ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH
COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEENS BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
Strand London WC2A 2LL | ||
B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE CHADWICK
LORD JUSTICE KEENE
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(1) THREE RIVERS DISTRICT COUNCIL AND OTHERS | ||
(2) BANK OF CREDIT AND COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL (SA) | ||
(IN LIQUIDATION) | Appellants | |
and | ||
HM TREASURY | First Respondent | |
THE GOVERNOR AND THE COMPANY OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND | Second Respondent | |
HM TREASURY | Appellant | |
and | ||
(1) THREE RIVERS DISTRICT COUNCIL AND OTHERS | ||
(2) BANK OF CREDIT AND COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL SA | ||
(In Liquidation) | First Respondent |
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Smith Bernal Reporting Limited, 190 Fleet Street
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NICHOLAS STADLEN QC, BANCIM THANKI and BEN VALENTIN (Instructed by Freshfields Bruckhaus Derringer) appeared on behalf of the Bank of England.
CHARLES HOLLANDER QC and SARAH LEE(instructed by Treasury Solicitor) appeared on behalf of H.M Treasury.
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(AS APPROVED BY THE COURT)
Crown Copyright ©
Tuesday, 16th July 2002
1. LORD PHILLIPS MR: Before the judge below, Mr Stadlen on behalf of the Bank of England, urged that whether or not the judge had jurisdiction to accede to the discovery order sought, he ought in his discretion to dismiss the application because of the effect that acceding to it would have upon the timetable.
2. The judge dealt with the issue of law as to whether he had jurisdiction to make the order and concluded that he did and gave permission to appeal in relation to that.
3. So far as the exercise of his discretion is concerned, he certainly understood that he had adjourned that issue and reserved it to himself to consider in the light of further developments, including further evidence he anticipated he would receive from the Treasury Solicitor as to the impact of a discovery order on the timetable.
4. We are not in a position to evaluate those issues as we do not have the relevant material, and it seems to us that if we dismiss the appeal that has been made on the issue of law, the matter should plainly go back to the judge to decide what follows from that.