England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Application of Appellant for permission to appeal

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Monday 9th July 2001

Monday 9th July 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE HENRY: Mr Graham was on the Management Committee of the Plumstead Law Centre. He complains that he was expelled from that Committee and he brings proceedings stating that he was racially discriminated against. That involves the provisions of the Race Relations Act 1976, Part 2 of that Act relating to discrimination in the employment field. That is the relevant discrimination of which he complains.
2. The Employment Appeal Tribunal rejected that claim on grounds of jurisdiction on the basis that there was no contract of service between the members of the committee and another party, nor between the Law Centre and another party. Accordingly, first the Employment Tribunal by the judgment of His Honour Judge And then the Employment Appeal Tribunal said that they had no jurisdiction Levy.
3. This a pure question of law. The work of the Management Committee members is entirely voluntary. They are not remunerated for that work. However, they do receive reimbursements of their expenses. The Law Centre is a company limited by guarantee. It does employ people, but members of the Management Committee are not employed in the technical sense, in that they are volunteers and they can choose when they work. They do not have contracts of service, but are there on a voluntary basis. For instance they could take holidays or whatever whenever they wanted to. The question is whether in those circumstances there is a complaint of racial discrimination under this Act to the Employment Tribunal.
4. Mr Graham says – and there is no reason to doubt him – that he has had personal experience of three applications to an employment tribunal where, in circumstances which this Court is not informed because it is not relevant to the proceedings today, he got the impression that you could be 'employed' within the meaning of the Race Relations Act 1976 even if you are not formally the subject of a contract of service which is a normal requisite of employment.
5. This is a pure matter of law. The general interpretation proceedings in the Race Relations Act 1976 defines 'employment' as follows:

"'Employment' means employment under a contract of service or of apprenticeship or a contract personally to execute any work or labour and related expressions shall be construed accordingly."

6. That has been examined in the case of Daley v Allied Suppliers [1983] ICR 90, where it was held that a person working for a company as a trainee under a work experience scheme arranged by the Manpower Service Commission under their Youth Opportunities Programme was held not to be employed within the meaning of the section because he was not employed nor contractually bound to work for the company. That is exactly the same principle as applies here in this case. 'Employment' means employed under a contract of service, and it does not cover the case of voluntary workers who may perform or cease to perform as they wish. Members of the Management Committee therefore are not employees of the Law Centre. In those circumstances the protection that the Employment Tribunal gives to those who complain of discrimination in the employment field does not cover them because they are not employed within the meaning of the Act.
ORDER: Application for PTA dismissed.