England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE CENTRAL LONDON COUNTY COURT
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE MEDAWAR QC)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL Thursday 8 March 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE DYSON: By this application, the claimant, who appears in person, applies for permission to appeal from the order of Judge Medawar QC, made on 27 October 2000 in the Central London County Court, whereby he dismissed the appeal from the order of District Judge Appleman made on 8 March 2000 by which the claim against the first two defendants in these proceedings was struck out. Judge Medawar refused permission to appeal.
2. The proceedings were started on 5 November 1999. The claim against the first defendant is that it failed to award the claimant a degree in law in the summer of 1992, or possibly some time shortly thereafter, as a result of which he was refused admittance to the Bar vocational course run by the Inns of Court School of Law. One of his allegations was that the failure to award him a law degree was activated by racial discrimination. He referred that complaint to the Commission for Racial Equality in 1992. So far as I can tell from the papers, that complaint did not succeed before the Commission.
3. The claimant also corresponded with the second defendant, who at all material times were the first defendant's solicitors. They wrote a letter to him on 24 December 1993 in which, on instructions, they responded to a number of points that had been made by the claimant in his letter of 9 December. That letter is not appear to be in the bundle before me.
4. The position appears to have been somewhat complicated because the claimant had started on a three year LLB (Hons) course in business law but, after completing the first two years of that course, he transferred to the Modular Degree and Diploma Scheme ("MDDS") with the intention of gaining a BA in law. The claimant's case is that the two years of his LLB course entitled him to an exemption from four semesters of the MDDS and that he had successfully completed a sufficient number of modules on that course to entitle him to a degree.
5. By 1994 he was represented by solicitors. On 12 May 1994 they wrote to Mr Cooray at the University Law Department asserting, on the claimant's instructions, that he had sought the advice of Mr Cooray before he had transferred to the MDDS. On the basis of that advice, he understood that he would be credited with 11 modules, which he had already passed on the LLB course, and that he was required to complete a minimum of a further two modules in order to graduate. On 21 June 1995 Mr Cooray wrote a further letter in which he says that, although the claimant did approach him in 1991, he did not inform the claimant that he would be exempted from stage 1 of the MDDS and would be credited with 9 modules at stage 2. Mr Cooray says in that letter that he did not discuss with the claimant anything about exemptions.
6. On 4 December 1995, different solicitors, who were by then representing the claimant, wrote to the Chairman of the Board of Governors alleging racial discrimination on behalf of the university. They repeated that the claimant was entitled to his degree.
7. The degree was not forthcoming. On 17 June 1996 the claimant issued proceedings in the Mayor's and City of London County Court. His particulars of claim were based on the failure of the university to award him a degree. The particular relief that he sought from the court was that he should be awarded an Honours degree with what was said to be a maximum class (1st class Hons). It is true that the body of the particulars of claim does not, in terms, assert that the failure to award a degree was actuated by racial discrimination, but there is a reference in paragraph 13 to the fact that the claimant had referred the dispute to the Commission for Racial Equality.
8. The district judge struck out the claim. On 2 December 1996 Judge Simpson dismissed the claimant's appeal saying that any issue relating to the failure of the university to award a degree, if to be the subject of any legal proceedings, could only be the subject of judicial review proceedings. The judge held that there was no jurisdiction in the county court to entertain this claim. He applied the well-known case of Thorne v University of London [1966] 2 QB 237.
9. The claimant continued to correspond with the university. On 12 May 1997 he received computer print-outs from the university, which purported to show his examination results. Still not satisfied, he referred the matter to his MP. In a letter dated 9 June 1997 the university sets out its position stating:

"In view of his completion of the first two years of the LLB (Business Law) course Mr Ahilathirunayagam was granted exemption from the first two levels of the MDDS. He was required to take the final year of the MDDS which consisted of 6 full units. In order to qualify for an honours degree he was required to pass 5 of these units. No credit was given in respect of the units he had taken on the LLB course on the final year of the MDDS. This was explained to him at the time and has been reiterated repeatedly by the University since then. In the event Mr Ahilathirunayagam only passed 2½ units on the MDDS. He has not therefore completed the requirements for the award of a degree.

Mr Ahilathirunayagam has been in dispute with the University ever since. He has made various appeals under the University's own procedures (from July 1991), instituted action via the CRE (November 1992), and made a complaint to the Data Protection Registrar in December 1994. The University responded to all of these complaints at the time. None of Mr Ahilathirunayagam's allegations have been upheld."

10. So it was that on 5 November 1999 the claimant started the current proceedings. In my judgment his claim against the university substantially repeats the complaint that he has been making ever since the summer of 1992 and which, in large measure, is reflected in the 1996 proceedings. I accept that the particulars relied on in the current proceedings do, to some extent, go beyond the particulars relied on in the 1996 proceedings. For example, there are now specific allegations that the failure to award the degree was actuated by racial discrimination. But the core allegation in both sets of proceedings is the same; that the university wrongly and without justification refused to award him a degree. This being a second tier appeal, the claimant has to show that the case raises an important point of principle or practice, or that there is some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear the appeal (see section 55(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999).
11. So far as the claim against the university is concerned, if there was anything in the complaints, they would have to be the subject of judicial review proceedings. For the reasons mentioned by Judge Simpson, applying the Court of Appeal decision in Thorne v University of London, they could not be the subject of a private law action in the county court. It is now far too late for judicial review proceedings in any event.
12. Secondly, this is essentially an attempt to re-run, although with somewhat differently elaborated particulars, the claim that was made in 1996. The central complaint is the same. It would, therefore, on well established principles, be an abuse of process to allow subsequent proceedings to be brought in respect of, effectively, the same subject matter as that which has been the subject of previous judicial decision.
13. For those reasons, I am not persuaded that in this case there has been shown any important point of principle or practice, or that there is any other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear this case. It seems to me that the judge was right to conclude that this claim would have no prospects of success. The judge founded his decision also on the ground that the claim would in any event be statute barred. That may well be so, but I do not base my decision on that factor.
14. As to the claim against the solicitors, the claimant has not addressed me on that. I confess that I wholly fail to understand the basis on which the claim against the solicitors is sought to be put forward. The letter of December 1993, of which complaint is made, merely responds to points in the earlier letter written by the claimant, merely recording the instructions that have been given by the university to the solicitors. In those circumstances, it is impossible to see what cause of action could arise from that letter.
15. I would refuse this application for permission to appeal the decision in respect to both of these defendants.
Order: Permission to appeal refused.