British
and Irish Legal Information Institute
Freely Available British and Irish Public Legal Information
[
Home]
[
Databases]
[
World Law]
[
Multidatabase Search]
[
Help]
[
Feedback]
England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here:
BAILII >>
Databases >>
England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >>
Voak v London Borough Of Lambeth [2002] EWCA Civ 105 (29 January 2002)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/105.html
Cite as:
[2002] EWCA Civ 105
[
New search]
[
Printable RTF version]
[
Help]
|
|
Neutral Citation Number: [2002] EWCA Civ 105 |
|
|
NO: B2/2001/2101 |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
(Application of Voak for Permission to Appeal)
|
|
Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Tuesday, 29th January 2002 |
|
|
|
B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE SIMON BROWN
and
LORD JUSTICE LAWS
____________________
|
VOAK |
(Applicant) |
|
- v - |
|
|
MAYOR & BURGESSES OF LONDON BOROUGH OF LAMBETH |
(Respondent) |
____________________
Computer Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited
180 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2HG
Telephone No: 0171-421 4040 Fax No: 0171-404 1424
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
____________________
NO ATTENDANCE
____________________
HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Tuesday, 29th January 2002
- LORD JUSTICE SIMON BROWN: Although no one appears today on behalf of the applicant to make the application, it nevertheless appears that there may have been some difficulty in contacting Ms Voak, her solicitors having come off the record. Accordingly, I think it appropriate to give a short judgment as to how the matter strikes this court in the absence of oral argument.
- This is a renewed application for permission to appeal from the order of HHJ Cox, made in the Lambeth County Court on 14 September 2001, dismissing the applicant's statutory appeal against the respondent's decision on 13 February 2001, on a review of their earlier decision pursuant to section 202 of the Housing Act 1986, upholding that earlier decision and concluding that they had discharged their duty to the applicant under the homelessness legislation.
- The central facts can be very briefly told. The applicant has three children: two girls aged 8 and 5, and a boy of 1. The two girls go to school in Streatham. In June 2000 the applicant was evicted from accommodation and applied to the respondents as a homeless person. In August she was given temporary accommodation and in September was made a written offer of alternative accommodation in Stockwell.
- The applicant had already been told that she would only be made one offer, although she would have a right of review under section 202. She was expressly told that she would have that right of review whether she accepted or refused the offer, but if she refused it she would not be able to retract her refusal, and if she accepted it she would have to move from her temporary accommodation into the fresh accommodation pending the review.
- On 14 October 2000 the applicant refused the offer stating:
"I did put on the form that I wanted somewhere in Streatham. The reason why my kids go to school in Streatham. Not only that my friends and family live in Streatham. My kids go to Sunnyhill and I said that I wanted somewhere near to the school. They both start school at 9:00am. It will be too much in the morning."
- On 10 October the respondents notified the applicant, pursuant to section 193(7) of the Act, that they regarded themselves as having discharged their duty towards her and they told her of her right to seek a section 202 review. This she did. By the decision of 13 February 2001 that review, as already stated, went against her. The respondents did not accept the sufficiency of the applicant's reasons for refusing the offer. That letter, in turn, told the applicant of her right to appeal to the County Court in point of law. Thus it was that the matter came before HHJ Cox.
- In refusing permission to appeal, when initially this application was considered on the documents, Mantell LJ observed simply:
"The judge was plainly right for the reasons which appear from an admirably clear and concise judgment."
- That, I have to say, is my view too.
- The essential grounds upon which it is sought to challenge the judgment below, and in turn the decisions of the respondent housing authority - and for this purpose I refer particularly to the applicant's skeleton argument in this court, ably prepared by Mr Preston of counsel on her behalf - are that the applicant had legitimate expectations, first, that the original reasons for refusal would be considered and, second, that if they were rejected she would have a further opportunity to accept the accommodation offered.
- I see no substance in either ground. As to the first, there was sufficient reason for asking the applicant's reasons for refusal without it being implicit that at that stage the refusal would be reconsidered, notably with a view to the likely subsequent review procedure. Accordingly, it raised no legitimate expectation of a second decision prior to review. As the judge pointed out:
"...in suggesting as he does that the Local Authority must revisit the question of suitability before the review procedure is initiated, Mr Preston is attempting to introduce into the process a stage which is not envisaged in the statutory framework. The difficulty in his approach is that he is quite unable to suggest a timetable for this newly introduced stage. He suggests that a reasonable time should be allowed for the process but this is to introduce uncertainty into an area where statute has itself provided a timetable."
- The second point is no more persuasive. The fact is, as already stated, that this applicant was clearly told of the respondent's homelessness policies, and these included the fact that only one offer would be made and that:
"...if you refuse to accept the accommodation offered, you will not be able to retract your refusal..." (see the respondent's letter of 20 September 2000)
- In my judgment, no appeal here could possibly succeed. I would, accordingly, refuse this renewed application.
- LORD JUSTICE LAWS: I entirely agree.
------------