England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM QUEENS BENCH DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL Tuesday 15 May 2001

1. Lord Justice Judge: There are numerous applications before the court, all save one by Mr Alexander. To understand how they arise, and the orders which should be made, a lengthy narrative history is an unfortunate but essential requirement.
2. On 17th August 1998 Mr Alexander issued a writ against Phillips Electronics (UK) Limited (the defendants). He claimed, first, that in July 1995 he had entered into a contract with them the effect of which was that he would act as their agent, world-wide, marketing digital compact cassettes. The contract, he alleged, was repudiated in November 1995. As a result he had incurred unnecessary expense and had been deprived of the opportunity to make profit in excess of £1.5m. There was an alternative basis of claim, based on alleged representations by the defendants' agents, in reliance on which Mr Alexander had wasted time and energy in negotiations and had been deprived of the opportunity to earn income from alternative sources. The loss under this head was estimated at £200,000, and there was a claim for £25,000 expenses which had been included under the first head of claim.
3. On 15 March 1999 Master Eyre struck out the writ and statement of claim on the basis that they disclosed no reasonable cause of action. The action was therefore dismissed, and, we should emphasise, has remained dismissed ever since. The defendants were to "have the costs of the action as well as the costs of the summons which were assessed summarily at £1,904. So, on that date, there were two orders for costs, the first of the action, the second of the summons. An application by Mr Alexander for a stay on payment of the costs of the summons, pending appeal, was refused, but he was granted liberty to apply.
4. On 7 May 1999, Butterfield J dismissed Mr Alexander's appeal against the orders made by Master Eyre. He further ordered that he should pay the costs of the appeal, assessed at £2,0o7, within 28 days. Permission to appeal to this court was refused, and an application for a stay of execution of the order for costs was also refused. The costs were not paid. In due course, on 24 February 2000, a bankruptcy order was made on the basis of this order for costs.
5. On 15 July 1999 the defendant served a statutory demand based on Butterfield J's order for costs. One week later, Lindsay J refused an application for a stay of execution of Butterfield J's order on the ground of want of jurisdiction. Five days afterwards, on 15 July, Mr Registrar Jacques dismissed Mr Alexander's application to set the statutory demand aside.
6. On 6 August Lindsay J decided that no order should be made on Mr Alexander's application for the defendants to be precluded from presenting a petition in bankruptcy until his local and domestic remedies were exhausted.
7. On 27 October, an application to this court by Mr Alexander for permission to appeal the orders made by Butterfield J was refused: so was his application for a stay of execution relating to Butterfield J's costs order. His application for permission to present a petition of appeal to the House of Lords was dismissed on the grounds, first, that no appeal could be made to the House of Lords against the decision of the Court of Appeal where permission to appeal had been refused by this court, and, second, in any event, the case was not an appropriate case for permission. The order as drawn and sealed on 28 October was incomplete. It was not however amended, under the slip rule, until 14 April 2000. At that stage two further paragraphs were added:

"(3) that the claimant's application seeking a stay of execution relating to costs be refused.

(4) that there be liberty to apply in relation to the refusal of the stay if an application were made to the House of Lords and the respondent seeks to enforce the order for costs before the House of Lords had dealt with the application."

8. In the course of dealing with these aspects of the application, after Hale LJ had given the leading judgment on the merits of the application, I said to Mr Alexander:

"If you make an application to the House of Lords and so on, and, they seek to enforce the order for costs before that has been dealt with, that is a matter on which you would be entitled to return on liberty to apply. You are clear about that, are you? We are refusing your application for a stay. If there is an effort to enforce the order for costs against you, you have liberty to apply. But I do not think that if you have not already put your petition in to the House of Lords it will do very much good. In other words, you had better get on with any application you have to make to the House of Lords."

In fact, as we shall see, no application was made to the House of Lords until June 2000, over seven months later, a factor of some importance to Mr Alexander's reliance on events which were to take place between 18-25 February 2000.

9. Mr Alexander told us that he went abroad on 16 December, not returning until 5 January 2000. During that period he had serious domestic problems, which need no narration in open court, but which were serious enough to occupy his entire attention.
10. On 21 January 2000 notice was given of a supporting creditor (John Lewis Plc). On 27 January the hearing of the bankruptcy petition was adjourned to 24 February.
11. On 17 February Mr Alexander attended on Master Eyre, informally, as we understand it, by knocking on his door, in person, and without notice to the other side, requesting "an order that there be a stay of execution of the court's orders for costs given on 15 March 1999" (ie Master Eyre's original order made nearly a year earlier). Master Eyre's attention was not directed to the order made by Butterfield J, and he would, in any event, have had no jurisdiction to deal with it. He ordered that an application should be issued, returnable on 9 March, by not later than 18 February, and served forthwith on the defendants, seeking the stay of execution of his orders, together with an appropriate witness statement, to be served by 2 March 2000, setting out the grounds for the proposed stay. Subject to those conditions, execution by fi fa should be stayed pending disposal or further order.
12. Mr Alexander then telephoned the Civil Appeals Office, requesting an appointment before a Practice Master. According to the contemporaneous internal memorandum from the office, he appeared to be "asking for a stay of execution, pending an application to the House of Lords, against the order of Mr Justice Butterfield (7/5/99). The Court of Appeal has already refused permission......"
13. The request for an appointment before the practice master gave as the reason:

"To obtain a stay of execution in respect of the order of the Honourable Mr Justice Butterfield, dated 07 May 1999, on the grounds that; pursuant to special leave (by concurrence) of the Rt Honourable Lord Justice Judge and Her Ladyship Lady Justice Hale, sitting in the Court of Appeal on 27 October 1999, the matter was referred to the House of Lords."

That assertion was inaccurate. No special leave had been granted and the matter had not been referred to the House of Lords.

14. The contemporaneous Court of Appeal note records in Master Di Mambro's handwriting:

"(1) Master Eyre's order stays the costs orders in Alexander v Phillips (2) the C of A (proceedings) in that matter are now at an end so there is no need for an appointment."

15. On 24 February, Mr Registrar Baister adjudged Mr Alexander bankrupt. He noted:

"Mr Alexander's application to Butterfield J was itself an appeal from the decision of the Master. That appeal failed. His application to the Court of Appeal has failed. Whatever the original point was, it has been considered by three tribunals."

16. The judgment ended:

"There is another matter which seems to me to weigh in favour of making the order. The order of the judge stands. It is an order for costs to be paid. Like any order, it must be obeyed. This is especially the case now under the Civil Procedure Rules: parties are required to pay costs as they arise, not at some indefinite point in the future when, perhaps, all the issues between them have been aired."

This order has not been appealed.

17. Mr Alexander told us that on the following day (25 February) he received a letter dated 18 February from the Civil Appeals Registry, and signed by Mr Sugarman. The relevant paragraph reads:

"This matter has been before a Deputy Master of this court. The Deputy Master has directed that Master Eyre's order stays the costs orders in Alexander v Phillips Electronics (UK) Limited. Further the Deputy Master directs that because the Court of Appeal proceedings in this matter are now at an end there is no need for an appointment."

As one would expect, this accurately reflects the contemporaneous note made by Master Di Mambro.

18. Mr Alexander relied heavily on the contents of this letter. He suggested that it took effect as an order of this court, staying all the proceedings to enforce the court orders of 15 March and 7 May 1999. Therefore there was a stay against enforcement of the debt on which the bankruptcy proceedings was based. The order made on 24 February by Mr Registrar Baister was invalid because he took no account of the letter dated 18 February, evidencing the order of the court. In fact, as Mr Alexander told us, and the stamp on the document confirmed, the letter dated 18 February was not received by him until 25 February, so on 24 February no copy of it was available, and therefore none could have been shown to the Registrar. Mr Alexander said that he told the Registrar of it, which we assume to mean, told the Registrar of the conversation he had had with Mr Sugarman. That would not have provided a sufficient basis for refusing to make the bankruptcy order.
19. Despite its length, this narrative of events is not comprehensive, but the next significant date is 20 March, when an application by Mr Alexander to Master Eyre to continue the stay granted by him on 17 February 2000 was dismissed. Mr Alexander subsequently appealed, successfully, to Grigson J on 23 May.
20. On 21 March 2000 Mr Registrar Baister dismissed an application by Mr Alexander to annul the bankruptcy order made on 25 February 2000. He said:

"The overwhelming majority of points Mr Alexander made were the same as the points he made on 24 February or so similar as to amount to the same ...... There is nothing before the court that indicates that there was some ground in existence at the time the bankruptcy order was made that would have meant that the order would not have been made. The jurisdiction conferred on the court by s282(1) of the Act is restricted. It cannot be invoked to procure a rehearing of the petition, nor can it be used as a sort of appeal."

21. Mr Alexander says that he showed the Registrar the letter dated 18 February signed by Mr Sugarman, or "told him" it was available, but that the Registrar did not read it. It is this order which is now under appeal, not, as Mr Registrar Baister noted, an application to set aside the original bankruptcy order itself, but an application for an order for annulment under s282(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986.
22. As already recorded, on 14 April the Court of Appeal order dated 27 October 1999 was amended under the slip rule to add the two further paragraphs relating to Mr Alexander's application for a stay of execution, and for liberty to apply in relation to the refusal of a stay if an application was made to the House of Lords. On 23 May 2000 Grigson J allowed Mr Alexander's appeal against the refusal of Master Eyre to continue the stay of execution of the writ of fi fa granted on 17 February 2000, and relating back to the original orders in March 1999. Execution was stayed for 14 days provided Mr Alexander lodged a petition with the House of Lords seeking permission to appeal the order of this court dated 27 November. The stay was to continue until disposal of that petition.
23. On 2 June 2000 Mr Alexander lodged a petition to appeal with the House of Lords. The judicial office responded saying the petition was inappropriate (Lane v Esdaile [1891] AC 210). Mr Alexander however requested consideration of his petition by a Committee of the House and lodged the appropriate fee.
24. On 11 July 2000 Mr Alexander's appeal against the order of Mr Registrar Baister made on 21 March, refusing to annul the bankruptcy order, was heard by Mr Richard McCombe QC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the Chancery Division.
25. Mr Alexander told us that the letter dated 18 February was shown in court to Mr McCombe. The transcript records Mr Alexander saying :

"I think you ought to be made aware of on 18 February, the date after Master Eyre's order, I received a letter from the Court of Appeal. I will read it."

The Deputy Judge asked, "what date is this?"

Mr Alexander responded: "The 18 February." He then read out the relevant paragraph of the letter dated 18 February. He asked the judge if he would be interested to see the letter, and the judge responded that he had not seen it, and would quite like to do so. There then followed this brief exchange.

Mr Alexander: "It is the original. I do not have a copy."

The Deputy Judge: "That was at the time of the existence of the original stay of the fi fa proceedings, was it not?"

Mr Alexander: "No, no, my Lord. Yes, yes, indeed."

The Deputy Judge: "That was the 17th, the day before."

Mr Alexander: "I am sorry."

26. In the text from which we were reading, in what I believe to be Mr Alexander's handwriting, there are some amendments. The exchange quoted above concludes rather differently. Where Mr Alexander is recorded as having said: "No, no, my Lord. Yes, yes indeed." The words no, no, my Lord. Yes," are crossed out, and his response to the judge's comment "that was the 17th, the day before". The text has been amended from "I am sorry" to "Yes".
27. The exchange then moved immediately to what Mr Alexander described as a conflict of interest between the Bankruptcy Court and the Court of Appeal. Just before Mr Alexander sat down, the Deputy Judge said:

"What I want to make very clear to you before you sit down, before you stop, is that your applications depend on showing that there is a real and proper challenge to be made to the claim made by Phillips upon which the bankruptcy petition and order was based. Your problem, as I see it at the moment, is that that order was made by Butterfield J, you went to the Court of Appeal and I can do nothing about what they decided........."

28. The Deputy Judge heard brief submissions from counsel for the Official Receiver. In his response, Mr Alexander referred at the very end of his submissions to having "a letter dated 18 February from the Court of Appeal which states that Master Eyre's order stays the costs order in Alexander......"
29. When he gave judgment Mr McCombe recorded that the order made by Master Eyre on 17 February 2000 did not involve any stay of the order made by Butterfield J. He went on:

"The position remains that the order upon which the bankruptcy order was made was the costs' order of Butterfield J in the sum of £2,047. Mr Alexander has sought to appeal to the Court of Appeal against that order and has been refused permission to do so. The Court of Appeal has said that it is not open to them to grant permission to appeal further to the House of Lords....... I have been shown correspondence from the House of Lords office indicating that the relevant office there considers that the appeal (to the House of Lords) would be inadmissible within the rule of the decision in Lane v Esdaile...... There is no real or serious prospect of the House of Lords taking any action to reverse or annul the order of the Court of Appeal or of Butterfield J on which the bankruptcy petition and the bankruptcy order was based."

30. In the result, the appeal against the decision dated 21 March 2000 was dismissed, and Mr Alexander was ordered to pay £1,000 in costs. They have not yet been paid. On 25 July 2000 Mr Alexander applied to this court for permission to appeal the order made by Mr McCombe. That is one of the most significant applications now before us.
31. The grounds of appeal are:

"the judgment is unsafe, wrong in law and unjust, as the order made in court at first instance dated 24 February 2000 ...... ought not to have been made. It is fundamentally unfair as public interest in the administration of justice appear to stand in conflict."

32. On 30 July the Civil Appeals office informed Mr Alexander that his trustee in bankruptcy had been appointed.
33. On 31 July 2000 Sarah Iwi, a lawyer in the Civil Appeals Office, wrote to Mr Alexander;

"It appears that you are asserting that the bankruptcy order should never have been made and that a letter sent from this office on 18 February 2000 confirms that the order of Master Eyre dated 17 February stayed the costs order.

As you are well aware, and as I have pointed out in correspondence, the order of Master Eyre dated 17 February related to execution by way of fi fa only. Further, the application for permission to appeal ..... had been dismissed on 27th October 1999 and therefore the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to deal with a stay for reasons which have already been rehearsed to you in previous correspondence.

It is noted that Master Eyre refused to continue this stay of execution by fi fa on 20th March 2000 and that the bankruptcy order was made on 21st March 2000."

34. There is no further material relevant to the application for permission to appeal against the order made on 11 July 2000 by Mr McCombe. S282(1)(a) of the 1986 Act empowers a bankruptcy court to annul its own bankruptcy order if at any time it appears to the court that on any grounds existing at the time when the bankruptcy order was made, the order ought not to be made.
35. The order made by Master Eyre on 17 February 2000 provided no comfort to Mr Alexander in relation to the forthcoming hearing of the bankruptcy petition. It could not do so for at least two reasons, which were identified by Mr Registrar Baister on 24 February 2000. First, the stay directed by the order of 17 February 1999 was in respect only of execution by fi fa; it did not purport to restrain proceedings under a bankruptcy petition. Secondly, the stay was in respect only of the costs orders of 15 March 1999; it had no effect in relation to Butterfield J's order of 7 May.
36. The letter dated 18 February 2000 refers to the "costs orders". There were two separate orders made by Master Eyre on 15 March 1999. The recital to his order on 17 February 2000, quoted earlier in paragraph 11, refers to a request by the claimant for an order that there "be a stay of execution of the court's Orders for costs given on 15 March 1999". Therefore the order of 17 February 2000 had nothing to do with the order for costs made on 7 May 1999.
37. In our view Mr Alexander's contention that the letter of 18 February 2000 takes effect as an order of this court staying all proceedings to enforce the costs orders made on 15 March and 7 May, including, in particular, the bankruptcy proceedings, is misconceived. It is plain, as a matter of construction, that the letter of 18 February purports to do no more than record the Deputy Master's view as to the effect of the order that Master Eyre had made on the previous day, 17 February. The letter does not purport to record any further or additional order going beyond the scope of Master Eyre's order. Reading Master Eyre's order of 17 February and the letter of 18 February, together, as they should be, it is plain:

(i) that the only stay to which the Deputy Master can be referring is that imposed by the order of 17 February;

(ii) that the only stay imposed by the order of 17 February relates to the "court's orders for costs given on 15 March 1999", and

(iii) that the only stay in relation to the enforcement of an order or orders made on 15 March is a stay of execution by fi fa.

It is therefore impossible to read into the letter of 18 February an intention to impose a stay on the enforcement of the costs order of 7 May 1999.

38. In any event however it appears most unlikely that the Deputy Master could possibly have thought that she had power to impose a stay on Butterfield J's order for costs. First, save in exceptional circumstances, and none were shown here, it would be wrong in principle to impose a stay of execution without giving the party who would otherwise be entitled to enforce the order an opportunity to be heard. Second, on 27 October, this court, (Hale LJ and I) had refused permission to appeal from Butterfield J's order so there was no ground upon which an application for a stay pending appeal, or for any other purpose, could be advanced. It is true that the Deputy Master may well not have been aware that this court had given liberty to apply for a stay in the event Mr Alexander made an application to the House of Lords - because the additional paragraphs were not included in the order of 27 October 1999 until 14 April 2000 - but even if she had been aware of that, it could have made no difference because, Mr Alexander had not in fact made any application to the House of Lords at the relevant time. Third, the matters in respect of which CPR 52.16(1) confers power on a court officer assigned to the Court of Appeal to exercise the jurisdiction of the court do not include the making of a stay of execution. The letter of 18 February must be construed in context; and that context includes the powers which the Deputy Master could properly exercise. It would be wrong, in the absence of clear words, to assume that she was seeking to go outside her powers, and to make an order which she had no jurisdiction to make. There is in fact no reason to think that she intended to do so. As a matter of construction, the letter of 18 February was not intended to add to the legal effect of the order which Master Eyre had made on 17 February. For these reasons, we are satisfied that the letter of 18 February does not have the effect that Mr Alexander contends. Having had the letter drawn to his attention, but without the benefit of any close analysis, the judge was plainly correct to dismiss the appeal against the refusal to annul the bankruptcy order. The application for permission to appeal to this court should be refused.
39. Shortly after the hearing before Mr McCombe there was an application, refused by David Steel J, for an injunction to restraint the Official Receiver from notifying the House of Lords of Mr Alexander's bankruptcy. Permission to appeal was also refused.
40. On 1 September 2000 Mr Alexander applied to Master Eyre for what was described as a "blanket stay" of execution of the costs orders he had made on 15 March 1999, and Butterfield J had made on 7 May 1999. Master Eyre ordered Mr Alexander to pay £1900 to the defendants. The costs have not been paid.
41. On 7 September an application by Mr Alexander to have KPMG joined as third parties to his struck out claim against the defendants was dismissed.
42. On 18 September, on consideration of the papers, Jackson J refused Mr Alexander's application for permission to appeal the order of Master Eyre dated 1 September. Mr Alexander renewed his application for permission to appeal this order, which was heard on 17 October and refused by Blofeld J. He seeks permission to appeal Blofeld J's order, or more accurately, Deputy Master Joseph's direction, refusing permission to set down the appellant's notice on the ground that the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from this order.
43. On 6 October the Judicial Office at the House of Lords confirmed to the solicitors for the defendants that if the bankruptcy petition was invalid (as Mr Alexander had asserted) he could lodge his petition notwithstanding the fact that he had been informed of the principle in Lane v Esdaile, and, if he wished to proceed, he would need to lodge a petition, out of time. The end result was that the Judicial Office at the House of Lords returned the defendants' cheque for £100 which had been paid on 2 June 2000.
44. In late September Mr Alexander applied for permission to adduce further evidence, subsequently "boosted", to use his own word, by a letter dated 24 October, together with enclosures, which included a detailed statement about the claim against the defendants from Mr Alexander himself.
45. On 16 November Mr Alexander applied for a general stay of execution pending the proceedings then current in the House of Lords. On 27 November sitting in this court, Robert Walker LJ and I adjourned Mr Alexander's application for permission to appeal against the order of Mr Richard McCombe, until after the hearing before Sullivan J on 29 November of Mr Alexander's application for the general stay. At the same time an application for permission to appeal the order made by David Steel J on 3 August together with the ancillary application for permission to rely on further evidence was dismissed, although Mr Alexander preferred that the word "discontinued" should be used to describe the order. For present purposes nothing turns on the distinction. On 29 November Sullivan J dismissed Mr Alexander's application. He ordered him to pay the defendants' costs of £1,551. Again, these costs have not been paid. He seeks leave to appeal this order.
46. On 7 December, Mr Alexander applied for an adjournment of the hearing before this court due to take place on 13 December. He wished to rely on the evidence of Sevket Gozalan and Robert Sherman. In effect this was an application to adduce fresh evidence. We have studied the papers relied on by Mr Alexander. To give something of the flavour of the application we shall quote from it:

"I have recently established that Mr Seuket Gozalan currently employed by the Universal Music Group..... is currently working and residing in Istanbul. I believe that he may now be prepared to make a statement confirming that the contract relied upon by me in this action was a binding and concluded contract...... This evidence has not previously been available to use. It is necessary for me to deploy an agent in Turkey to locate and obtain this statement from the said Seuket Gozalan... I need time to obtain the appropriate statement from him, and sub-peona him to defend (attend) as a witness, if necessary."

47. The application continues to note that Mr Alexander has recently re established contact with Mr Sherman and that he needed him "to give evidence pertaining to a meeting he attended at the respondents' London offices in 1994". Mr Sherman attended the proceedings before us in person.
48. The original proceedings brought by Mr Alexander against the defendants were struck out. They disclosed no reasonable cause of action. We can find nothing in the "fresh" material to lead us to the conclusion that it is arguable that the striking out order should be set aside.
49. On 13 December 2000 Robert Walker LJ and I adjourned the applications then before us pending consideration by the House of Lords of Mr Alexander's petition for permission to appeal.
50. On 16 January 2001 Master Eyre refused a renewed application for an extended stay,

"it being apparent that the claimant puts forward no ground to justify the grant of an extended stay other than his personal feelings about the bankruptcy order and its implications."

51. It is plain that Mr Alexander is indeed incensed about the bankruptcy order, perhaps aggravated by the fact that he has the means to pay the costs order made by Butterfield J, but has so far chosen not to do so. Permission to appeal was refused.
52. On 26 January, on consideration of the papers, Pitchford J refused permission to appeal. On 1st February Grigson J refused a renewed application for permission. And indeed on 12 February Owen J also refused a renewed application for permission, and also refused permission to appeal a consequent order for costs.
53. In the meantime on 19 January, Lloyd J dismissed an application by Mr Alexander from the order of the Registrar in Bankruptcy relating to Mr Alexander's public examination, but on 25 January Jacob J, by consent, adjourned the public examination until 16 March 2001. Mr Alexander seeks to appeal both these orders, his grounds in relation to the decision by Jacob J asserting that he was "given no opportunity to accede to a consent order and the hearing lawfully due before a High Court Judge was denied". He sought a further order from this court that his public examination should be adjourned generally,

"pending the full and complete exhaustion of all and any available local remedies in the courts of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland pursuant to the Ambatielos principle under European Law, or until further order, as such public examination violates my constitutional right to work and is, in the circumstances, inappropriate."

54. In February 2001 Owen J heard and dismissed an application by Mr Alexander to have the word "energetic" deleted from a skeleton argument prepared by the defendants. He refused permission to appeal. Mr Alexander intends to seek permission to appeal the orders made by Owen J as:

"inequitable, wrong in law and contrary to legitimate public interest, as well as standing in direct conflict with European Law."

The order of 12 February was said to violate his constitutional right to work in his chosen job occupation or profession, and the order dated 16 February conflicted with his views "pertaining to matters of professional integrity and a sense of pride emanating from cultural identity inherited at birth, such being ..... discarded and ignored by the learned judge".

55. In the meantime, on 7 February the defendants applied for a Grepe v Loam order [1887] 37 Ch D 168 on the essential ground that "Mr Alexander's conduct to date demonstrates that he is intent on making applications which stand no prospect of success and, in the absence of an order as requested, it is likely that (he) will continue to make applications which stand no prospect of success. Without such an order ........ the respondent is likely to be put to considerable further expense in dealing with applications made by (Mr Alexander) which stand no prospect of success." This order would not be sought if any of Mr Alexander's present applications were allowed.
56. On 13 February the House of Lords confirmed the position in relation to Lane v Esdaile, although from what we have been able to discover from the papers, in connection with separate proceedings. Effectively, however, the petition for permission to appeal to the House of Lords from the decision of this court dated 27 October 1999, and itself dated 2 June 2000, is no longer extant.
57. With the exception of the applications which have already been dealt with earlier in this judgment, the remaining applications for permission to appeal arise from Mr Alexander's determined efforts to procure a stay of execution for the purpose of mounting a critical attack, undermining the original bankruptcy order or the order dismissing his application to annul it. In reality he has a strong sense of grievance that his original proceedings against the defendants were struck out, and the attack on Butterfield J's decision in relation to costs, and the consequent bankruptcy order, provide him with a focus on which to mount his attack. None of the applications for permission to appeal has any merit, and indeed they have become increasingly unreal. The descent into fantasy was illustrated by the application that the skeleton argument should omit the word "energetic". Each of the orders currently under consideration was fully justified. The narrative of events provides a sufficient explanation for the orders, and why there is no realistic prospect of a successful appeal against them.
58. The final matter for consideration is the Grepe v Loam application by the defendants. The narrative demonstrates that the orders for costs made in favour of the defendants just about two years ago, together with further orders, have not yet been paid.
59. The courts from the Master to the House of Lords have been inundated with a series of applications by Mr Alexander which have ultimately proved to be ill-founded. Time and again the exercise has been pointless and wasteful of limited court resources and from time to time, has involved the defendants in additional expense. Having seen Mr Alexander on a number of occasions personally, I should record that although he has always treated the court with proper courtesy there is no doubting that the prospect of forensic battle holds no terrors or concerns for him, and that indeed he relishes the cut and thrust of the forensic process.
60. We are entirely satisfied that without an order he will continue to exercise his ingenious and fertile brain to formulate yet further applications to restore this issue to the court. Ignoring altogether the position of his trustee in bankruptcy, who has now been appointed, a Grepe v Loam order should now be made so as to provide a safeguard for the defendants against any unjustified protraction of this litigation.
61. To reflect our present views, I shall indicate the terms of the order which, at present, we should be minded to make:
62. The first defendant's application be granted and
63. (a) the claimant shall not make any further applications or take any steps in this court or in any court below in or arising out of these proceedings without prior permission of this court;
64. (b) but if the claimant wants to apply for permission then the application must be made in writing without notice to the other party and shall be dealt with by this court on paper; and
65. (c) that if any application, notice or any other form of document which is within the scope of this order is served on or given to any other person without prior permission of this court, that person shall not be required to appear and the application will stand dismissed without having been heard.