England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE TUNBRIDGE WELLS COUNTY COURT
(His Honour Judge Hargrove QC)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Friday, 7th December 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE THORPE: Mr Robert Thorogood applies this morning as a litigant in person for permission to appeal the order of His Honour Judge Hargrove QC, sitting in the Tunbridge Wells County Court on 26th July 2001.
2. Mr Thorogood and his wife were co-defendants to an action brought by a firm of solicitors, Heath Giles & Co, who had formally acted for them. Before the court on 26th July was their application seeking to appeal the order of District Judge Smith that the charging order nisi made on 27th July 1999 be made absolute. Judge Hargrove refused Mr Thorogood's application to adjourn, refused him leave to appeal District Judge Smith's order and ordered that the costs of the application be added to the judgment debt and that no further applications by Mr and Mrs Thorogood be made without the leave of the court. Finally, he refused leave to appeal his order.
3. The application to this court, filed on 3rd August 2001, is in my opinion clearly caught by section 54(4) of the Access to Justice Act 1999, which provides:

"No appeal may be made against a decision of a court under this section to give or refuse permission (but this subsection does not affect any right under rules of court to make a further application for permission to the same or another court)."

4. The language is plain: no appeal may be made against the decision of Judge Hargrove refusing permission to appeal the order of District Judge Smith. This may seem a denial of justice to Mr Thorogood, but the purpose of the statutory provisions was to effect a wide reform of the appellate structure in civil justice and to inhibit multiple appeals and confine rights of appeal, where appropriate, to the inferior courts. I therefore have no discretion in the matter. The statutory language is plain and it prevents me acceding to Mr Thorogood's application.
5. I have to say that, even were it not for the statutory prohibition, Mr Thorogood would have encountered difficulty in demonstrating any error of law or principle in the judgment of Judge Hargrove or in demonstrating that his ultimate conclusion was manifestly wrong.
6. I am grateful to Mr Thorogood for his courteous and understanding reception of the bad news that section 54(4) catches his application. I have assured him that by this application he has exhausted his domestic remedies.
Order: application for permission to appeal dismissed.