England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM WEST LONDON COUNTY COURT
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE COMPSTON)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Tuesday, 15th May 2001

Tuesday, 15th May 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE JUDGE:
2. This litigation is concerned with a property if Fulham, bought in 1990 by Mr Alexander with the help of a substantial mortgage from Halifax Building Society. Thereafter the property became home for Mr Alexander and Miss Costello.
3. Unfortunately mortgage arrears accrued. In November 1996 at West London County Court a possession order, together with a money judgment in the sum of £133,664 was made. The warrant of execution of the possession order was suspended, pending the hearing of an application for permission to appeal.
4. On 28th January 1999 this court refused permission to appeal, and the suspension order was lifted. Mr Alexander and Miss Costello then issued applications returnable before a judge of West London County Court. His application sought an extension of time for giving up possession in the light of the fact that he had no other accommodation for his own use or that of Miss Costello, and an appeal was said to be pending in the House of Lords against a decision of the Court of Appeal. Miss Costello's application sought an injunction against the Halifax, that it should be forbidden from issuing a warrant for possession which would evict her, and ordering the company to allow her to continue to reside in the property.
5. On 26th February 1999 at West London County Court, His Honour Judge Compston dismissed these applications. That led to an application by both Mr Alexander and Miss Costello for leave to appeal. This court dismissed the applications.
6. Since then Mr Alexander has been made bankrupt, and his trustee in bankruptcy has been appointed. The circumstances in which the order was made and Mr Alexander's efforts to undermine it or have it set aside, need no elaboration in this judgment. They are set out at great length in the judgment given earlier this morning in Mr Alexander's litigation against Phillips Electronics (UK) limited.
7. Mr Alexander, rather than his trustee in bankruptcy, now makes three applications.
8. He asks for permission to refer the decision of the Court of Appeal refusing to grant him permission to appeal against the orders of His Honour Judge Compston to the House of Lords. He also seeks to take third party proceedings against Halifax Plc's registered auditors, KPMG, and further seeks to introduce evidence in the form of witness statements from himself and Miss Costello in relation to the proceedings at West London County Court.
9. In our judgment which can do nothing to assist Mr Alexander. The judgment of the Court of Appeal refusing his application for permission to appeal is clear. Permission to appeal have been refused, there is no basis on which to grant permission to appeal to the House of Lords. For Mr Alexander the principles in Lane v Esdaile are well travelled and clear.
10. The litigation is now at an end. There is therefore no basis for considering an order for third party proceedings against Halifax's registered auditors. There is nothing left in the litigation between Mr Alexander and the Halifax Plc in which to involve them.
11. Finally, as to the permission to introduce evidence, this relates back to some earlier litigation involving Mr Alexander with the Bank of Cyprus which, as we understand it, culminated in a refusal by the Court of Appeal to give him permission to appeal. Again, as we understand it, Halifax Plc was either involved or intended to be involved as third party to the proceedings. Nothing we have seen suggests that this evidence should properly be admitted, or if admitted, would serve to undermine the original decisions at West London County Court.
12. As indicated earlier in this judgment, none of these applications are supported by Mr Alexander's trustee in bankruptcy. Dealing with them, however, on the basis that the appointment of a trustee has no inhibiting effect whatsoever, we are unable to find any basis for allowing any of them.
(Applications refused; no order for costs).