England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE PLYMOUTH COUNTY COURT
(His Honour Judge Overend)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Wednesday, 14th November 2001

Wednesday, 14th November 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE WARD: Mr Luke seeks permission to appeal against the order of His Honour Judge Overend made on 9th March of this year when the judge, having heard a bit about the proposed appeal from the judgment of District Judge Crosse, made on 15th December 2000, in fact refused permission to appeal that order. Mr Luke also seeks permission to appeal the order for costs made against him.
2. I have looked carefully at the papers, and I readily understand the sense of injustice which Mr Luke feels, not only from this litigation perhaps, but also from matters which may have occurred relating to the break down of his marriage. I have pointed out to him that perhaps some of his criticisms are not quite fair: because, for example, when District Judge Crosse interrupted his cross-examination he did so to point out that the matters covered in the cross-examination had seemed to the judge to be a bit off the mark when the issue was whether or not there was an agreement to waive arrears of rent; and I pointed out that Mr Luke's reaction was then to decide to ask no more questions. I understand why he did so. He felt oppressed by the whole procedure, apparently conducted in a small room; and I have no doubt that for many litigants in person the whole process is utterly daunting and mystifying and that at the end of it, when the decision goes against one, it all seems unfair.
3. I have tried to sympathise with Mr Luke. I wish to emphasise that his appearance before me this afternoon has been thoroughly courteous and thoroughly helpful. I will say in addition that having read the papers I had not expected such a courteous response from him. He might have been entitled to be pretty cross, because I had to point out to him that the effect of section 54(4) of the Access to Justice Act denies me the jurisdiction to hear his main application. Subsection (4) reads:

"No appeal may be made against the decision of the court under this section to give or refuse permission."

4. As the law now stands, and for the benefit of both the District Judge and the judge (who will eventually I think get a transcript of this judgment), what I am saying probably does not apply to family proceedings, but it does apply in this case.
5. The first judge for this purpose was District Judge Crosse. To appeal his order permission had to be granted either by him or by the appellate court, which for this purpose was constituted by His Honour Judge Overend. Without permission the appeal to the Circuit Judge would not lie. His Honour Judge Overend had to give permission before he could hear the substantial appeal. He refused to give that permission. There is now no appeal from that refusal to give permission to appeal. As I explained to Mr Luke, where the Court of Appeal refuses to give permission to appeal to the full Court of Appeal there is no further right of appeal to the House of Lords. The same rule now applies to us when the judge below refuses permission to entertain the appeal. Thus I have no jurisdiction to entertain his application. Even if I had, Mr Luke would have formidable difficulties in persuading me to grant permission.
6. As for his application for permission to appeal the costs order, I do have the jurisdiction to entertain it; but Mr Luke very sensibly acknowledges the difficulties he has and the academic nature of that relief in any event. He does not have the money, and Mr May is going to have to sing for it, because he is not likely to get it out of Mr Luke from what one can tell from the papers.
7. In any event, costs follow the event. That is the general rule. The application to His Honour Judge Overend failed. There would be no reason not to make an order for costs. The order for costs was wholly realistic in its assessment, and an attempt to get a bit more blood out of this stone was rejected by the judge. I can see no error whatever in that and there is no realistic prospect of success; so I dismiss that application as well.
Order: Application dismissed.