England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
(MR JUSTICE LINDSAY)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Friday, 10th August 2001

Friday, 10th August 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE MUMMERY: This is an application for permission to appeal. The applicant is Mr Walji, who acts in person. The decision which he wishes to appeal is that of the President of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, Lindsay J. On 26th April this year Lindsay J dismissed Mr Walji's appeal against the order of the Registrar of the Employment Tribunal on 23rd January this year, refusing an extension of time in which to appeal against a decision of the Employment Tribunal.
2. In order to understand the way in which the case comes before this court it is necessary to explain some of the background to the dispute between Mr Walji and his employers. Mr Walji was employed by the Great Ormond Street NHS Trust as a post-room porter. He started to work there on 13th June 1988. During 1998 there were incidents which led to his suspension. It is unnecessary to explain the nature of those incidents. There were disciplinary proceedings and unsuccessful appeals by Mr Walji against the results of those proceedings. Mr Walji claimed that the suspensions of his employment were as a result of harassment of him. He later made complaints that he had been discriminated against on racial grounds. He was dismissed from the employment of the NHS Trust on 16th February 2000. He had brought a claim for racial harassment against the NHS Trust. The IT1 was presented on 27th July 1999, that is before his dismissal. He brought a second claim on an IT1, which was presented on 12th May 2000 and that claimed that he had been unfairly dismissed.
3. The hearing took place in the Employment Tribunal at London Central on 11th and 12th September 2000. For extended reasons sent to the parties on 6th October 2000 the Tribunal rejected Mr Walji's claims of race discrimination and unfair dismissal.
4. The decision was subject to a correction on 13th October 2000. Mr Walji also asked the Tribunal to review his decision. That was refused on 23rd November.
5. Mr Walji's notice of appeal did not arrive at the Employment Appeal Tribunal until 30th November 2000, by which time the time for appealing had expired. He then applied to the Registrar for an extension of time. That was refused. On his unsuccessful appeal to the President of the Employment Appeal Tribunal it was held that Mr Walji was aware of the time-limit for appealing. That had been pointed out to him in a letter from the Commission of Racial Equality on 13th November 2000. I refer to the letter, which is addressed to Mr Walji and headed "Race Relations Act Yourself v Great Ormond Street NHS Trust":

"Dear Mr Walji,

Further to our telephone conversation of today I confirm that the deadline for your appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal runs from the date of the reserved decision of the Tribunal, 6th October 2000.

It is your responsibility should you decide to do so to submit your appeal on a point of law.

I know that you are awaiting the decision of the review but this is a decision on facts and not law and should not affect whether your case goes to Employment Appeals Tribunal.

If you have any query my direct line is..."

- then the phone number was given by Mr David Keeffe, who signed the letter as a complaints officer.

6. Lindsay J pointed out that Mr Walji was not entitled to await the outcome of his application for a review before lodging an appeal on a point of law against the decision of the Employment Tribunal. The fact that there is a pending review application is not a good ground for delaying an appeal against the substantive decision. Lindsay J went on to say that no sufficient ground had been established for taking the exceptional step of granting an extension of time for appealing. He also pointed out, in answer to arguments which had been raised, that the Human Rights Act did not affect the operation of reasonable time limits under English law.
7. Mr Walji has submitted a number of documents to this court in support of his application for permission to appeal. He has submitted that the Registrar failed to consider properly the reasons for the lateness of the appeal arriving in the Employment Appeal Tribunal, and he says that the Registrar was prejudiced and biased against him. He says that his point of view had been disregarded and that his real complaints are now against the Registrar of the Employment Appeal Tribunal and against the Commission for Racial Equality, rather than the Great Ormond Street NHS Trust, which, as he rightly says, was not responsible for the lateness of his appeal. He says that the denial of the extension has violated his right of appeal and the case was not fairly handled by the Employment Appeal Tribunal. He complains in particular that a bundle of documents was imposed upon him. He has been victimised by them. He says that his complaints involve a number of different people who have been conspiring to victimise him. He also refers to the provisions of the Human Rights Act and makes a complaint that the Commission for Racial Equality had not properly drawn them to his attention.
8. I have taken into account all these letters and also the points made by Mr Walji in the correspondence included in the appeal bundle. In my judgment permission to appeal cannot be granted in this case. Mr Walji is attempting to appeal against the exercise of a discretion. There was a discretion in the Employment Appeal Tribunal to extend the time for appealing, but it is an exceptional step to take and it will only be taken if there is a satisfactory explanation of the reason for the delay in the appeal. In order to appeal against a discretion, it is necessary for the applicant to establish that there was an error of legal principle in the exercise of the discretion or a failure to appreciate the relevant facts and to disregard irrelevant facts. In my view, Mr Walji cannot show in this case that the exercise of the discretion was plainly wrong and therefore his appeal has no real prospect of success. That is clear from reading the decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal and the correspondence.
9. The decision refusing an extension of time was taken in accordance with well established principles. For those reasons I would refuse this application.
(Application refused; no order for costs).