England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM SWANSEA COUNTY COURT
(JUDGE HICKINBOTTOM)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Tuesday, 3rd July 2001

Tuesday, 3rd July 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE JUDGE: I have to be circumspect in the way I explain both the simple issue in this case and the more difficult one. The more difficult issue is that Mrs. Harrison-Lowe, who has come to court today in support of her application for permission to appeal against a ruling given against her by Judge Hickinbottom on 13th February of this year has a very powerful sense, and has explained why she feels ,that for many years now she has been, to use her own words, victimised, threatened non-stop in the most serious way or (more moderately perhaps) plagued. The result has been not only to upset her personally but to terrify her because of the possible consequences for her son Adam.
2. As I explained in the course of Mrs. Harrison-Lowe telling me about all these problems, I understand her concerns. I have asked her what steps she has taken to see how to bring, if she is half right, this profoundly unpleasant life to an end. All that said, I cannot act as some sort of magician, all powerful and able somehow with the wave of the wand of litigation to bring all this sadness and unpleasantness to an end. I recognise her distress, I acknowledge it and I have to explain that I can do nothing about it.
3. What I have to consider is whether or not permission should be given to appeal Judge Hickinbottom's ruling, which arose in these circumstances.
4. The appellant was arrested for theft and criminal damage on 18th January 1995. No proceedings were ever taken against her. Indeed it is right to emphasise that she tells me that she was never charged with an offence. She brought proceedings against the local constabulary for wrongful arrest and false imprisonment. The action was heard before Judge Hickinbottom and a jury, sitting at Swansea County Court. During the trial the judge withdrew the case from the jury on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to leave the matter to them for their consideration. The application for permission to appeal proceeds on the basis that, if granted and if the appeal were successful, then there should be an order for a fresh trial before another jury, and inevitably, a different judge.
5. The essential facts, if one strips the case of the very long and bitter background, can be summarised in this way. First, there is absolutely no dispute that on the day in question Mrs. Harrison-Lowe physically moved six to eight dressed flint stones from the rockery of her neighbour. Her case (and it was her case at trial) was that she was simply recovering or reclaiming the stones which had been taken from her garden a couple of days earlier. The case advanced on behalf of the police officers who arrested her was that she had been seen taking the stones by two people. Those people were obviously neighbours. One of them was Mr. Hodson, from whose rockery she had removed the stones, and the other was a Mr. James.
6. The telephone call to the police station was made by Mr. Hodson. He spoke to a police officer, P.C. McDonald, and made the complaint, claiming that the stones were his and that Mrs. Harrison-Lowe had removed them. The precise identity of the officers who attended was a matter of dispute, but one of those who did come to the scene was P.C. McDonald. He visited Mr. Hodson and, according to his evidence, Mr. Hodson repeated the complaint. Mr. McDonald then visited Mr. James, who confirmed that he had seen Mrs. Harrison-Lowe taking the stones. Of course, as she admits that she had taken the stones, we now know that was not of great importance; but at that time there were two members of the public saying that what they asserted was a crime had been witnessed.
7. The officer then visited another set of neighbours called the Leatherans. The evidence was that he was told by Mrs. Leatheran that the stones had originally belonged to her and that she had given them to Mr. Hodson; in other words, not to Mrs. Harrison-Lowe. With that information, the officer knocked on the door at the home address of Mrs. Harrison-Lowe. She answered and there was a conversation. It was common ground before the judge that she asked whether they had come to arrest her neighbours, and the officer said that they had not, they were arresting her. She was duly arrested and she explained to the judge that she well understood that she was being arrested in relation to the removal of those stones from her neighbour's rockery.
8. Mrs. Harrison-Lowe was taken to the police station. Her son went with her. That was a matter of considerable concern and distress to her, because he was at that time rather too young to be left alone. She was sufficiently concerned (although this does not matter to the issue I have to decide, but it gives a flavour of her concerns) that she would not give her name and address until her son was properly cared for and a social worker arrived to take on the responsibilities.
9. Mrs. Harrison-Lowe was then interviewed. According to what she has told me, she gave the story that she was to give to the judge, namely that the stones were hers all along. In due course she was released on bail. According to the judge's judgment (and this may be only a matter of recollection) she was in fact charged, but the fact was, that after the Crown Prosecution Service considered the case, no prosecution was proceeded with.
10. The question for the judge in this civil action was whether the constable was justified in arresting Mrs. Harrison-Lowe in accordance with the statutory powers given by section 24(6) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, under which a constable may arrest without a warrant any person whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be guilty of an offence. It was common ground at the hearing that the theft alleged against Mrs. Harrison-Lowe constituted an arrestable offence.
11. As I have explained to Mrs. Harrison-Lowe in the course of the argument before me (and I did so in what I hope she will not regard as a patronising manner, but in ordinary layman's language) was that on the face of it the police officer was entitled to rely on the evidence of three separate people, two of whom said they saw the stones being removed, one of whom was the person from whose garden they were removed and who was claiming that they had indeed been taken from his garden, and then a third person who said that she had given the stones in question, not to Mrs. Harrison-Lowe but to the complainant, Mr. Hodson. In those circumstances, the judge concluded that the case really could not go any further forward. The way in which he put it in his judgment was this:

"There is no doubt in my mind that, on the basis of the relevant evidence before me, the Defendant has discharged the burden of proof on him on this issue, that the police officer did have reasonable grounds for suspecting that Mrs. Harrison-Lowe had committed the offence of criminal damage and/or theft on the basis of the information available to him at that time."

12. He then went on to explain that Mrs. Harrison-Lowe had not been prosecuted and he concluded this part of his judgment by saying:

"...even if P.C. McDonald's suspicion proved wrong and Mrs. Harrison-Lowe had not in fact committed any offence, on the basis of the information available to him at the time of the arrest he cannot be blamed for that and the arrest would still be a proper and lawful arrest."

13. Accordingly the case was withdrawn from the jury.
14. Mrs. Harrison-Lowe believes and plainly believes quite genuinely that this decision was flawed. She has explained the whole of the background to me. She has identified her profound concerns. But when all is said and done I have to decide this case on the basis of the law as I find it.
15. I do not think there is any realistic prospect of a successful appeal. The matters about which Mrs. Harrison-Low has expressed her great concern -- victimisation and the like -- are matters of great concern to me, having heard her. But I do not think they provide any justifiable basis for allowing her to go on to a full hearing which I am afraid she would inevitably lose.
16. In those circumstances I must refuse the application for permission.
ORDER: Application refused.