England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(Ebsworth J)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 14th September 2001

14th September 2001
1. LORD JUSTICE CHADWICK: These proceedings, (1999 A 135), were commenced in the Queen's Bench Division by the issue of a writ on 15th February 1999. The claimant, Mr Anthony Alexander, claimed against the defendant, Halifax plc, damages to be assessed in respect of what was alleged to be the breach of a right conferred on him by Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
2. The operative paragraphs of the Statement of Claim endorsed on the writ are in these terms:

"1) Pursuant to Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) it is provided that everyone has a right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, and, the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age, or, any other lack of livelihood, in circumstances beyond his/her/their control.

2) By virtue by their constant harassment, the Defendants have, in breach of the said Article, upheld by Treaty, and buttressed by Ratification, to which the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland subscribe, continue preventing the Plaintiff from earning a livelihood, to enable him to obtain a reasonable standard of living for himself and his Partner, Miss Moira Costello, by, compelling him to spend the whom of his time in engaging in heavy and complex litigation in the County Court, in the High Court, and, in the Court of Appeal."

3. There follow two paragraphs under the heading "Particulars". The first of those paragraphs is itself divided into nine subparagraphs. The first of those subparagraphs - subparagraph (a) - contains the allegation that:

"Between 12th November 1990 and 23rd January 1998, the Defendants, maliciously and without good cause commenced proceedings for possession of the Plaintiff's home at Firth Cottage, Firth Gardens, in the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham, in the West London County Court, as follows."

4. There are then set out 13 dates, running from 12th November 1990 to 9th July 1998, on which, as it appears, summonses were issued in one or other of three actions. The reference numbers of those actions ( as they appear in the particulars) are WL9016511, WL931684O, and WL860182, indicating from the prefix WL that each was indeed commenced in the West London County Court. The remaining eight subparagraphs of paragraph (1)- that is to say paragraphs (b) to (j)- contain particulars of other litigation in which Mr Alexander has been involved.
5. Paragraph (2) of the particulars is in these terms:

"In fact in all of these proceedings there was considerable complexity of law and facts, lengthy pleadings and full discovery of documents, and there was duplication in the High Court and the County Court of work relating to two actions in respect of which, as the Court of Appeal have acknowledged, the issues of fact and law were entirely identical. In spite of the Plaintiff's legal training as an advocate pro bono the amount of work involved was such as to completely prevent the Plaintiff from carrying on his normal occupations as a professional writer and distributor of musical electronic software worldwide. He and his partner have suffered, and continue to suffer, from a considerable deterioration in their health brought on by anxiety over work and an unacceptable level of stress all as a result of the inappropriate actions and harassment on the part of the Defendants."

6. Halifax plc applied to strike out that Statement of Claim and to have the action dismissed on the ground that the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action and/or was scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, and/or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. That application came before Master Trench on 20th April 1999. Mr Alexander appeared in person. The Master made the order sought and he awarded costs against Mr Alexander. He assessed the costs of the application at £1,292, ( to include VAT) and directed that the costs of the action be taxed if not agreed.
7. Mr Alexander appealed to the judge. The appeal came before Ebsworth J on 10th June 1999. She dismissed the appeal with costs assessed at £1,000. She refused leave to appeal to this Court. In the judgment which she gave on 10th June 1999 she held that there was no basis upon which it could be argued that Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights conferred a right on an individual which he could enforce in a private law action in our courts. In reaching that conclusion she was applying well settled principles, conveniently expressed at paragraph 1626 of Volume 18 of Halsbury's Laws of England ( 4th edition) to which she referred.
8. She went on to say this at page 5 from line 16 of her judgment:

"I would have come to the same conclusion as to the fate of the appeal on the merits in any event, because one only has to look at what is actually being said, which is that the defendants Halifax Plc have deprived the claimant of his rights under Article 25 by constant harassment by way of litigation, compelling him, as it is put, to spend the whole of his time engaging in heavy and complex litigation in the County Court.

It is right that there has been a series of actions brought against Mr Alexander, and indeed there have been some brought by Mr Alexander.

So far as the Halifax is concerned, there is an action, WL9316840, between the Halifax Building Society and Anthony Alexander; there was an action, WL806182, between the Halifax and Mr Alexander; there is an action brought by Mr Alexander, WL703260. There are, additionally, two actions brought by the Bank of Cyprus against Mr Alexander. Those actions have involved a significantly great number of hearings before District Judges, Circuit Judges and the Court of Appeal and, in five cases of consolidated actions, three of which involve Halifax, there have been attempts by Mr Alexander to persuade the Court of Appeal both to give him leave to appeal and to give him leave to appeal to the House of Lords; he has sought to petition the House of Lords.

I have to say that in a situation where Mr Alexander has regularly lost on the merits before various judges at various levels and where the present situation is that there is a series of judgments against him in the Court of Appeal which have been, for convenience, consolidated and where leave to appeal has been refused, even in circumstances where an appeal would have lain to the House of Lords, it cannot reasonably or rationally be said that it is, in this case, the Halifax who have compelled Mr Alexander to spend the whole of his time in litigation. So I would have come to the conclusion in any event that this was an action which showed no reasonable cause of action on its merits. The appeal will therefore be dismissed."

9. Mr Alexander did not seek to appeal against Ebsworth J's order of 10th June 1999 within the time limited by the rules for that purpose. His application for permission to appeal and his proforma notice of appeal were lodged on 27th February 2000, that is to say some eight months after the order against which he seeks permission to appeal.
10. In the meantime two events had occurred. First, section 55 of the Administration of Justice Act had come into force on 27th September 1999: see section 108(3) of that Act. Second, Mr Alexander had been adjudicated bankrupt. The bankruptcy order was made on 24th February 2000. The effect of the bankruptcy order was that, prima facie at least, whatever cause of action Mr Alexander might have had against the Halifax in these proceedings had vested in the official receiver, as his trustee in bankrupt: see sections 283 and 306 of the Insolvency Act 1986. That is the view that is taken by the official receiver. Mr Alexander takes a different view. He disputes the bankruptcy order itself, but in any event he contends that the cause of action remains vested in him, this being a cause of action which, as I understand him to say, is not caught by the statutory provisions.
11. Section 55 (1) of the Administration of Justice Act 1999 is in these terms:

"Where an appeal is made to a county court or the High Court in relation to any matter, and on hearing the appeal the court makes a decision in relation to that matter, no appeal may be made to the Court of Appeal from that decision unless the Court of Appeal considers that:

(a) the appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice; or

(b) there is some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it."

12. This is a case to which that section applies. There has been an appeal to the High Court, and on the hearing of that appeal the High Court made an order in relation to it. So permission to appeal to this court cannot be given unless this court considers that the appeal would raise some important point of principle or practice, or that there is some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it.
13. It was in those circumstances that, in May 2001, I directed that, rather than list Mr Alexander's application for permission to appeal for a hearing of the preliminary question whether the cause of action was vested in him or in the trustee in bankruptcy, the convenient course was to list the matter for hearing on notice to both him and the trustee, to show cause why the application should not be dismissed or struck out on the basis that the conditions in section 55(1) were not satisfied. That direction was conveyed to Mr Alexander and to the trustee by a letter of 24th May 2001. It is pursuant to that direction that this matter has been listed today.
14. In those circumstances we are not concerned with the question in whom does the cause of action vest. We are concerned only with the question whether an appeal against the order of 10 June 1999 could satisfy the requirements of section 55(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999. If the appeal could not satisfy those requirements, then this application should be dismissed at this stage; because, no matter in whom the cause of action is now vested, there is no prospect that the application could proceed. The question, therefore, is whether there is any important point of principle or practice, or any other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to entertain an appeal against the order made by Ebsworth J on 10th June 1999.
15. For my part, I am quite satisfied that neither paragraphs (a) or (b) of section 55(1) of the 1999 Act can be satisfied in this case. The question whether or not Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights confers an individual right at private law has long been regarded as settled. The passage in Halsbury's Laws, to which Ebsworth J referred, the law sets out on the point. I can see no reason why this Court should regard it as sensible to entertain an appeal on that issue.
16. Further, even if that question were debateable, on the facts of this case, as Ebsworth J explained, there is no prospect that the Court of Appeal would take the view that the litigation in which Mr Alexander has been engaged over the past ten years or so was brought about by any infringement by the Halifax of any right which he might have under Article 25. The litigation, the history of which has been examined by this Court on a number of occasions, is litigation generated by Mr Alexander's conviction that he has been wronged. The courts have sought to dispel that conviction on a number of occasions; but without any apparent success. Mr Alexander's pursuit of his cause arises from his own misplaced conviction and not from anything for which the Halifax can be regarded as responsible.
17. For those reasons, I would hold that no cause has been shown why this application for permission to appeal should not be dismissed (1) I would dismiss the application.
18. LORD JUSTICE LAWS: I entirely agree.
(Discussion re the making of a Grepe v Loam order)
19. LORD JUSTICE CHADWICK: I have referred, in the judgment which I have just given, to the history of litigation between Mr Alexander and the Halifax plc as set out by Ebsworth J in her judgment of 10th June 1999. That litigation has come before this court on, I think, at least five occasions in the last few years, including most recently an occasion in May of 2001, before Schiemann LJ and Judge LJ and myself. The history of the matter is fully set out in the judgments which this court has given on the occasions when the litigation has been before it.
20. The present attempt to appeal in the action which is now before us is a further example of Mr Alexander's refusal to accept that there must be finality in this litigation. In those circumstances, we have taken the view that this is a case in which a Grepe v Loam order should now be made so as to provide a safeguard against further applications in this matter. Accordingly, we make an order that the claimant, Mr Alexander, shall not make any further applications, or take any steps, in this court, or in any court below, arising out of the proceedings between himself and Halifax plc, which have been referred to in the claim in this action, or in relation to the property the subject of those proceedings without first obtaining the prior permission of this court. If the claimant wishes to apply for that permission, then the application is to be made in writing without notice to the other party and is to be dealt with by a single Lord Justice on paper. If any application notice, or other form of document within the scope of this order, is served on or given to any other person without prior permission of this court, then that person shall not be required to appear and the application will stand dismissed without having been heard.
21. We are also proposing to refer the papers now before us to the Attorney General so that he can consider whether or not the time has come for him to make application for a restraint order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. We are minded to do that because the history of Mr Alexander's litigation suggests that there is a real danger that Grepe v Loam orders will not provide a sufficient protection against the abuse of the process of the court. The time of the court and its resources are limited and should be employed in dealing with matters which raise real issues requiring adjudication, not with fanciful issues and hopeless points. We will refer the papers to the Attorney General for the reasons that I have indicated.
ORDER: Application dismissed. No order as to costs. Grepe v Loam order made. Papers in the case to be referred to the Attorney General.