him with any remedy.
10. I conclude, therefore, that I have to dismiss this application.
(Application dismissed; no order for costs).