England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
(HIS HONOUR PETER CLARK)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Thursday, 15th February 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE PILL: This is an application by Mr J A Layode for permission to appeal against a decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal which dismissed an appeal from the decision of the registrar who had refused to extend time.
2. The applicant had brought a claim against his employers alleging unfair dismissal and race discrimination arising from his employment with them as a painter and decorator/handyman. By decision on 3rd November 1999 the Employment Tribunal unanimously decided that the applicant was not the subject of discrimination on the grounds of his race and that the applicant was unfairly dismissed but because of his conduct there was a one hundred percent contribution to his dismissal and therefore there was no order for compensation.
3. The extended reasons were sent to the parties on 16th November and in accordance with the rules time began to run on that date. The applicant had 42 days within which to appeal. What he did was to write to the Employment Tribunal by letter which carries the date 28th of December 1999 but plainly was written a month earlier. He states in that letter:

"I am writing immediately (that is immediately on his return from holidays to which he refers) to ask the Tribunal to change or revoke the wrong ruling."

4. That was an application to the Employment Tribunal to review its own decision. That application was considered by the Employment Tribunal and the application for review was refused. That decision was given on 13th December and sent to the parties on 21st December, which was still within the 42-day limit for appeal. With the decision is a formal notice which states, amongst other things:

"It should be noted that the application for review has not extended the time limit for appeal from the original tribunal decision."

5. Mr Layode accepts that he received that decision and notice. He says that he went to the Citizens Advice Bureau in Paddington and in his words in a document to the Court he states:

"The fact that the Paddington Citizens Advice Bureau missadvised me, as to when the 42 days limit started from. All of us thought the counting started from the date of the chairman's letter to me. I was shocked and surprised when I was written that the counting from the day of hearing. I was misled (unintentionally) by the Paddington CAD.

Therefore, this appeal is very important, to at last put what went wrong right."

6. It is clear that Mr Layode has strong views about the original decision and the treatment to which he says he was subjected. I do not doubt the strength of his feelings which he has expressed in more than one document to the Court and has indicated orally today.
7. There are further letters from him following his receipt of the documents, to which I have referred, from the Employment Tribunal. The applicant wrote to the registrar of the Employment Tribunal on 31st January. That is outside the time limit. He states in that letter:

"As soon as the Citizens Advice Bureau can find me a solicitor, he will take over legally.

In view of the difficulty I am encountering, I beg that the time limit be extended, so that the case can be handled as required by law."

8. He wrote again on 3rd February requesting "up to four weeks extension, in view of the difficulty in getting a solicitor to represent me".
9. On 12th February he again wrote stating that he applied for an extension of four weeks to enable him to find a lawyer and repeating his main reason for appealing is in relation to the merits of the issue and the way in which the hearing before the Employment Tribunal was conducted.
10. On 1st February the applicant lodged his notice of appeal with the Employment Appeal Tribunal which was 35 days out of time. Following the application to which I have referred in the letter dated 3rd February, the matter was placed before the registrar who by order of 17th March declined to extend time. That decision was upheld by His Honour Judge Peter Clark in the Employment Appeal Tribunal.
11. Judge Clark sets out in his judgment both the grounds upon which the application is made and the relevant law. He came to the conclusion that an extension of time should not be granted. One of the points raised was that the chairman of the Employment Tribunal had misled the applicant as to the time for appealing. I agree with Judge Clark that that submission, which has not been repeated orally, must be rejected. The reference in the decision refusing the application to review was that it would more appropriately form the basis for an appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal. It does not in my view mislead the applicant as to the time limit.
12. I agree with the judgment of Judge Peter Clark. I note that upon receipt of the refusal to review, the applicant was still within time and could have entered an appeal within the appropriate 42 days. He refers to the consultation with the Paddington Citizens Advice Bureau. Having regard to the fact that the rules are clear and that the notice in relation to time was sent to Mr Layode, I do not regard that as a sufficient ground for extending time. In the public interest time limits are enforced in this jurisdiction and in my judgment no reason has been shown why the extension of 35 days, which is sought, should be granted in this case.
13. Accordingly this application for permission to appeal must be refused.
(Application for permission to appeal refused)