England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION (ADMINISTRATIVE COURT)
(LAWS J)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL Thursday 8 February 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE SIMON BROWN: Lord Justice Longmore will give the first judgment.
2. LORD JUSTICE LONGMORE: There are two applications before the court arising from a judgment given by Laws J, as he then was, as long ago as 4 July 1997. In that case, which was a case stated from the Magistrates' Court, the learned judge was asked to rule on the question of law in the case stated which arose from a distraint on Mr Barnes' BMW vehicle for unpaid council tax. Mr Barnes said he was entitled to use his car in his trade. The judge said that was not so and he gave judgment in favour of the council.
3. The first application is on the basis that it was a criminal cause or matter, the criminality alleged to be that the learned judge had found that Mr Barnes had not paid the vehicle excise tax for the car. The second application arises on the basis that it is a civil matter. Mr Barnes has said that he has had sufficient notice of his application being listed on the criminal matter, but not on the civil matter. He has applied for the application in relation to the civil matter, if it be one, to be adjourned. We must refuse that application because both these matters arise from the single judgment and Mr Barnes knows very well the matters that do arise.
4. His submission on the criminal aspect of the matter, if it is a criminal case, is that in order to proceed further, he has asked for a point of law to be certified in order to pave the way for an application for leave to appeal to the House of Lords pursuant to the Administration of Justice Act 1960. Three years after the hearing Mr Barnes asked the court that a point of law be certified. On 19 July 2000 Laws J ordered that, in his view, there was no point of law in the case fit to be certified for their Lordships' House. On the basis that this is a criminal matter, this court has no jurisdiction of any kind whatever and, therefore, any application to us is completely misconceived. Mr Barnes says that it is quite wrong for the judge who decides the case to be the judge who is asked to certify that a question of law arises in the case, and that it should be some other independent judge who makes that decision.
5. That is not a matter, if it is a criminal cause or matter which arises, upon which we can express any view, save to say that it would be an absurd waste of judicial manpower if it was not the judge who decided the case who had to certify whether or not a point of law arises. But this court is a civil court; it has no jurisdiction in criminal cause or matters in any event, so Mr Barnes' application in relation to it being a criminal cause or matter must, as far as this court is concerned, be dismissed.
6. The more promising avenue, in one sense, is that the matter be treated as a civil matter. Since it was a case for restraint for recovery of council tax, it seems to me that it must indeed be a civil matter. Although we have no jurisdiction to consider the criminal matter, we have jurisdiction to consider whether or not permission to appeal should be granted on the basis that it is a civil matter. The preliminary question on an application for permission to appeal is whether this court would have any jurisdiction to hear any appeal if such permission were to be given.
7. Mr Barnes' difficulty in this court is section 28A of the Supreme Court Act 1981. That provides:

"The following provisions apply where a case is stated for the opinion of the High Court under section 111 of the Magistrates' Court 1980."

8. It then says in subsection (4):

"Except as provided by the Administration of Justice Act 1960 (right of appeal to the House of Lords in criminal cases), a decision of the High Court under this section is final."

9. Mr Barnes has to get over the fact that that statute says that the decision of the High Court on a case stated is final. If any elaboration of that is possible, it was considered by this court in the case of Maile v Manchester City Council (16 October 1997), a copy of which has been furnished by the Court of Appeal office to Mr Barnes. That makes it perfectly clear that the statute means exactly what it says.
10. Mr Barnes has referred us in his written material to the case of Re A Company [1980] Ch 138. On the statutory provision that was under consideration in that case, it was decided that there could be an appeal, despite the fact that the statute said it was unappealable, if the decision was made by a judge of the High Court on a point of law that he had no jurisdiction. The difficulty about that from Mr Barnes' point of view is that that was reversed by the House of Lords in [1981] AC 374 on the basis that the statute meant what it appeared to say and that there could be no separate provision for questions of law, even questions of law going to the jurisdiction of the court.
11. Accordingly, the civil application made by Mr Barnes must fail because there would be no jurisdiction in this court to entertain an appeal if permission were given, and thus permission cannot be given.
12. LORD JUSTICE SIMON BROWN: I agree. There are before us just two very short points of law: (i) has this court any jurisdiction to entertain a complaint that a judge of the Crown Office list (now the Administrative Court) has refused to certify that his decision on a case stated appeal gives rise to a point of law fit for consideration by the House of Lords; (ii) has this court any jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the decision of the first instance judge on an appeal to the Crown Office (now the Administrative Court) by way of case stated from the magistrates. As my Lord has explained, the plain answer to both those questions is "no".
13. In reality none of Mr Barnes' arguments, on analysis, relate to either of those questions. Rather he sought to return to and resurrect before us all his substantive grievances about the District Council's conduct in past years towards him and, indeed, his grievance as to Laws J having deprived him of the fruits of his victory before the magistrates. Those arguments simply do not bear on the jurisdictional questions which alone today arise for this court's determination.
14. In the result, these applications are dismissed.
Order: Application dismissed. Leave to appeal refused.