England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE MANSFIELD COUNTY COURT
(His Honour Judge Waine)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Wednesday, 4th September 2002

Wednesday, 4th September 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE PETER GIBSON: The claimant, Hardwick Nominees Ltd, renews its application for permission to appeal from the order made on 13th May of this year by His Honour Judge Steven Waine in the Mansfield County Court dismissing the claimant's appeal from the notice served by the defendant, Nottingham City Council, as the local housing authority under section 352 of the Housing Act 1985. Permission was refused by Sir Philip Otton on paper on the basis that CPR 52.13 applied to the intended appeal as a second appeal. The rule provides:

"(1) Permission is required from the Court of Appeal for any appeal to that court from a decision of a county court or the High Court which was itself made on appeal.

(2) The Court of Appeal will not give permission unless it considers that-

(a)the appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice; or

(b)there is some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it."

2. Although Mr Cranfield for the claimant in his skeleton argument makes no mention of the rule applying, he now accepts that it does.
3. I need refer to the facts only briefly. The claimant owns numbers 26 and 28 Broad Street, Nottingham. When built in the 19th century they were separate buildings built, we are told, as dwelling houses. They were subsequently altered to create retail shops at ground floor level, with offices and one flat above and at first and second floor levels. In 1994 to 1995 the first and second floors of each of numbers 26 and 28 were converted to form two residential flats. The claimant says that to comply with fire regulations a connecting door was installed in the partition wall between number 26 and number 28 at first and second floor levels. Thus a door connects 26A and 28A and 26B and 28B. The defendant considered numbers 26 and 28 to be a single house in multiple occupation and served a notice under section 352 requiring fire precaution works. The claimant appealed under section 353(2)(c) on the ground that the notice was defective. It claimed that numbers 26 and 28 were two houses in multiple occupation requiring separate notices.
4. The appeal was heard by the judge. He noted that it was conceded by the claimant that if the two notices had been served the works required would have had to be done. Thus, as Mr Cranfield fairly concedes, the point taken is a technical one. The judge referred to the definition in section 345(1), defining "house in multiple occupation" as a house which is occupied by persons who do not form a single household. He referred to certain authorities and said that in his view the case boiled down ultimately to a factual situation of whether there was one or two houses. The judge said that he had no hesitation in finding as a fact that there was effectively one house. He referred to a number of factors which, he said, pointed in that direction. The most significant he found to be the connecting doors, one of which the defendant's environmental health officer found to be unlocked when he visited the premises.
5. Mr Cranfield submits that the judge was wrong in his conclusion that this was a single house in multiple occupation and he says that the connecting doors do not convert two houses into one unless they were installed for that purpose. He contends that it was wrong for the judge to infer from the fact that one connecting door was unlocked that there was a single house. I confess that if this were a first appeal I would have found some force in those submissions. But permission to appeal to this court is, as I have said, governed by the requirements of CPR 52.13(2). Sir Philip Otton pointed out that the judge had correctly identified the relevant legal principles and that the question whether there was one house or two was a question of fact. I agree.
6. Mr Cranfield was invited to say what was the important point of principle or practice to which this appeal gave rise. He submitted that the important point of principle turned on the definition of "a house". He told us that his clients were substantial landlords, owning many other properties. He suggested that this court, if it entertained the appeal, could give further guidance on what constitutes a valid notice, and he stressed the importance of that because of the consequences to the owner of the property on whom the notice was served. I am afraid that I do not think that any of those matters shows that any important point of principle or practice is raised by this appeal. The claimant is in effect challenging the single question of fact to which I have referred: is this one house or two?
7. No other compelling reason was suggested as to why this court should hear the appeal. In my judgment, therefore, this is not a case which satisfies the requirements of the rule relating to second appeals. It follows that permission to appeal cannot be given. I would refuse this application.
8. LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY: So would I.
Order: Application refused.