England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
(Mr Justice Collins)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Friday 31st August, 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE DYSON: On 7th June 2001 Collins J quashed a decision of the Legal Services Commission to revoke a legal aid certificate that had been issued in favour of Mr Wulfsohn to enable him to defend possession proceedings that had been issued against him by his landlord.
2. Mr Wulfsohn had appeared before Collins J in person to argue his case for judicial review and was successful. There had been three previous appearances by Mr Wulfsohn, two before High Court judges and one before the Court of Appeal, pursuant to his application for permission to apply for judicial review. Ultimately, the Court of Appeal had granted him permission and, as I say, his substantive application was successful.
3. The judge awarded him costs which he assessed at £120. Mr Wulfsohn seeks permission to appeal that assessment. The figure was arrived at by awarding him £80 in respect of travelling costs for four trips to London, £20 for the cost of photocopying 200 sheets and £20 as a top up, it seems for good measure. Mr Wulfsohn was unemployed at the time so that he was unable to demonstrate that he had suffered any financial loss in the way of lost earnings or lost income.
4. It seems from the transcript that the assessment of costs was done in a great hurry and that the judge was of the opinion that Mr Wulfsohn was not entitled to anything more since he could not demonstrate any loss of earnings.
5. The judge was referred by Mr Wulfsohn to Rule 48.6 of the Civil Procedure Rules and in particular to Rule 48.6(2). He was not, however, referred to Rule 48.6(4) which is in these terms:

"Subject to paragraph (2), the amount of costs to be allowed to the litigant in person for any item of work to which the costs relate shall, if he fails to prove financial loss, be an amount in respect of the time spent reasonably doing the work at the rate specified in the costs practice direction."

6. The note to Rule 48.6 states:

"The onus is on the litigant in person to prove financial loss in respect of any item of work and if he fails to do so the amount recoverable is that fixed periodically by statutory instrument (at September 1999, £9.25 per hour)."

7. It seems therefore that since Mr Wulfsohn was unable to prove financial loss he was entitled to £9.25 per hour for the number of hours that were or would have been reasonably spent doing the work in preparing for and presenting the various applications that Mr Wulfsohn presented.
8. Mr Wulfsohn now says that he has spent at least 1,200 hours in preparing these applications. He realistically accepts that the time spent by him was vastly greater than that which would have been reasonably spent by a legally qualified person in preparing these matters. The fact is, however, that this application was by no means straightforward, as is evidenced by the judgment given by the judge, and on any view it seems to me the time spent reasonably doing the work in connection with the applications for permission and then the substantive application would have been a considerable number of hours.
9. In those circumstances, it seems to me that it is right that Mr Wulfsohn should be given permission to appeal the judge's assessment in order that the matter can be reviewed by the full court.
10. He also wishes to challenge the decision of the judge on the basis that the disbursements that he incurred were considerably in excess of those which he was awarded. For example, he now says that he incurred costs of £140 in photocopying and that there were at least 15 trips to London in connection with this litigation. It seems to me that he has some difficulty in challenging this part of the judge's decision because it appears from the transcript that he agreed the figures suggested to him by the judge.
11. Mr Wulfsohn tells me, however, that everything happened in a great rush at the end of the hearing because the judge wanted to be away before the short adjournment. Bearing in mind that I am giving him permission to appeal on the principal point and that he is a litigant in person, I do not think it right to preclude him from seeking to challenge all aspects of the assessment of costs.
12. I would merely add this. It seems to me that this is manifestly a case which ought to be capable of resolution without a hearing in the Court of Appeal. I would hope that the Legal Services Commission when it has read this short judgment will consider whether it is possible to arrive at a reasonable compromise which I hope that Mr Wulfsohn acting reasonably will feel able to accept.
13. The constitution of the court for the hearing of this appeal can consist of two judges, of whom one can be a High Court judge.
ORDER: Application for permission to appeal granted; constitution of the court for the appeal can consist of two judges, of whom one can be a High Court judge. (Order not part of approved judgment)