England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM SHEFFIELD COUNTY COURT
(His Honour Judge Bowers)

		CCRTF 00/0072/B2 Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Tuesday, 4th April 2000

1. LORD JUSTICE HENRY: The appellant, Mrs Minchin, challenges the finding of the Sheffield City Council that she became intentionally homeless when she lost private rented accommodation, a six month shorthold assured tenancy, because of having to serve a prison sentence. She challenged that finding unsuccessfully to the county court where her appeal was dismissed by His Honour Judge Bowers, and now appeals to us with permission of the single Lord Justice.
2. The sequence of events was this. Between 1995 and 19th March 1997 she committed in all some five offences, two of theft and three of handling. At the time when she committed those offences she was living next door to her daughter, who has seven children, in council accommodation in a road called Brinsfield Drive in Sheffield. There, the neighbours had apparently complained about the conduct of her and her family, and the Sheffield Council obtained possession orders against both her and her daughter on the grounds of nuisance. Their criminal offences formed no part of that decision.
3. Having lost that Brinsfield Drive accommodation, she then stayed with friends and family until 23rd February 1998 when, with help from the social services, she and her daughter found the accommodation that she was found to be intentionally homeless from, namely in two houses next door to each other in Pye Bank Road, where she and her daughter and the seven children then lived. She said that three of the children lived mainly with her at that stage but they were not there for long, for about just over three weeks after they had moved in, on 19th March 1998, she and her daughter appeared for sentence in the Crown Court in relation to their criminal activities from 1995 to 1997. Each was sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment, to serve seven and a half. She was told, so she says in her witness statement, by the probation service that housing benefit would not be paid to her landlord for that length of time. She had no other funds and consequently the tenancy was lost to her. The same thing happened with her daughter but the children's fathers and relatives looked after them. That was the background against which the Sheffield City Council, by letter dated 8th April 1999, wrote as follows:

"Re: Application under 1996 Housing Act Part V11

Having considered all the relevant facts in your case, this Authority considers that you are homeless, eligible for assistance and in priority need under the above Act. However, it is also our opinion that you became homeless intentionally. This being the case, this Authority does not have a duty to provide you with temporary or permanent accommodation under the above Act.

The reason for the above decision is that you lost your private rented accommodation, due to having to serve a prison sentence."

4. The letter informed her she was entitled to a review and she set in motion proceedings for that review. That failed. She then appealed to the county court, as I have summarised.
5. All turns on the construction of section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996. That reads as follows:

"A person becomes homeless intentionally if he deliberately does or fails to do anything in consequence of which he ceases to occupy accommodation which is available for his occupation and which it would have been reasonable for him to continue to occupy."

6. Miss Krause for the appellant realistically acknowledges that, if that section is literally construed, the appellant was intentionally homeless. The "deliberate" actions relied on by the Council were the criminal offences. The "consequence" of those criminal offences was that she was sent to prison. As a result of being sent to prison and no rent being paid, she ceased to occupy the premises in Pye Bank Road, which it would have been reasonable for her to continue to occupy. That is the train of reasoning following the scheme set out in the subsection. But, Miss Krause submits, the section should be read so as to require that the property lost by the conduct complained of, the criminal offences, was the property actually occupied by the appellant at the time of committing the offences. Therefore, submits Miss Krause, as the appellant was living in Brinsfield Drive at the time she committed the offences, she could only become intentionally homeless if she ceased to occupy that property as a consequence of her criminal activity.
7. This situation would not be that unusual, as it potentially would occur whenever the direct consequence (losing a secure tenancy) of an act is, by the nature of things, delayed, as it would always be if the "act done" led directly to court proceedings resulting in loss of accommodation. Miss Krause concedes that the appellant would have been rightly found to be intentionally homeless if she had been occupying Brinsfield Drive at both the time of the commission of the offences and when she lost the property, but she could not be intentionally homeless, as she had moved in the intervening period to Pye Bank Road. But Miss Krause could not suggest why, as a matter of policy and of justice, that should be so. I say that without criticism, because I equally cannot see any good reason for so construing the section, even if the language were ambiguous, which, in my judgment, it is not. Accordingly, I would reject her primary ground of appeal and dismiss the appeal.
8. She did, however, tentatively advance what she described as a satellite submission based on section 191(2) of the Act, which I will read:

"For the purposes of subsection (1) (which I have read) an act or omission in good faith on the part of a person who was unaware of any relevant fact shall not be treated as deliberate."

9. She tentatively advanced this submission but wisely retreated from it when it became clear that, for that subsection to apply, it would involve the court finding that the appellant's criminal activity was first "done in good faith" and was "not to be treated as deliberate" because she was, while awaiting trial, so we are told, advised that she would not be sent to prison. When those facts became clear Miss Krause withdrew that submission. Therefore, for those reasons I would dismiss the appeal.
10. LORD JUSTICE ALDOUS: I agree.
11. LORD JUSTICE SCHIEMANN: I also agree and only add this. The effect of being declared homeless is to give the person concerned priority over others in the housing queue. The purpose of section 191 is to exclude a category of persons from being entitled to this priority. That category comprises those who deliberately engaged in conduct which had the effect of depriving them of the right to occupy premises. The appellant falls neatly within that category.

Order: Appeal dismissed; legal aid taxation.