England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE CENTRAL LONDON COUNTY COURT
(His Honour Judge Butter)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2
		Friday 16 March 2001

Friday 16th March 2001

JUDGMENT
1. LORD JUSTICE TUCKEY:This is an appeal by Warren Garrett ("the appellant") from a judgment of Judge Butter QC given in the Central London County Court on 5 August 1996 in which he dismissed the appellant's negligence claim for damages for work-related stress against his employers, London Borough of Camden ("Camden").
2. Camden employed the appellant as a financial development officer in their Economic Development Unit ("EDU") in June 1991. He started these proceedings in February 1995 and was retired on medical grounds in September 1996. Put shortly, his particulars of claim alleged that the psychiatric injury which he had suffered as a result of stress was caused by the fact that between 1992 and 1994 he had to work under confused and conflicting lines of management during which time the role of the EDU and his role within it were systematically undermined and he was harassed, intimidated and assaulted.
3. The appellant represented himself at the trial, which lasted eleven days. It was common ground that Camden owed the appellant a duty of care and that he suffered psychiatric injury caused by stress. However, foreseeability, breach of duty and causation were in issue. At the end of his judgment, the judge summarised his conclusions as follows:

"Clearly there were unattractive disputes between personnel which contributed to stress on the plaintiff as well, no doubt, as to other personnel involved, and there may have been mistakes in management, but I do not find that there was harassment of the plaintiff. I consider, and I mean no discourtesy, that the plaintiff is to a large extent his own worst enemy, and one whose evidence I have to treat with some reserve because of his apparent inability in relation to the defendants to see any point of view other than his own.

I do not consider on the facts as I find them that a reasonable employer ought to have foreseen that the plaintiff would suffer injury from the workload or conditions or circumstances in which he was expected to carry out this work. I hold that the plaintiff has failed to establish breach of duty on the part of the defendants and, even if he had established breach of duty, he would have failed on the question as to what was reasonably foreseeable. In my judgment such injury to the plaintiff's health as has occurred has arisen in substance from the vulnerable personality of the plaintiff himself, and for these reasons it follows that the plaintiff's claim fails and must be dismissed."

4. The appellant now contends that what happened to him can be explained by the fact that he was victimised for whistle-blowing. To this end his appeal has been mounted on a broad front. First, the appellant contends that the trial was unfair because Camden failed to disclose documents which would have revealed the real reason why they treated him as they did and the judge refused to adjourn the hearing to await the result of an inquiry by the anti-fraud unit of the European Commission ("UCLAF") (about which more later) and prevented him from properly putting his case. Secondly, the appellant asked for permission to put in further evidence (five volumes of it) which he says, among other things, would have led the judge to reject the evidence of a number of senior Camden officials whose evidence he accepted. Thirdly and in any event, he says that the judge misapplied the law and reached the wrong conclusion on the facts.
5. The appellant has represented himself on this appeal. We have found him (as did the judge) both courteous and competent and we are grateful to him for the helpful way in which he made his submissions and responded to questions from the court.
6. At the beginning of the hearing, the appellant applied for extensive specific discovery on the basis that if we made such an order the appeal would be adjourned. We refused this application. Much of it was directed to the court service to discover court documents surrounding the making of various interlocutory orders in the county court and the fact that before a full transcript of the trial was requested in 1999 the court's tapes had been destroyed. Any such documents would have been of no value whatsoever to the appellant on this appeal. He also applied for further discovery from Camden. We did not think that this would advance the appellant's case either. There were eleven trial bundles, and we agreed to look at the further evidence to see what light it shed on the events with which the appellant's claim was concerned without formally ruling on its admissibility. This is more than enough documentation in a case of this kind. Any further orders for discovery at this stage would have been entirely disproportionate. Furthermore, the documents requested, if they exist, relate to what happened after the proceedings were started.
7. Before considering the appellant's grounds of appeal further, I must deal in some detail with the history of the matter as found by the judge or revealed by the documents which we have considered.
8. The appellant joined Camden after working for the London Borough of Waltham Forest for five years in a comparable position. He came with favourable references, including one which said that he had always impressed by his reliability and capacity to cope with a heavy workload. However, disclosure of his medical and work records for this period for the purpose of the trial led the judge to note that there were disconcerting resemblances between some of the problems which involved the appellant at Waltham Forest and subsequently at Camden. None of those medical or work records had been disclosed to Camden before they employed the appellant. This and the medical evidence which he heard from two consultant psychiatrists at the trial led the judge to conclude that the appellant was a person who was substantially more vulnerable than most to sustaining psychiatric injury, although Camden did not know this. It was not the appellant's case either that he was a vulnerable person or that the nature of his job was particularly stressful.
9. The EDU was a small specialist unit. When the appellant joined it in 1991 it enjoyed a fair amount of autonomy under its manager, Miss Kingsley. The trouble started in 1992 when the EDU was transferred into a new division of the Environment Department, whose director was Mr Pike. His assistant director, Miss McDonald, became Miss Kingsley's line manager. This transfer was opposed by Miss Kingsley and others, including the appellant. There followed two years of turmoil in which Miss McDonald attempt to establish management control over the EDU. She was supported by Mr Pike and a number of the EDU staff but Miss Kingsley, supported by others including the appellant, resisted and resented what she was trying to do.
10. Over this time complaints and counter-complaints were made by and against those involved which invoked the council's grievance procedures and led to two internal inquiries. On the advice of their union the appellant and Miss Kingsley refused to cooperate with the first inquiry, which reported in November 1994. The second inquiry, conducted by Mr Carmichael, reported in December 1995.
11. The general complaint made by the appellant, which was supported by the evidence of Miss Kingsley and others in their camp, was that Miss McDonald, with Mr Pike's support, was attempting to undermine the EDU. They contended that a restructuring and an audit review were designed to eliminate the unit and/or to unsettle them. In the process, they were harassed and intimidated. Mr Pike and Miss McDonald's response was that they were only trying to establish management control over the EDU so as to get a satisfactory understanding of what was going on, and yet they were obstructed at every turn.
12. The judge described the evidence of Mr Pike and Miss McDonald as "impressive". Having reviewed their evidence and the evidence of the appellant and those who were called to support his case, he said:

"What I think is clear, however, is that whether because of a clash of personalities, or because of the attitudes of employees at different levels, there was at times a substantial amount of friction."

13. However, he concluded that the restructuring and audit review had been for legitimate reasons.
14. The judge also dealt with a number of specific incidents involving friction. The first related to a complaint by the appellant that he had been prevented from attending a meeting and assaulted by Mr Connor (about whom more later) in May 1993. The judge found that there had been no physical assault. The incident was unpleasant, he said, but it had been blown up out of all proportion. Mr Connor was transferred out of the EDU at his own request in September 1993. The judge then dealt with another incident in 1993, about which he accepted the evidence of a councillor that after a meeting at which some criticism had been made of the EDU's work, the appellant suddenly erupted and shouted "Why don't you leave us alone?"
15. The appellant contended that he first became involved in the events which led to his whistle-blowing in early 1994. From 1989 Camden and other councils had been involved with a registered charity called Migrant Trading Company ("MTC"). MTC was set up to provide work training for migrants in the London area. Mr Connor was one of the moving forces behind this company and one of its unpaid directors. His wife was a part-time employee. The services provided by MTC made it eligible for grants from the European Social Fund ("ESF"), matched to the level of funding provided by the councils. Much of the funding provided by the councils was in kind, represented by the value of services and accommodation which they provided to MTC. There was nothing wrong with this, but the councils were required to keep accurate records to vouch the value of what they had provided.
16. Between 1989 and 1991 Camden made substantial loans to MTC in anticipation of MTC's receipt of grants from the ESF out of which the loans were to be repaid. Mr Connor, in his capacity as a council officer, was involved in the process which led to these loans being made. Camden's internal procedures for making them were not fully followed either and the district auditor, reporting in September 2000, provisionally concluded that although Camden had the power to make such loans the decision to do so was vitiated by the participation in the decision-making process of Mr Connor, who had a disqualifying interest.
17. By early 1994 MTC had an accumulated deficit of £105,000. To enable it to continue trading the participating councils agreed to make cash grants, of which Camden's share was £13,000. The EDU were asked to prepare a report for the relevant members' sub-committee to approve the payment. The appellant says that he was involved in the preparation of this report and was not happy when he discovered some of the history of Camden's dealing with MTC with which the EDU had not previously been involved, including the fact that MTC owed Camden nearly £500,000 and that, without her knowledge, Mr Connor had prepared a report in Miss Kingsley's name in 1991.
18. From 1994 Camden became involved with Islington Council in making a bid for government money for regeneration of the Kings Cross area. Mr Smith, Camden's chief executive, was in charge of the bid and used Miss Kingsley and the appellant to do much of the work needed to prepare it. They were also working to the Environment Department in the EDU at the same time. The appellant therefore had conflicting lines of management during this period. This reflected a difference of view between Mr Smith and Mr Pike as to whether regeneration (which was very much part of the EDU's remit) was principally a business or an environmental matter.
19. On 2 August 1994 the appellant had an altercation on the telephone with Miss McDonald about a report which she had asked him to produce. Two days later the appellant complained to Mr Smith about competing demands being made upon the EDU. Referring to the continuing audit review he said:

"I cannot overemphasise how stressful, diversionary and demotivating this is for officers who are stretched to the very limit of their mental and physical endurance."

20. In response to this memo the appellant was formally seconded to Mr Smith for the remainder of the bid period.
21. The judge dealt with the events of September and October 1994 as follows:

"Mr Smith . . . indicated to the plaintiff that he would consider asking the latter to be the co-ordinator of the regeneration work while Miss Kingsley was in the USA [she had won a Harkness fellowship and had gone to the United States for that reason]. According to his evidence, his heart sank when the plaintiff referred to 'the justice issue'. The plaintiff understandably believed, however, that he would step into Miss Kingsley's position, and indeed Miss Kingsley handed over all her files to him. The plaintiff went away on holiday, but in the meantime Mr Smith, on his return from his holiday, learned of growing concerns about the plaintiff and his abilities to co-operate with others. Mr Smith's evidence, which in substance I accept, was that the leader of the council indicated, rightly or wrongly, how unimpressed some members were about the bid which had been made, and separate concerns were being expressed about the plaintiff's physical wellbeing and his mental health. Mr Smith . . . explained what he felt he had to do in the circumstances and why, and concluded that the plaintiff should not be asked to be the co-ordinator. This was something the plaintiff learned . . . when he telephoned whilst on holiday.

Mr Smith and the plaintiff met on 11th October 1994. The plaintiff was angry and bitter and felt, and probably said, that he had been betrayed. Soon afterwards his secondment to the regeneration team ended at his request.

I find that Mr Smith acted reasonably in making the decision he did and, having made it, there was probably no way in which he could communicate it without causing distress to the plaintiff. The latter, with respect, has immense difficulty in looking at problems objectively , though he did accept in his closing speech that if he had been appointed to the job, it probably would hve involved additional stress on him."

22. The appellant was first off work sick from 26 October 1994, after which he visited his GP complaining of depression for the first time. He was off work for much of the next year. In November 1994 he was told that the EDU was to be disbanded as part of further restructuring following the audit. He was to be ring-fenced for a number of alternative jobs but did not in the event go for interviews because he felt too ill.
23. However, on 28 October 1994 the appellant had sent Mr Smith a bundle of documents relating to MTC. He had previously discussed his concerns about MTC with Mr Smith. By a memo of 16 November 1994 Mr Smith told the appellant that he had passed the documents to the district auditor for his consideration. In a memo to the Carmichael inquiry on 18 December 1994 the appellant said:

"I wish to submit what I believe to be supporting evidence that the EDU has been smeared by a number of officers in order to divert attention from the secret activities by a number of individuals within this authority and across London including the use of EU and Council taxpayers money to pursue their private agenda, personal or political ambitions.

The dossier has been supplied to the Chief Executive whom I understand has passed a copy to . . . the District Auditors local office, for investigation. This dossier sets the context in which I and my aforementioned colleagues have become the target of campaign of malice and hatred culminating in the disbandment of the EDU and the present employment insecurity we now all face. A close examination of the restructuring of the Environment Department will show that the only significant change in the Department's structure is the deletion of the Economic Development Unit."

24. On 12 January 1995, in response to an offer of alternative employment, the appellant wrote to Miss McDonald saying:

"As you know, I have been suffering from acute stress, mental and physical exhaustion arising from the excessive overtime I was required to work during the preparation and submission of the Single Regeneration Bid. This was exacerbated by the competing demands placed upon me by the dual line management arrangements that existed. I was required to work from two separate offices and fulfil my normal work duties in the EDU as well as preparing and negotiating the bid submission until a brief secondment was arranged."

25. The judge heard a lot of evidence about the hours which the appellant worked during that period. He concluded that:

"I am not satisfied, however, that the plaintiff worked from 8 am to 11 pm every day throughout July and August, but I have no doubt that he did work very long hours during this particular period of time. Whether all this work was necessary is less clear. There is at least a question mark whether the hours worked were fully deployed on the bid or whether quite a lot of time was taken up on grievances relating to EDU management."

26. Returning to the history, as I have already said these proceedings were started in February 1995. Later in 1995 the appellant went to the press and others with the MTC story. This started the UCLAF investigation, which was conducted by Mr Bonner and Camden undertook a number of internal inquiries into MTC in 1995 and 1996. As well as the shortcomings revealed by the district auditor's report, to which I have already referred, Camden's internal inquiries revealed that the council was unable to vouch for some of its matched funding for MTC upon which the claims for grant from the ESF had been based. This ultimately resulted in Camden having to repay about £54,000 to the ESF. MTC, however, repaid its loans to Camden and there was no evidence that it had used any of the money which it had received for improper purposes.
27. In June 1998, following short visits to Camden in 1995 and 1997, Mr Bonner produced a report for UCLAF. It was highly critical of Camden and its senior officers, including Mr Bundred (who was Director of Finance in 1993 and 1994 and later became Chief Executive) whom it alleged had behaved with impropriety. It concluded that senior management had ignored repeated advice from EDU staff, including the appellant, to suspend the 1994 ESF claims and that:

"the reticence of the EDU to accept this break in procedure resulted in pressure being applied by senior management and the ultimate dismantling of the unit in November 1994."

28. Annex XL, which is not referred to in the body of the report, under the heading "Perjury" said:

"There is also evidence that at the hearing at first instance in Garrettt v London Borough of Camden a number of the plaintiff's former colleagues made false statements under oath."

29. Neither the colleagues nor the respects in which their statements were falsified and why were specified.
30. Camden was furious when it received the UCLAF report because the allegations of impropriety made in it had not been put to the officers concerned. The council commissioned its own report from the Society of Local Authority Chief Executives and Senior Managers ("SOLACE") and set up a separate inquiry to consider the allegations against Mr Bundred.
31. SOLACE reported in July 1999. It concluded that there was was no evidence of substance to support the allegations of impropriety, although Camden had accepted that there had been a failure to comply with the requirements of the ESF, the council's own standing orders and the national/local codes of conduct relating to the councils' dealings with MTC. This report was highly critical of UCLAF's methods of investigation and its unsubstantiated conclusion about perjury. The other inquiry cleared Mr Bundred.
32. Finally, in relation to MTC I have already referred to the district auditor's report. His provisional conclusion was that there was no wilful misconduct on the part of any member or officer of the council.
33. Obviously the appellant's actions in going to the press and the UCLAF investigation caused concern within Camden. In his submissions to us the appellant relied on three documents, one of which was not before the judge. The first is is a letter of 15 August 1995 from Miss McDonald to the ESF unit at the Department of Education and Employment expressing concern at the threat which had been made to withold all ESF funding from Camden. The next is a letter from Mr Pike to the appellant of 31 August 1995 reminding him that Camden's code of conduct required him to use the appropriate management processes if he had concerns or grievances and insisting that he "desist from making other unauthorised delegation or representation outside of . . . Camden". The third is a memo from Mr Bundred to Mr Pike of 31 October 1995 in which he reports members' concerns about recent publicity concerning MTC which, he says:

". . . appears to have been prompted by the actions of a member of staff in your department who has been making a series of wild allegations and has recently taken to arresting staff in my own department in the street, in order to engage them in his conspiracy fantasies. Members would like to know whether any action is being taken about this employee and, if so, what."

34. With that somewhat extended history, I now return to consider the appellant's grounds of appeal and, firstly, his assertion that the trial was unfair.
35. He starts by saying that he is at a considerable disadvantage in making good this part of his appeal without a transcript. It is unfortunate that the tapes were destroyed by the court before the appeal was disposed of. We are told that steps have now been taken to avoid this happening in the future. What happened in this case is that between April 1997 and April 1999 the appellant was represented by solicitors instructed by the European Commission, who did not ask for a transcript. When they came off the record the appellant asked for one, in September 1999. It was then discovered that the tapes had been destroyed. Camden's solicitors therefore transcribed their notes of the proceedings, which were submitted to Judge Butter for his approval. In what must have been a laborious task, Judge Butter supplemented the solicitors' note in manuscript from his own notes. I think his additions show that he has attempted to ensure that the record we have is as full and as fair as is possible in the circumstances.
36. In response to the appellant's continued assertions that the record was inaccurate on 9 February 2001 Lord Justice Simon Brown directed that:

". . . insofar as Mr Garrett contests the accuracy of any particular part of the annotated transcript he be at liberty at the appeal hearing to produce any rival contemporaneous note provided only that it is (a) produced in original form together with a typescript copy and (b) it is verified by its author."

37. The appellant has not produced any such rival note.
38. In these circumstances we are satisfied that the record we have is the best available and that it is not unfair to the appellant for us to use it on his appeal.
39. The appellant's first complaint is that the judge refused to grant him an adjournment on the first day of the trial so that he could call Mr Bonner when he had completed his enquiries on behalf of UCLAF. Pages 1 to 16 of Book 1 of the record show that at the beginning of the trial the appellant asked for permission to call a number of witnesses whose statements he had not served. One of those witnesses was Mr Bonner, from whom he did not have a statement or a report (page 9), although he said he had a letter from the commissioner responsible which explained the difficulty in Mr Bonner coming forward at that stage although he could, according to what the appellant told the judge "confirm my conduct and the gravity of the report" (page 10). The appellant then raised the possibility of obtaining legal aid and the judge asked him if he was applying for an adjournment, to which he replied he was (page 13). After pointing out that the appellant would be liable for costs if he granted the adjournment, the judge gave the appellant time to consider the position. When the court resumed after ten minutes the appellant said, "On balance I wish to go on" (Page 15).
40. It is clear, therefore, that the appellant withdrew his application for an adjournment and so he cannot now say that the judge should have adjourned. The case had been fixed for some time with a time estimate of five days. In any event, Mr Bonner would not have been able to give any admissible evidence. It was for the judge to decide what happened after hearing the evidence of the witnesses called at trial. Mr Bonner's views were irrelevant.
41. The appellant contends that the judge prevented him from properly putting his case to some of the witnesses. Having looked at the record, I do not accept this criticism. The judge had a duty to confine the evidence to matters which were relevant to the issues which he had to decide, but there is nothing to suggest that he did any more than this. The appellant was allowed to cross-examine Camden's witnesses at length.
42. In conclusion, I am quite satisfied that there was nothing unfair about the trial. The judge did all that he was required to do to assist the appellant as a litigant in person. A comparison between the appellant's closing argument and the judgment shows that the judge dealt with all of the relevant points made by the appellant.
43. I turn then to the second of the appellant's main grounds of appeal, that the judge would not have accepted the evidence of Mr Smith, Mr Pike and Miss McDonald in the light of what has since been revealed about the MTC affair in which they must have been implicated.
44. I reject this ground of appeal. At best the link between any of these three and MTC was tenuous. At worst there is nothing to show that they were involved in any impropriety of a kind which would have fatally undermined the credibility of the evidence which they gave at trial about their dealings with the appellant. This was given over two days and occupies 88 pages of the record (Book 2). The judge was in a better position than anyone else who has had to consider this matter to decide whether or not they were telling the truth. I do not believe that his view of these witnesses would have been altered by any of the further evidence which we have seen.
45. So I turn finally to the appellant's attack on the judgment itself. The judge applied the law stated by Colman J in Walker v Northumberland County Council [1995] 1 AER 737, from which he cited extensively in his judgment. The appellant accepts the principles set out in that case between pages 749C and 752C of the report, which I think accurately state the law generally applicable to a case of this kind. It is not necessary in this case to refine or elaborate on this statement. Colman J cited Dillon LJ's judgment in Petch v Customs and Excise [1993] ICR 789, which is a helpful guide to the issue of foreseeability. Of the facts in that case Dillon LJ said at pages 796-797:

". . . unless senior management in the defendants' department were aware or ought to have been aware that the plaintiff was showing signs of impending breakdown, or were aware or ought to have been aware that his workload carried a real risk that he would have a breakdown, then the defendants were not negligent in failing to prevent the breakdown."

46. Proving breach of duty and causation also present difficulties for the claimant in this type of case.
47. The appellant argues that the judge misapplied these principles in this case. On analysis, however, all he is saying is that his case is stronger than Mr Walker's was. Mr Walker was a senior manager and a social worker, trained and expected to cope with highly stressful working conditions; he was not. The answer to this is simple; that each case depends upon its own facts. It is only the principles to be found in Walker which matter. The judge self-evidently applied them to the facts of the appellant's case.
48. The appellant referred us to the decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal in Cornelius v London Borough of Hackney (18 January 1996) in which Tucker J said:

"There is a high duty upon local government officers . . . to report dishonesty in any form, and to persist if need be in ensuring that it is brought to the attention of those in authority and that appropriate action is taken."

49. There is no doubt about this principle. There is, in short, nothing wrong with whistle-blowing.
50. So did the judge reach the wrong conclusion on the facts? The appellant's principal contention is that the judge should have held that he was victimised for raising concerns about MTC. The judge dealt with this point by saying:

"MTC . . . is not referred to in the pleadings and, despite the plaintiff's conviction as to its importance and relevance, it appears to me only to be relevant if and in so far as the plaintiff can establish that it added to an excessive workload on his part, and/or that there was an attempt to undermine or get rid of him because of the actions he took in reporting apparent financial irregularities.

The plaintiff's allegations in relation to MTC . . . were referred to the District Auditor. I have no doubt that for a time the plaintiff became preoccupied with MTC, and I have to say that during the hearing his preoccupation seemed to continue. It appears to me that the plaintiff acted correctly in drawing attention to apparent irregularities, and I suspect he may have gained some satisfaction in doing so. To what extent, however, this was stressful at the time, or can or should be regarded as additional work pressure put on him, is highly questionable, and this has not been established on the evidence before me any more than the allegation that his employers treated him adversely as a result of his raising the MTC issue."

51. I think the judge's analysis of the relevance of MTC was right. It is important to bear in mind that this was not a claim for wrongful or unfair dismissal but a claim for damages which required the appellant to prove that he had negligently been subjected to stress by the conditions in which he was required to work. It was not enough for him simply to say that he had blown the whistle on the MTC affair. He had to show that it was a cause of the stress, the subject of his claim. Relevant contemporaneous documents, all of which I have attempted to summarise earlier in this judgment, suggest that it was not. The appellant was not slow to complain and to put his complaints into writing, and yet he did not complain of stress caused by his concerns about MTC. I think the fact that MTC does not feature at all in the particulars of claim is significant. Furthermore, on his own admission the appellant was not involved at all with MTC until early 1994, yet he traced the cause of his illness back to 1992. Like the judge, it seems to me that the importance of MTC has grown in the appellant's mind as it has become of greater and continuing interest to the outside world. He has retrospectively and incorrectly (although I do not say dishonestly) made the connection between MTC and his illness.
52. The appellant has taken us through the judgment and made a number of detailed criticisms of what the judge said. Chief among these is the judge's reliance on the appellant's medical and work records in his previous employment. But this evidence was highly relevant to the issue of forseeability and I think the documents which the judge relied on in his judgment fully support the conclusion which he reached. The appellant's other criticisms do not take the matter forward.
53. Standing back from the detail, it is quite clear that the conditions in which the appellant was working during the relevant time between 1992 and 1994 were chaotic and counterproductive, but this was partly of the appellant's own making. With the benefit of hindsight, more effective management was required to bring the situation under control, but that may have been easier said than done given the catalogue of complaints and counter complaints which those involved were entitled to have investigated through grievance procedures, which the applicant and others refused to co-operate with until the end of 1994. No doubt all of this caused stress to everyone involved, but there was nothing to alert Camden to the fact that the appellant was particularly vulnerable to such stress. His claim therefore failed because risk of injury was not reasonably foreseeable. Although he did not say so in terms, it appears that the judge may also have felt that the real cause of the appellant's illness was his disappointment at not being promoted, about which, of course, he could not complain.
54. The more I have considered the judge's judgment, the more impressed I have been with it. He got the law right and correctly applied it to his clear and, I think, unassailable findings of fact. In my judgment he reached the right result. For these reasons I would dismiss this appeal.
55. LORD JUSTICE MANCE: I agree. Like my Lord, it seems to me that the general principles are not in doubt. They are stated in the case of Petch in Dillon LJ's judgment, in the passages to which my Lord has referred at pages 795C and 796H-797A. There were here, as the judge said, "unattractive disputes between [Camden London Borough] personnel which contributed to stress on the claimant as well, no doubt, as to other personnel involved"; there may have been, as the judge also said, mistakes made by management; but the judge was entitled to conclude that nothing that occurred suggested impending breakdown or communicated to Camden a real risk of breakdown; and there is, it seems to me, nothing to lead us to a contrary conclusion in this court. The mere fact of internal differences, however unattractive they were, and even though they may have appeared at some point irreconcilable, so calling for action from higher management, was not sufficient notice to Camden of a real risk of breakdown.
56. One can, it seems to me, say that all the personnel involved were on the face of it capable of holding their own quarter and were doing so vigorously. Camden's difficulty was in knowing how to deal with this. There were internal grievance procedures, as my Lord, Lord Justice Tuckey has said, which needed to be followed. The first inquiry, by Mr Gonsal in 1994, was not one with which either Miss Kingsley or the appellant chose to cooperate. It may be, as the judge indicated, that more decisive and speedy steps could and should have been taken by Camden senior management, but that does not mean that Camden were or ought to have been aware of any real risk of impending breakdown.
57. It appears, from the judgment, that substantial distress was caused by the news, communicated to the appellant at the meeting with Mr Smith on 11 October 1994, of the views taken by Mr Smith and others about the regeneration fund bid which had been submitted in 1994 and about his, the appellant's, responsibility for its perceived inadequacy something which the appellant submitted was an unjust conclusion before us as well as about the decision not to promote him to acting coordinator of the regeneration unit, which was communicated to him at the same meeting. However, the judge, having heard the evidence of all the relevant witnesses, reached the conclusion that there was no cause for criticism of Mr Smith's approach, or indeed of his views. This was a decision, no doubt unpalatable to the recipient, which had to be communicated to the appellant. The judge said that:

"Mr Smith and the plaintiff met on 11th October 1994. The plaintiff was angry and bitter and felt, and probably said, that he had been betrayed. Soon afterwards his secondment to the regeneration team ended at his request.

I find that Mr Smith acted reasonably in making the decision he did and, having made it, there was probably no way in which he could communicate it without causing distress to the plaintiff. The latter, with respect, has immense difficulty in looking at problems objectively , though he did accept in his closing speech that if he had been appointed to the job, it probably wuld hve involved additional stress on him."

58. Later in the judgment the judge referred to the medical evidence that he heard, that disappointment over promotion is well known to be a source of stress.
59. Underlying the conclusions which the judge reached is a conclusion that there was a problem of which Camden was not on notice at any material time, namely an underlying vulnerability of personality peculiar to this appellant which, the judgment indicates, was combined with an inability to see this case or other matters from any perspective other than his own, and with a preoccupation with problems and grievances to which his attention was directed.
60. The MTC affair was undoubtedly one such matter in which the appellant became very interested in 1994, although only after the 11 October 1994 meeting did he discover some of the documents which are in his submission the most critical. The MTC affair was not mentioned in his original claim of 2 February 1995, although subsequently it has featured strongly in these proceedings. It had been mentioned in a letter of 16 December 1994 but not, as I see it, in the context of stress. Undoubtedly, as a matter for investigation it was a very appropriate subject matter for attention. Subsequent events indicate at least that. But subsequent material does not indicate any deliberate wrongdoing or wrongdoing recklessly committed to the detriment of this appellant's health. What it does appear to confirm is something which the judge accepted, namely that Camden disbursed moneys without lawful authority. That is a different matter from the case of harassment and victimisation which has been pursued before us and which the judge rejected. I see nothing in the subsequent material to lead us to a different view on that, or indeed to undermine the credibility of either Mr Pike or Miss McDonald as witnesses on whom the judge felt that he could and should rely. It is the appellant who has subsequently associated the MTC affair with his stress. Like my Lord, it seems to me that the way the judge dealt with the matter remains correct.
61. For those reasons, in addition to all those which my Lord has stated, I agree that this appeal fails.
62. LORD JUSTICE SIMON BROWN: It is not easy to make good the cause of action embarked upon by Mr Garrett in this case, a claim in negligence for damages for injury, loss and damage sustained consequent on work-related stress.
63. Many, alas, suffer breakdowns and depressive illnesses and a significant proportion could doubtless ascribe some at least of their problems to the strains and stresses of their work situation: be it simple overworking, the tensions of difficult relationships, career prospect worries, fears or feelings of discrimination or harassment, to take just some examples. Unless, however, there was a real risk of breakdown which the claimant's employers ought reasonably to have foreseen and which they ought properly to have averted, there can be no liability.
64. The two most directly relevant authorities are the Court of Appeal's decision in Petch v Customs and Excise [1993] ICR 789, and Walker v Northumberland County Council [1995] 1 AER 737, a first instance decision of Colman J. Mr Petch failed in his claim despite having suffered successive breakdowns over many years. Mr Walker's claim succeeded, but only to the extent of a second breakdown which occurred after his employers had learned of his propensity to collapse and which resulted from their failure to honour assurances of work assistance.
65. Mr Garrett's principal difficulties in sustaining this action were in my judgment the trial judge's findings, first, that the claimant was "substantially more vulnerable than most to sustaining psychiatric injury" and, second, that when he entered Camden's employment nothing was said or disclosed to put them on notice or enquiry of his mental state.
66. The second of those findings was not controversial. The first was based in part upon expert psychiatric evidence at trial and in part upon records, by then disclosed, of Mr Garrettt's earlier employment at Waltham Forest, which recorded not merely a brief Mental Health Act admission to hospital, but also feelings variously of apprehension, paranoia, frustration, ostracism and the like, and various worries and problems which the judge understandably thought disconcertingly resembled those which Mr Garrett eventually came to experience at Camden.
67. It seems to me hardly surprising that Mr Garrett's claim should in those circumstances be held to fail. The combined effect of those twin findings was that he knew materially more than his employers about his propensity to work-related stress and breakdown,and can hardly, therefore, blame them for not recognising the particular difficulties attendant upon his continued employment.
68. To my mind, the judge's conclusion that "such injury to the claimant's health as has occurred has arisen in substance from the vulnerable personality of the claimant himself" was of itself fatal to his claim, allied as it was to the finding that Camden had at the time known nothing of Mr Garrett's vulnerable personality. The judge's other findings, although also for the most part adverse to the claimant's interests and prospects of success, were to my mind merely alternative and additional reasons for having dismissed his action.
69. For these reasons, as well as those given by each of my Lords, I too would dismiss this appeal.
ORDER: Appeal dismissed with costs upon a detailed assessment, to include costs of the application to adduce further evidence. The monies in Court to be paid out in part payment of these costs and the costs below. Permission to appeal to the House of Lords refused. (Order not part of approved judgment)