England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT SWANSEA
(His Honour Judge Moseley QC)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Tuesday, 13th February 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE THORPE: Mrs McColl seeks permission to appeal the judgment of His Honour Judge Moseley QC given in the County Court at Swansea on 10th October 2000. He entertained an appeal brought by Mrs McColl and in due course a cross appeal by the claimant, Lloyds TSB Bank PLC, from a reserved judgment of Deputy District Judge Thomas dated 8th March 2000.
2. The dispute between the bank and Mrs McColl was a relatively simple one to state. Mrs McColl borrowed from the bank. In due course the bank brought an action against her for recovery of the sums that they alleged were due to them. The action was initiated in the Salisbury County Court which undoubtedly Mrs McColl found difficult to understand and in due course to deal with, since she was herself always living in Wales. Indeed, the money had been borrowed on an account at the Fishguard branch of the claimant bank.
3. The action proceeded to judgment in default of defence, and Mrs McColl has complained that she was confused by the paperwork that she received from the county court into a failure to file a defence. The matter then proceeded, the bank seeking to obtain a charging order against the property in which Mrs McColl was living, The Court House at Goodwick. That was a property which had belonged to her late father who had died intestate, with the consequence that Mrs McColl had only a one-fifth share in the estate and in the property. The initial attempt by the bank to obtain a charging order against the property was ultimately amended to a charging order against her beneficial 20 per cent share.
4. The hearing before the deputy district judge resulted in a declaration that the bank were due the sum of just over £35,000 plus interest, and that there be an order that, unless Mrs McColl exchanged contracts for the sale of the property, then the sale go into the hands of the bank who, through their solicitors, would be in a position to sell and to recoup. That order was the order that came by way of appeal to Judge Moseley on 10th October.
5. There is a complete transcript of the hearing of 10th October and it runs to 76 pages. The bank was represented by counsel, as was Mrs McColl's brother, known as Dai Griffiths. Mrs McColl herself appeared in person. During the course of the transcript it is possible to pick out short judgments given by the judge on different distinct points at pages 28, 44, 54 and 74. The judge had the task of conducting an appeal hearing in a way that would be fair and which would hopefully appear fair to a litigant in person. He dealt with Mrs McColl's appeal during the course of the judgment, when he said at page 32:

"So it seems to me nevertheless, having looked at the matter with a sympathetic eye for Mrs McColl's interests, that there are no grounds upon which Mrs McColl could possibly succeed in the appeal and for that reason it is in her interests that I dismiss the appeal."

6. In coming to this court, Mrs McColl has prepared her case by reference to a Home Office guidance publication introducing the Human Rights legislation to the general public, and she has made extensive reference to that document in reading a carefully drafted submission. It is undoubted that the Human Rights Act 1998 applies to the hearing on 10th October which, as Mrs McColl has pointed out, was eight days into human rights territory but, although I have listened with admiration to her steadfast emphasis on the articles of the Convention, it seems to me that really only Articles 6 and 8 are in direct play. It is manifest that Mrs McColl feels that she did not receive a fair trial from Judge Moseley. She feels that he simply brushed her appeal aside, listening always to counsel for the bank, and allowing the bank to belatedly cross appeal, as she puts it, piggy backing on her appeal. She clearly felt that at the time because she raised that sort of complaint to Judge Moseley himself, and he responded by saying that he regretted that she had that feeling because he felt that he had done his best to assist her as a litigant in person and to ensure that she received a fair hearing. I have to ask myself, was the judge's response justified? I have to say that I think it was. It is difficult for a judge in circumstances like this to give the first word to the litigant in person, who is necessarily a bit at sea. There is a temptation perhaps to allow the represented party to set out the background and the issues before approaching a decision. But I am in no doubt at all that the judge did, as he said he had, look at the matter with a sympathetic eye for Mrs McColl's interests. Any experienced judge of the county court, conducting an appeal brought by a litigant in person, invariably uses his forensic skill to see whether there is anything which the litigant in person has overlooked or anything which could be said on the litigant's behalf. I am quite satisfied that Judge Moseley honoured that tradition. As well as the Human Rights Act 1998, consideration must be given to the Access to Justice Act 1999. That Act says by section 55 that, when an appeal is made to a county court in relation to any matter, and on hearing the appeal the court makes a decision in relation to that matter, no appeal may be made to the Court of Appeal unless the Court of Appeal considers that the appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice or there is some other compelling reason for the court to hear it. That is a very high hurdle for an applicant for permission to surmount. Although I appreciate the care that Mrs McColl has devoted to preparing her case for this hearing, and although I equally appreciate the way in which she has addressed me today, I cannot begin to find either a sufficient point of principle or practice or some other compelling reason to depart from the ordinary rule that this court will not entertain second tier appeals. I must as a matter of principle dismiss this application. I appreciate that Mrs McColl may feel again that she has lost because she is a litigant in person, and that had she had some eminent counsel she would have received a different result, but I can assure her that it is not so. The application would have had no greater prospect of success had it been prepared and advanced by even the most experienced and skilful of leaders. The application is dismissed.
Order: Application refused.